No. 14-­--2579 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Anthony Adams

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
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No. 14-­‐‑2579
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY ADAMS,
Defendant-­‐‑Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 11 CR 779-­‐‑5 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
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ARGUED JUNE 5, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 12, 2015
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Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. As part of a plea bargain,
Anthony Adams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit
armed robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C.
§1951(a), and to possessing a firearm during and in relation
to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A). Sentenced to
87 months’ imprisonment, he asks us to set aside his plea
and remand for a trial. His argument rests on Rosemond v.

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United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), which was decided after
he entered the plea (though before he was sentenced).
Rosemond holds that a person cannot be convicted of aid-­‐‑
ing and abetting a violation of §924(c) unless he has enough
time to drop out of joint criminal activity after learning that
a confederate is armed. We stated in United States v. Newman,
755 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2014), that the rules of accountabil-­‐‑
ity for aiding and abetting track those of conspiracy law un-­‐‑
der Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Adams
puts Newman together with Rosemond and concludes that
there are new, and more stringent, rules for co-­‐‑conspirator
liability. But that’s not what either Rosemond or Newman
held; instead Rosemond adapted the rules of aiding-­‐‑and-­‐‑
abetting liability to make them more like the Pinkerton ap-­‐‑
proach to conspiracy.
The indictment charged Adams with conspiring to rob a
drug stash house. Thieves think them good targets because
they may hold large supplies of drugs and cash, and victims
cannot report the offense to the police. But Adams was
caught in a sting, proposed by an informant working with
federal agents. Adams was eager to participate and did not
raise an entrapment defense. Cf. United States v. Mayfield, 771
F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Now, however, he rues the
guilty plea and contends that he cannot be held accountable
for three firearms that were in a van when he was arrested.
The plea agreement sets out the factual basis for the con-­‐‑
victions. Adams signed this agreement and adopted its con-­‐‑
tents in open court. According to the narration, a conspirator
(not the informant) took a toolbox from one van and moved
it to another as part of the group’s preparation for the theft.
The toolbox was opened after the arrest and found to con-­‐‑

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No. 14-­‐‑2579 3
tain three firearms. Adams maintains that he was not the
person who moved the toolbox and did not know what it
contained. But he did acknowledge, as part of the factual ba-­‐‑
sis for the §1951(a) conviction, that he and the other con-­‐‑
spirators “agreed to rob a purported stash house of at least
50 kilograms of cocaine, using firearms.” Being armed thus
was part of the agreement. With respect to the §924(c) con-­‐‑
viction, Adams acknowledged that he “knowingly possessed
a firearm” and that he had agreed with five other persons
“to rob a purported stash house of at least 50 kilograms of
cocaine, and to use firearms in furtherance of the robbery.”
Finally, Adams acknowledged that “in furtherance of and as
a foreseeable consequence of that agreement, a toolbox con-­‐‑
taining” firearms was placed in the van.
These acknowledgments suffice to hold Adams account-­‐‑
able for the firearms, no matter who put the toolbox in the
van and whether or not Adams knew what was in it. He
conceded that the presence of firearms was a “foreseeable
consequence” of his agreement to rob a stash house “using
firearms.” Using weapons was part of the plan. Pinkerton
makes one conspirator liable for the foreseeable acts of oth-­‐‑
ers within the scope of the agreement. The provision of
weapons was part of the plan, and thus within the conspira-­‐‑
cy’s scope, and what’s part of a plan is foreseeable to the
planners. Adams never attempted to withdraw from the
conspiracy, so he is accountable for his confederates’ fore-­‐‑
seeable acts.
Nothing in Rosemond alters this assessment. The Court
dealt with a situation in which one criminal participant un-­‐‑
expectedly produced a gun, and Rosemond was arrested be-­‐‑
fore he had an opportunity either to assist or to walk away.

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The Court held that “a defendant may be convicted of abet-­‐‑
ting a §924(c) violation only if his intent reaches beyond a
simple drug sale, to an armed one.” 134 S. Ct. at 1248. And
whether the defendant had the necessary intent, the Court
concluded, depended in part on whether he anticipated his
colleague’s possession of a gun. If he did, then he was cul-­‐‑
pable; if he did not, then it mattered whether he had a
chance to stop assisting the criminal venture (i.e., to walk
away) after learning that someone else was packing.
Adams admitted planning that one or more of the con-­‐‑
spirators would be armed. His intent thus “reache[d] beyond
a simple drug [theft], to an armed one.” If this had been a
prosecution for aiding and abetting, there would not have
been a problem under Rosemond. No more is there a problem
when the charge is conspiracy. It does not matter under
Rosemond, Pinkerton, or Newman, whether Adams knew how
many guns would be used, who would supply them, and
whether they would come in a toolbox, a holster, a car’s se-­‐‑
cret compartment, or a picnic basket; it is enough if the crim-­‐‑
inal agreement entailed use of a firearm. Adams is not enti-­‐‑
tled to withdraw his plea.
AFFIRMED

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