Mary A. Galindo v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge for the U.S.***
District Court for Northern Texas, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY A. GALINDO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-55242
D.C. No. 2:09-CV-01460-AN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Arthur Nakazato, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 12, 2011**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District
Judge.***
FILED
OCT 17 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Claimant Mary Galindo appeals from the judgment of United States
Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato of the Central District of California, affirming
the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that Claimant was not
disabled and, therefore, was ineligible for Title II disability insurance benefits. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
We review the decision of a district court (or, where, as here, the parties
have consented, the decision of a Magistrate Judge) denying benefits de novo. We
must independently determine whether the Commissioner's decision is (1) free of
legal error and (2) supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d
1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir.
1989)).
The ALJ’s finding that Galindo could perform light work with restrictions
was not erroneous and is supported by substantial evidence. The finding
appropriately accounted for Galindo’s physical and mental conditions. The ALJ
considered work restrictions determined by Galindo’s examining and treating
physicians, and the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding is consistent with
the medical evidence. When the ALJ discredited a medical opinion from a treating
physician or discounted portions of Claimant’s testimony, the ALJ provided

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specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F3d 821, 830
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983)).
AFFIRMED.

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