Michael O. Devaughn v. STANLEY SNIFF, Sheriff of Riverside County

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL O. DEVAUGHN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
STANLEY SNIFF, Sheriff of Riverside
County,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 08-56947
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00258-DSF-SH
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL O. DEVAUGHN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
STANLEY SNIFF, Sheriff of Riverside
County,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 10-55281
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-07972-TJH-SH
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding (No. 08-56947)
Terry J. Hatter, District Judge, Presiding (No. 10-55281)
FILED
OCT 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Argued and Submitted August 31, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
The government represented that DeVaughn’s Riverside trial has begun, and
that the state court has now ruled on his pretrial motions. At oral argument,
DeVaughn’s counsel could not identify any specific motion that is still
outstanding. DeVaughn’s appeal No. 08-56947, to the extent it challenged lack of
ruling on prior motions, is therefore moot. See San Lazaro Ass'n v. Connell, 286
F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). DeVaughn’s appeal is dismissed in part as to his
challenge to delayed ruling on pretrial motions.
To the extent DeVaughn argues that he cannot be forced to stand trial
because the state has failed to follow its own pretrial commitment procedures, the
district court properly abstained. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495
F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2007). The ongoing proceedings involve important
state interests, and DeVaughn may adequately raise the issue through state
appellate procedures. See Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196
F.3d 1011, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 1999). For our court to intervene would interfere
with the state criminal prosecution in a way precluded by Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).

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The district court also properly abstained from intervening in DeVaughn’s
Los Angeles prosecution. See id. Those ongoing proceedings also implicate the
state’s interest in administering its criminal justice system, and DeVaughn can
adequately challenge any pre-trial delays at trial or through state appellate
procedures. See AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1148–49. Ordering the dismissal
of the charges as DeVaughn requests would effectively enjoin the proceedings.
See id. at 1149. He has not shown special circumstances justifying such federal
intervention, as the multiple prosecutions do not demonstrate bad faith or
harassment. See Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980). Because
the district court properly abstained, we need not address whether exhaustion was
required.
The motions for judicial notice are granted. See Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d
854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002). We decline to address the uncertified issues raised in
DeVaughn’s brief, because these uncertified issues are not fairly debatable. See
Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 515 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to General Order 4.5(e), the panel determines that each party shall
bear its own costs. It is so ordered.
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.

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