Enrique Arriaga-Tello; Reina Arriaga; v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

08-74031Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit6 janv. 2011

Texte intégral

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ENRIQUE ARRIAGA-TELLO; REINA
ARRIAGA; et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-74031
Agency Nos. A096-050-035
A096-050-037
A096-050-038
A096-050-036
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 14, 2010**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Enrique Arriaga-Tello, Reina Arriaga and family, natives and citizens of
Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying Arriaga’s
application for cancellation of removal, and the BIA’s order sustaining the
FILED
JAN 06 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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08-74031 2
government’s appeal of an immigration judge’s decision granting Arriaga-Tello’s
application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s continuous physical
presence determination, Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir.
2006), and review de novo questions of law, Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894
(9th Cir. 2003). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Arriaga did
not meet the continuous physical presence requirement where she testified that she
entered the United States in December of 1992, was not in the United States prior
to that time, and her Notice to Appear was served in October of 2002. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A).
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that
Arriaga-Tello failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a
qualifying relative. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.
2005).
Arriaga-Tello’s contention that the BIA violated his due process rights by
reversing the IJ’s decision does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim. See
Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 930 (“traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast

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08-74031 3
as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims
that would invoke our jurisdiction.”).
Contrary to Arriaga-Tello’s contention, the BIA’s interpretation of the
hardship standard falls within the broad range authorized by the statute. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1004-06
(9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in
part.

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