Charles James Chatman v. RICHARD EARLY, Regional Administrator;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES JAMES CHATMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RICHARD EARLY, Regional
Administrator; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-15683
D.C. No. 3:03-cv-02820-MMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2010**
Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Charles James Chatman, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations in connection with the conditions of his confinement and
FILED
JUL 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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the handling of his mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003), and its grant of summary
judgment, Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Chatman’s claims alleging inadequate
food and denial of basic necessities because Chatman failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies before filing this action. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is
mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chatman’s First
Amendment claims because Chatman failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the correspondence at issue was legal mail. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (stating that legal mail must be “specially
marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if
[it is] to receive special treatment”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chatman’s claims
against defendant Chen, the former Chief Deputy Inspector General for the
California Office of the Inspector General, because Chatman failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chen was legally required to intervene

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after conducting investigations, at Chatman’s request, into the conditions of
Chatman’s confinement. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)
(an official can be liable under section 1983 only “if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is
legally required to do that causes the deprivation” of which plaintiff complains
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chatman’s requests
for judicial notice where the news articles at issue did not contain adjudicative
facts relevant to the parties’ dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (requiring judicially
noticed facts to be “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); United States v.
Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).
Chatman’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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