Carol Everett v. Cook County

Circuit Judge Evans died on August 10, 2011, and did not å
participate in the decision of this case, which is being
resolved by a quorum of the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-1975
CAROL EVERETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COOK COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 07 C 5440—Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
ARGUED JUNE 6, 2011—DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2011
Before KANNE, EVANS , and SYKES, Circuit Judges.å
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Dr. Carol Everett sued Cook
County, alleging that the County’s decision to lay her
off (and retain another employee instead) was predicated
on her Caucasian ethnicity, in violation of Title VII of the

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2 No. 10-1975
Civil Rights Act, and her apolitical status, in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Shakman decree. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Cook
County, finding that Everett failed to point to evidence
that tended to show any discriminatory animus by the
County. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Everett began working as a dentist at Cook County’s
Cermak Health Services in 1982. Cermak is a health care
facility dedicated to providing medical and dental treat-
ment to the thousands of detainees housed at the Cook
County Jail. During her extended tenure at Cermak,
Everett worked at dental clinics set up throughout the
jail, where she supplied both emergent and preventative
dental care to the inmate population.
By late 2006, Cook County was in the throes of a budget
crisis. The County had a budget shortfall of 500 million
dollars, and Cook County President Todd Stroger deter-
mined that 100 million dollars of that shortfall had to
be cut from the County’s health care budget. In Decem-
ber 2006, Stroger directed Dr. Robert Simon, the Interim
Bureau Chief of Cook County’s Bureau of Health, to
submit recommendations for health care budget cuts.
Stroger gave Simon until February 2007 to find ways to
cure the health care budget’s woes.
Faced with a time crunch, Simon quickly formed a team
to assess all of Cook County’s health care programs and
recommend ways to trim those programs’ budgets. One

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No. 10-1975 3
member of that team was Dr. Eileen Couture, a physician
at Cermak. Couture was to review the budget at Cermak
and draft a report recommending cuts, including staff
reductions.
The dental budget at Cermak was one of Couture’s
many problems. She soon discovered that the dental care
requirements for jails were minimal and that Cermak
could still provide sufficient care with only one dentist.
She told Simon of her discovery, and he agreed that
Cermak could survive with a single dentist. That left
Couture with the unenviable task of picking the one
dentist to remain at Cermak following the layoff.
Couture had five dentists to choose from: Dr. Allen
Knox, Dr. Jack Liu, Dr. Shandra Bundy-Smith, Dr. Ronald
Townsend, and Everett. Knox was the dental administra-
tor, while the other doctors were staff dentists. Because
the entire dental program was going to be dismantled
and reduced to one dentist and two assistants pro-
viding emergent care only, Couture determined that
the remaining dentist had to have some indicia of man-
agement experience, as well as a history of flexibility,
productivity, emergent clinical skill, and responsiveness
to other physicians’ needs.
Based on this criteria, Couture concluded that Townsend
was the most qualified to take over the program at
Cermak. Couture noted that Townsend appeared to have
prior administrative experience, as he often served as the
acting director of Cermak’s dental unit when Knox was
away on vacation. Couture also knew, by virtue of her
work in Cermak’s emergency room, that Townsend

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4 No. 10-1975
provided good patient care, while at the same time re-
maining cognizant of the problems associated with ser-
vicing an inmate population. Her experiences with
Townsend were echoed by other colleagues, who told
Couture that Townsend was a productive, responsive,
skilled, and flexible dentist. Couture decided against
Everett based on her lack of supervisory experience,
as well as some informal complaints she heard from
other physicians at Cermak regarding Everett’s pace.
In February 2007, Couture submitted her report to
Simon. She recommended, among other things, slashing
the budget at Cermak and retaining Townsend as the
only remaining dentist on staff. The program would
then be restructured to provide jail inmates with
emergent dental care only. Simon agreed with Couture’s
recommendations, and the layoff decisions were de-
livered to the other dentists in March 2007.
Disappointed by the news of not being selected, Everett
filed an appeal of her layoff. On June 26, 2007, Everett
was sent a letter in anticipation of her appeal, explaining
the bases for the layoff decisions. The letter provided
that a number of factors were looked at in picking the
remaining dentist, including time management skills, the
ability and desire to assume a management role, supervi-
sory skills, and clinical expertise. Those factors, the letter
explained, led Couture and Simon to conclude that
Townsend should remain at the center following the
reduction in staff. At the hearing, Couture testified that,
given all of those factors, she believed that Townsend
was the best choice for the position. She based this

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No. 10-1975 5
decision on her own observations in the emergency
room setting, her consultation with other professionals,
the fact that Townsend seemingly had some administra-
tive experience, and the fact that he had a desire
to assume leadership positions. The hearing officer ulti-
mately denied Everett’s appeal, finding no violation of
County procedures.
Everett remained convinced that there was something
suspicious about her termination. On May 21, 2008, she
sued Cook County in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that the
decision to lay her off was based on impermissible crite-
ria. Everett argued that political considerations infected
the layoff decision, in violation of the Shakman decree
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She also claimed that the choice to
lay her off was predicated on both her Caucasian
ethnicity and her female gender, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. Everett also sought a state law
petition for writ of certiorari, attacking the agency deci-
sion upholding her layoff. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Cook County on all of
Everett’s federal claims, finding that she failed to
put forth evidence of discriminatory animus. The district
court then relinquished jurisdiction over Everett’s re-
maining state law claim.
Everett timely appealed the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Cook County.

