Texte intégral
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 18, 2014
Decided August 13, 2015
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐1265
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JESUS MIRANDA‐CAMARENA,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 12 CR 755‐28
Ronald A. Guzmán,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jesus Miranda‐Camarena appealed his 34‐month, within‐guidelines sentence for
drug trafficking as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. While the appeal was
pending, he completed his term of imprisonment and was removed to Mexico. His
lawyer and the government now contend that this appeal is moot, and we agree.
Miranda‐Camarena pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute cocaine
as part of a large cocaine‐trafficking organization in Chicago. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The district court rejected Miranda‐Camarena’s request for a below‐guidelines sentence,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
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No. 14‐1265 Page 2
observing that his drug sales had contributed to the “misery” in neighborhoods affected
by drug trafficking.
Miranda‐Camarena appealed, challenging the length of his sentence and arguing
that the district court did not consider any of his mitigating arguments. After we heard
oral argument in this appeal, the Bureau of Prisons released Miranda‐Camarena, and his
lawyer notified us that he had been removed to Mexico. Counsel for Miranda‐Camarena
and the government now assert that this appeal is moot, and we agree that the appeal
must be dismissed. Because Miranda‐Camarena has completed his prison term and been
removed to Mexico, we cannot grant him any effective relief. See Calderon v. Moore, 518
U.S. 149, 150 (1996); United States v. Ramer, 787 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). Having
served his sentence, he cannot show any “concrete and continuing injury other than the
now‐ended incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction” to
maintain jurisdiction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see Eichwedel v. Curry, 700
F.3d 275, 278–79 (7th Cir. 2012). Although the length of his sentence could potentially be
used to increase a sentence in a future criminal proceeding in the United States, that
possibility is insufficient to overcome mootness, see Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15, and in any
event, Miranda‐Camarena has not made that argument.
The appeal is DISMISSED.
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