Paul David Fowler v. ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA and NEVEN

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL DAVID FOWLER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEVADA and NEVEN,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 09-15280
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00691-KJD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2010**
Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Paul David Fowler appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his
jury-trial conviction for first-degree murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
FILED
JUL 13 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-15280 2
§ 2253, and we affirm.
Fowler contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
investigate and present evidence regarding his state of mind at the time of the
killing and the possible culpability of one of the witnesses. This contention fails
because Fowler has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that
he suffered any prejudice from counsel’s alleged errors. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d
1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to present witnesses at trial whose testimony
would have been cumulative was not prejudicial under Strickland).
Fowler also contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to
raise certain claims on direct appeal. This contention lacks merit because Fowler
has not shown his counsel’s failure to raise those claims was objectively
unreasonable, or that the claims had a reasonable probability of success on appeal.
See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
Thus, the state court’s decision rejecting Fowler’s claims was neither
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
AFFIRMED.

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