Judith Marie Paulick v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 18, 2015*
Decided June 24, 2015
Before
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
Nos. 14‐3106 & 14‐3524
JUDITH MARIE PAULICK,
Petitioner‐Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent‐Appellee.
Appeals from the United States Tax Court.
Nos. 3020‐12 & 29394‐12
Mary Ann Cohen,
Judge.
O R D E R
Judith Paulick appeals from two decisions of the Tax Court establishing income
tax deficiencies for tax years 2004 through 2010. Paulick stipulated to the entry of those
decisions, and for that reason her appeals are without merit.
Paulick is licensed to practice law in Wisconsin and has represented clients in
disputes with the IRS. In the cases now before us Paulick received two notices of
* After examining the briefs and records, we have concluded that oral argument
is unnecessary. Thus these appeals are submitted on the briefs and records. See FED. R.
A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 14‐3106 & 14‐3524 Page 2
deficiency for her own tax liability (one for tax year 2004 and the other for 2005 through
2010). Paulick retained counsel and, for each notice, filed a petition in the Tax Court
seeking a redetermination of the deficiency. Paulick’s lawyer and IRS counsel negotiated
comprehensive pretrial stipulations, see T AX C T . R. 91, and based on those stipulations
the parties agreed on the amount owed by Paulick. Her lawyer, and Paulick personally,
then consented to the entry of the first stipulated decision on her petition for tax year
2004. Shortly afterward, Paulick fired her attorney, and without counsel she consented to
the second stipulated decision on her petition for tax years 2005 through 2010. The two
decisions entered by the Tax Court make Paulick liable for additional tax of $290,370 and
penalties of $123,595 (in total about half of what the IRS originally had sought). After
personally approving the stipulated decisions, though, Paulick filed a notice of appeal
from each decision.
For the first time on appeal Paulick asserts that she didn’t validly consent to entry
of the stipulated decisions and shouldn’t be bound by them. She principally contends
that her attorney pressured her to sign the underlying pretrial stipulations by
“threatening” that the IRS would seek a higher fraud penalty if she did not immediately
agree to those stipulations. And since the pretrial stipulations were signed “under
duress,” says Paulick, the Tax Court’s decisions incorporating those stipulations should
be vacated.
But a litigant who consented to the entry of a decision cannot challenge that
decision on appeal unless the right to do so was reserved explicitly when consent was
given. See Downey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 266 F.3d 675, 682–83 (7th Cir. 2001); Ass’n
of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); White v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 776 F.2d 976, 977 (11th Cir. 1985); Tapper v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
766 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1985). Paulick did not reserve the right to appeal, and thus to
evade the resulting waiver she would have to establish that the Tax Court lacked
subject‐matter jurisdiction to enter the stipulated decisions or that she did not actually
consent. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 376 F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1967); Nat’l Res. Def.
Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Tapper, 766 F.2d at 403; White, 776
F.2d at 977. Paulick does not contest the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to decide her case, and
instead asserts that her consents to the stipulated decisions are invalid because of her
attorney’s “threats” and “misrepresentations.”
The problem with this contention, however, is that Paulick raises it for the first
time on appeal. Her accusations against her lawyer have no support in the record, and,
in fact, Paulick consented to entry of the second stipulated decision, which accounts for

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Nos. 14‐3106 & 14‐3524 Page 3
more than 90% of what she owes the IRS, after she had fired counsel. Moreover,
although Paulick could have addressed her concerns to the Tax Court through
postjudgment motions, see T AX CT . R. 162, she failed to do so. Paulick gives no plausible
explanation for that omission, and as noted by the appellee, we do not take new
evidence or decide disputed facts. See Martin Marietta Corp., 376 F.2d at 434 n.7 (noting
difficulty of reviewing request to modify consent order since issue was uncontested
during agency proceedings); Stewart v. Lincoln‐Douglas Hotel Corp., 208 F.2d 379, 382 (7th
Cir. 1953) (explaining that appeal cannot lie where record showed judgment was entered
at plaintiff’s consent and “an application for a resettlement of the decree” was not made
in the district court); Gatto v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 1 F.3d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1993)
(noting unwillingness to entertain allegation that consent was invalid since assertion
was first raised on appeal and there were “no factual findings regarding its veracity”).
Accordingly, the judgments of the Tax Court are AFFIRMED.

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