John David Stoner, individually and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Ex. Rel. John David Stoner v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION and EAST SIDE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN DAVID STONER, individually and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Ex.
Rel. John David Stoner,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF
EDUCATION and EAST SIDE UNION
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants,
and
COLLEEN B. WILCOX; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-16768
D.C. No. 5:03-cv-04622-JW
MEMORANDUM*
FILED
OCT 18 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge**
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 8, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: REINHARDT and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, Senior
District Judge.**
California preclusion law applies. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). Although the district court erred in applying federal
preclusion law, our review is de novo, see Far Out Prod., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d
986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001), and we may affirm the judgment below if the record
supports doing so under the proper California standard. It does.
In California, “Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and
decided in prior proceedings. Traditionally, [California courts] have applied the
doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought
to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former
proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former
proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.
Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits.

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Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in
privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” Lucido v. Super. Ct., 795 P.2d
1223, 1225 (Cal. 1990) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
All five conditions are met here. First, the issue under the Federal False
Claims Act is identical to the one decided under the California False Claims Act:
whether the defendants received and kept funds disbursed by the California
government, some of which came from the federal government, “after knowingly
presenting or causing to be presented, making, using, or causing to be made, false
claims, records or statements.” Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729 with Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 12651. Both false claims acts require the same degree of scienter. Compare 31
U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) with Cal. Gov’t Code § 12650(b)(3).
Second and third, the California Court of Appeal actually and necessarily
adjudicated this issue in affirming the dismissal of Stoner’s claims against Fimiani
and Wong for failure to state sufficient facts and in affirming the grant of summary
adjudication to Wilcox on the basis of insufficient evidence. See Hernandez v.
City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2009) (finding an issue actually litigated
where it “was raised, submitted for decision, and actually decided”). The
opportunity to litigate in the Superior Court and on appeal was full and fair.

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Fourth, under California law, sustaining a demurrer for failure to plead
sufficient facts to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits. Kanarek v.
Bugliosi, 108 Cal. App. 3d 327, 334 (1980). Similarly, summary adjudication is a
final judgment on the merits. Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sight-Seeing Cos.
Assoc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629 (1981).
Fifth, Stoner was the sole party to the prior proceeding and is the sole party
to this proceeding, because neither California nor the United States exercised its
right to intervene. Cf. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S.
Ct. 2230, 2235 (2009).
Finally, California courts would not find that the public interest requires
them to disregard the judgment in the prior case. Thus, that interest does not
override the determination we must make after applying the factors considered
above.
AFFIRMED.

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