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6 No. 10-1975
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Everett contests only the grant of summary
judgment for her political and race discrimination
claims. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo,
construing all facts and drawing all inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. Grigsby v.
LaHood, 628 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judg-
ment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “A court must grant a motion for summary
judgment against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Bio v. Fed. Express
Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 2005).
Everett’s first argument against summary judgment is
one common to all of her claims. She contends that the
“conscious destruction” of two documents—Couture’s
report to Simon and Couture’s notes related to the
layoff—warrants an inference that the documents con-
tained information adverse to the County, an inference
a jury could rely upon in finding for Everett. But
conscious destruction of documents alone “does not
warrant an inference that the document[s], if produced,
would have contained information adverse to the em-
ployer’s case.” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 615 (7th
Cir. 2002). Rather, in order to draw an inference that
the absent documents contained negative information,
Everett must show that the documents were intentionally

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No. 10-1975 7
Everett also claims that we cannot rely, at the summary 1
judgment phase, on any testimony offered by the County to
explain why it chose Townsend over Everett, as that testimony
would be contradicted by the absent documents. But for a
factfinder to be able to make the inferential leap that those
documents would contradict the County’s testimony, Everett
would need to show that the documents were destroyed in
(continued...)
destroyed in bad faith. Norman-Nunnery v. Madison
Area Technical Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2010).
Everett’s spoilation argument falters for a number of
reasons. First, Everett does not specifically explain what
evidence, if any, satisfies the bad faith requirement,
meaning that she has not satisfied her burden. This over-
sight is hardly surprising, given that she does not
bother to discuss the legal framework for the spoilation
inference at all. (This lack of argumentation is a theme
throughout Everett’s brief: she routinely fails to lay out
the legal framework for her claims or cite law in support
of her arguments.) Second, the record evidence does not
suggest that the documents were destroyed “for the
purpose of hiding adverse information.” Id. Couture’s
testimony shows that she discarded some, if not all, of
the documents not in a last-ditch effort to get rid of in-
formation that could hurt the County, but rather as a
routine effort to clean out her office before she
departed Cermak for greener pastures. In any event,
without specifically pointing us to some evidence of
bad faith, Everett cannot rely on a spoilation inference
to get her past summary judgment.1

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8 No. 10-1975
(...continued) 1
bad faith. As we have already said, Everett has failed to specifi-
cally point to evidence to satisfy that burden.
We proceed next to Everett’s twin political discrimina-
tion claims. Everett claims that Couture and Simon
picked Townsend not because he was the best candidate,
but because he engaged in political activity favorable to
Simon’s superior, President Stroger. The entirety of
Townsend’s political activity consisted of a donation of
$300 in September 2000 to the 8th Ward Regular Demo-
cratic Organization (where Stroger’s family allegedly
has a political base) and two donations totaling $225
in 2006 to the Citizens for Lyle (a group that raises
political funds for a former Stroger organizer). Everett
engaged in no political activity, and it was this lack of
activity that she says motivated her termination.
Everett’s political discrimination claims are premised
on the Shakman decree and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Shakman
decree forbids the County from “conditioning, basing, or
knowingly prejudicing or affecting any term or aspect
of governmental employment, with respect to one who
is at the time a government employee, upon or because
of any political factor.” Shakman v. Democratic Org. of
Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
vacated sub nom. Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387,
1389 (7th Cir. 1987). The First Amendment—made action-
able through § 1983—similarly prohibits a public em-
ployer from firing an employee for “purely political
reasons,” with certain exceptions not applicable to the

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No. 10-1975 9
case at bar. Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584-85 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Both Shakman claims and § 1983 claims require a
plaintiff to show that political considerations led to the
ultimate employment decision, see Shanahan v. City of
Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1996), so we will start
there. Everett argues that she has established causation
by virtue of evidence of numerous procedural irreg-
ularities in the dentist layoff process, irregularities that
she claims could permit a jury to infer discrimination.
To be sure, an employer’s failure to abide by its own
internal procedures may, combined with other evi-
dence, raise the specter of discriminatory animus. Rudin
v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir.
2005). But for a jury to be able to infer any impropriety
based on an employer’s failure to abide by its own pro-
cedures, the employee must show that there was an
actual procedure in place that served to bind the em-
ployer’s discretion. See Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532
F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
As her first alleged procedural irregularity, Everett
claims that the County departed from Rule 7 of its person-
nel rules. Rule 7, Everett contends, has two require-
ments: the County must consider seniority as a part
of any layoff, and the County’s Bureau of Human Re-
sources must transmit a seniority list to the Bureau of
Health Services during all layoffs. By failing to consider
seniority or transmit a seniority list, Everett argues
that the County contravened Rule 7, thereby raising
an inference of suspicious conduct.

