M.z., by and through her parent Yiling Zhang, and YILING ZHANG, an individual v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
M.Z., by and through her parent Yiling
Zhang, and YILING ZHANG, an
individual,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
LAKE ELSINORE UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-56505
D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01091-VAP-OP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2011**
Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Yiling Zhang as parent of M.Z. and as an individual appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing her action brought under the Individuals with
FILED
JAN 19 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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08-56505 2
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm on any ground supported by
the record. Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s IDEA claims arising from the
May 2007 administrative decision because she did not show that she was an
“aggrieved” party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s claims of discriminatory
denial of special education rights in violation of the ADA and RA because she did
not plead sufficient facts to support her conclusory statement that defendants were
deliberately indifferent. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-39
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that deliberate indifference is the correct standard and
explaining that it “requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected
right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood”). The
district court properly dismissed Zhang’s other claims under the ADA and RA on
various grounds and we are not persuaded by Zhang’s contentions that it would
have been futile for her to exhaust administrative remedies, that her claims against
the officials in their official capacities were not coterminous with those she made

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08-56505 3
against their agencies, that she plead sufficient facts to show retaliation, and that
she alleged ADA and RA claims independent of rights established by the IDEA.
The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s section 1983 claims insofar as
they related to the alleged denial of rights established by the IDEA. See Blanchard
v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We now . . . hold that the
comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress’ intent to
preclude a § 1983 claim for the violation of rights under the IDEA.”). We are not
persuaded by Zhang’s contention that she plead sufficient facts to show a denial of
rights under either the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.
Zhang’s remaining contentions, including those regarding newly-discovered
evidence, alleged bias by the administrative law judge, and whether she was in fact
the prevailing party in the prior administrative determinations, are not persuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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