Jin Soo Park v. Citibank, N.a.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JIN SOO PARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITIBANK, N.A.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-16167
D.C. No. CV-05-00006
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the District Court of Guam
Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2010
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: D. NELSON, FARRIS, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Jin Soo Park (“Park”) appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Citibank, N.A. (“Citibank”) on the ground that all
of Park’s claims were time-barred. Park brought this action against Citibank for
the following state law claims: (1) wrongful dishonor of banking items, in
FILED
FEB 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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“If a person entitled to bring an action . . . be, at the time the cause of1
action accrued . . . Insane . . . the time of such disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.” 7 Guam Code Ann. § 11404
(emphasis added).
Park does not challenge the district court’s calculation of the relevant2
limitation periods.
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violation of 13 Guam Code Ann. § 4202; (2) common law claims for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).
In response to Citibank’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds
Park’s claims were time-barred, Park asserted the statutes of limitations were tolled
under 7 Guam Code Ann. § 11404(2) because he was insane when his causes of1
action accrued.
The district court determined that, with one exception, Park’s claims are
subject to statutory limitations periods of two and three years. The date the last of2
Park causes of action accrued is December 7, 2001, the date of his last dishonored
or delayed transfer request. Thus, under even the longest (i.e., three year) statute
of limitations, Park’s right to bring suit terminated on December 7, 2004, more
than a month before he filed his action. Park’s claims for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing are subject to a four-year limitation period. Three of

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Park also does not challenge the district court’s determination his claims3
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to his transfer requests
in July and December of 2001 are barred by the one-year contractual limitation on
claims.
Park also does not challenge the district court’s determination of when4
each of Park’s causes accrued.
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Park’s transfer requests occurred less than four years before Park filed his action:
the requests on July 20, 2001 and December 6 and 7, 2001. Although not barred
by the statute of limitations, these requests are subject to the Fund Transfer
Agreement’s one-year limitation on bringing claims related to a transfer.
Accordingly, Park’s time to bring his breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claims as to the three later transfer requests expired on December 7, 2002.3
The district court determined that Park’s causes of action accrued as
follows: A separate cause of action for wrongful dishonor accrued on the dates of4
Park’s sixteen transfer requests and four alleged check requests. Those dates are:
October 2, 1998, November 16, 1998, January 20, 1999, February 10, 1999, May
24, 1999, July 14, 1999, September 12, 1999, December 25, 1999, January 15,
2000, February 15, 2000, April 13, 2000, August 14, 2000, September 4, 2000,
July 20, 2001, July 30, 2001, August 1, 2001, August 3 and 4, 2001, and December
6 and 7, 2001. The district court found that Park’s claims for tortious and
contractual breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent and

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negligent misrepresentation, and NIED accrued no later than July 26, 2001, the
date Park was declared bankrupt. Under 7 Guam Code § 11404(2), Park needed to
create a triable issue of fact as to whether he was insane on the date his claims
accrued to support tolling of the statute of limitations.
There is no expert or other medical evidence regarding Park’s claim of
insanity. None of Park’s lay testimony shows he was suffering “a severe mental
impairment that effects [sic] his or her ability to comprehend rights or acts that he
would otherwise understand.” Custodio vs. Boonprakong, 1999 Guam 5 (Guam
Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1999). Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to Citibank due to Park's failure to file his complaint within the
limitations periods.
AFFIRMED.

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