Rafaela Gonzalez-Rios v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Barbara Lynn, U.S. District Judge for the Northern**
District of Texas, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAELA GONZALEZ-RIOS,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 05-76935
Agency No. A023-055-742
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2009
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District**
Judge.
Rafaela Gonzalez-Rios is a native and citizen of Mexico who petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying her
FILED
JAN 07 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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application for a waiver of her deportability as an aggravated felon. See INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001) (citing the former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). The record
reflects she was never granted lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status, but she
contends the government should be estopped from denying that she has LPR status
for purposes of determining eligibility for the waiver. We have jurisdiction to
review the estoppel issues. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding REAL ID Act restored jurisdiction over mixed questions of law and
fact).
On the merits, however, Gonzalez-Rios’ estoppel arguments fail. She was
aware at all times that the government had never granted her applications for
adjustment of status and that she had failed to post the bond the government
requested in 1989 in order to process her application; traditional equitable estoppel
requirements are therefore not met. See Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158,
1165-67 (9th Cir. 2005). She also cannot establish the affirmative misconduct
required to estop the government. Delay alone is not sufficient, INS v. Miranda,
459 U.S. 14, 18 (1982); Jaa v. INS, 779 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1986), and she
offers nothing more.

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The contention that her parents’ status should be imputed to her was never
presented to the BIA and is therefore unexhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2003).
The petition for review is DENIED.

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