Joseph Lee Bell, Jr. v. LAURA GRAMLING PEREZ and KELLI MURPHY

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 25, 2015*
Decided August 25, 2015
Before
RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐1815
JOSEPH LEE BELL, JR.,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
LAURA GRAMLING PEREZ and
KELLI MURPHY,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 15‐cv‐268‐pp
Pamela Pepper,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Bell, a Wisconsin resident, appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which
vaguely asserts irregularities in connection with a state court’s denial of a DNA blood
test to establish paternity. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject‐matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
* The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not
participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we
have concluded that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. A PP.
P. 34(a)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐1815 Page 2
As set forth in his complaint, Bell believes that he is the father of a daughter
whom, for unexplained reasons, the two defendants collaborated to put up for adoption.
Bell twice filed a request for DNA testing in Wisconsin state court. The state court’s
decision to deny both requests, Bell says, violated his equal‐protection and due‐process
rights.
The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and
dismissed it because Bell had not alleged a basis for either diversity or federal‐question
jurisdiction. Bell, the court added, “clear[ly and] . . . strongly disagrees with something
that happened to him in Milwaukee County Circuit Court” and should seek relief in
Wisconsin state courts.
On appeal Bell maintains that he is entitled to a DNA test to prove paternity as
well as visitation rights to see his daughter. But he fails to develop this argument,
see FED. R. A PP. P. 28(a)(8), let alone explain why his requests are not barred by the
Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, which strips lower federal courts of jurisdiction to review
state‐court civil judgments, see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87
(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). Bell seems to be unhappy with
the state court’s denial of his requests for DNA testing, but challenges to state‐court child
custody and visitation decisions are barred by Rooker‐Feldman. See, e.g, Struck v. Cook
Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2007); T.Q. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898
(7th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.

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