In re: Vikram Buddhi.

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-3802
IN RE:
VIKRAM BUDDHI.
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:10-cv-126—James T. Moody, Judge.
SUBMITTED JULY 11, 2011—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2011
Before POSNER, MANION and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. Vikram Buddhi, a criminal
defendant who has appealed the district court’s denial of
his motion to reconsider his sentence, now asks us to
command that court to rescind its order requiring
that money in Buddhi’s prison trust account be applied
to his district court filing fee and to a special assess-
ment against him that was imposed as part of his sen-
tence. 18 U.S.C. § 3013. The judge allowed Buddhi to
proceed in forma pauperis in the district court. But
when after losing there Buddhi asked for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, the judge

-- 1 of 4 --

2 No. 10-3802
discovered that although $1501.83 had been deposited
in Buddhi’s prison trust account in the preceding six
months, he had made no payments toward his district
court filing fee, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The judge ordered him to pay $300.67 toward the filing
fee and directed the warden to deduct from his prison
trust account the outstanding balance on the $1100
special assessment; the balance was $1067.00. The two
payment orders left Buddhi with no money to pay the
filing fee for this appeal; hence this petition for mandamus.
Buddhi argues that authority to collect unpaid fines
and fees resides with the Attorney General, not the
courts, and that the Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program of the Bureau of Prisons (which is part of the
Justice Department) allows inmates to pay special assess-
ments in installments. He also argues that the district
judge erred in including the filing fees with the assess-
ment because civil filing fees are not “payments
required under the sentence” within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(3). That’s true, but the judge made
separate orders, and the order directing payment of the
unpaid filing fee from Buddhi’s prison trust account
was entirely proper. Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 776
(7th Cir. 1998).
But not the order that the warden deduct money from
the account to pay the special assessment. It’s true that
18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3) provides that “the court may, on
its own motion or the motion of any party, adjust the
payment schedule, or require immediate payment in
full, as the interests of justice require,” and that special

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 10-3802 3
assessments “shall be collected in the manner that fines
are collected in criminal cases.” § 3013(b). But the
district court had already, in its judgment in Buddhi's
criminal case, ordered immediate payment of the spe-
cial assessment. United States v. Buddhi, 06-cr-063 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 11, 2009). It was because he couldn’t pay it im-
mediately that he had enrolled in the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program. A form submitted with his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis disclosed that he
was earning $16.40 a month in his prison job and was
required by his payment plan under the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program to contribute $25 per quarter
toward payment of the unpaid balance of the special
assessment. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(1).
The Attorney General rather than the courts “shall
be responsible for collection of an unpaid fine or restitu-
tion” imposed by a judgment, 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c), and
he has delegated his authority to the Bureau of
Prisons, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(1), which created the Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program to facilitate collection.
This delegation is proper, United States v. Ellis, 522 F.3d
737, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2008); Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d
709, 712 (8th Cir. 2002); Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162
F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), and the “courts
are not authorized to override the Bureau’s discretion
about such matters, any more than a judge could dictate
particulars about a prisoner’s meal schedule or recrea-
tion (all constitutional problems to the side).” United
States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
United States v. Lampien, 89 F.3d 1316, 1320 (7th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Boal, 534 F.3d 965, 966 n.1

-- 3 of 4 --

4 No. 10-3802
(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271, 1281-
82 (6th Cir. 1996).
Recall that Buddhi’s payment plan required him to pay
only $25 a quarter toward his special assessment. The
criminal judgment against him had been entered in
December 2009 and the district court’s order was issued
14 months later. Fourteen months is 4.67 quarters. So in
ordering the warden to deduct $1067.00 from Buddhi’s
account, the district court overrode the payment plan,
under which he owed only $116.75 (4.67 x $25). By
doing this, the district court exceeded its authority. The
Bureau of Prisons could have enlarged or accelerated
Buddhi’s payment obligation, see McGhee v. Clark, 166
F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1999), but had not done so, and
the court could not do so.
No matter. Buddhi’s appeal is being summarily
affirmed in a separate order issued today, so his inability
to pay the filing fee is moot. His complaint about the
depletion of his prison trust account focuses on the
impart of that depletion on his ability to prosecute his
appeal rather than on other uses to which he might put
the money in the account. The district court’s order to
the warden did exceed the court’s authority and the
district judge should rescind it, but the petition for man-
damus is
DENIED.
9-9-11

-- 4 of 4 --