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10 No. 10-1975
We do not believe Everett has offered sufficient
evidence which, if believed, would permit a factfinder
to conclude that the County violated Rule 7. Even read
in the light most favorable to Everett, Rule 7 does not in
any way compel the County to consider seniority as a
part of a reduction in force. The relevant portion of Rule 7
provides only that, “[w]here applicable,” Human Re-
sources must transmit a list of the names of personnel
“having the least seniority in those classifications
affected by the reduction in force.” To the extent that
Everett argues that this list requirement was violated, she
does not offer evidence (or even argument) as to why
the dentist layoffs were the type of “applicable” situa-
tion where the list requirement was triggered. Without
something to satisfy that point, she has not established
that the County breached Rule 7, and thus her argu-
ment fails.
Everett’s remaining procedural irregularities are any-
thing but. She makes much of the fact that the County
neither consulted the Shakman compliance officer nor
conducted interviews as a part of the dentist layoff, as
the County did for some of the contemporaneous
physician layoffs. But, as was the case for her argument
about seniority, there was no procedure that required
interviews or consultation with the Shakman officer as a
part of a layoff; there wasn’t even evidence offered to
show that the County had a consistent past practice of
engaging in those measures. Because the County did not
breach any procedures in deciding not to consult the
Shakman officer or conduct interviews for the dentist

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No. 10-1975 11
reduction in force, we see nothing inherently suspicious
about its conduct.
We note, out of an abundance of caution, that even if
we assumed there was something irregular about the
County’s conduct as it relates to Rule 7, interviews, or
the Shakman officer, Everett’s claim would still lack
merit. For Everett to establish that the County was moti-
vated by political considerations, she had to show—as
a threshold matter—that the County was aware of
Everett’s or Townsend’s political activities. Gunville v.
Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2009); Hall v. Babb,
389 F.3d 758, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2004). There was no
evidence that the decision-makers were aware of
Everett’s apolitical status or Townsend’s political con-
tributions. Without such evidence, the entry of summary
judgment was proper. See, e.g., Holmes v. Potter, 384 F.3d
356, 362 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n employer’s lack of knowl-
edge about a protected category rings a death knell for
a discrimination claim.”).
We proceed to Everett’s final claim: that the County
discriminated against her based on her Caucasian
ethnicity when it picked Townsend, an African
American, over her. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits an employer from firing an employee based
on race, a prohibition that includes so-called “reverse
discrimination” against white employees. See Mlynczak
v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 2006). To proceed
past summary judgment on a Title VII claim, an
employee may utilize the direct or indirect method of
proof. Sartor v. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 278 (7th
Cir. 2004).

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12 No. 10-1975
Everett insists that she has offered enough evidence
to proceed under both the direct and indirect methods.
Under the direct method, a plaintiff must offer direct
evidence of discrimination—an outright admission that
an action was taken for discriminatory reasons—or cir-
cumstantial evidence that points to discriminatory
animus through a longer chain of inferences. Van Antwerp
v. City of Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 2010).
Circumstantial evidence can take on many forms, and
includes “evidence that the employee was qualified for
the job in question but was passed over in favor of a
person outside the protected class and the employer’s
reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Sun v. Bd. of Trs.,
473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007). Whatever circumstantial
evidence is offered must, in the end, “point directly to a
discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Adams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003).
Everett relies on circumstantial evidence for her direct
method claim, arguing that she was qualified to be re-
tained, that she was passed over in favor of Townsend, and
that the reasons given for choosing Townsend were
pretextual. To establish pretext, Everett must show that
the County’s reasons for its decision were dishonest,
and not merely inaccurate or poorly considered. Ptasznik
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2006).
It is sufficient evidence of pretext that Everett lacks.
Couture claimed that she chose Townsend because he
was the most qualified for the post, based on his evinced
desire to lead, productivity, administrative experience,
clinical skill, and flexibility with the other physicians

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No. 10-1975 13
Everett insists that we cannot, at the summary judgment 2
phase, rely on evidence proffered by the County that comes
from interested witnesses, a proposition that would bar us
from considering the County’s reasons for choosing Townsend.
For this, she cites to the Supreme Court’s statement in Reeves
that “the court should give credence to the evidence favoring
the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least
to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested
witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
151 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Everett
misreads the scope of Reeves. Even if testimony comes from
interested employees, “[w]e do not interpret the quoted lan-
guage so broadly as to require a court to ignore the
uncontroverted testimony of company employees or to con-
clude, where a proffered reason is established through such
testimony, that it is necessarily pretextual.” Traylor v. Brown,
295 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2002).
at Cermak. To show pretext, Everett points us to a pro-2
ductivity report from three years before the layoff that
paints Everett as slightly more productive than
Townsend, a statement by Knox—the former director
at Cermak—that Everett was a productive dentist, and
another statement by Knox that Townsend’s acting
director duties at the clinic provided him with only
minimal administrative experience. But even read in the
light most favorable to Everett, none of this evidence
shows that Couture’s reasons for choosing Townsend
over Everett were phony. The dated productivity report,
which Couture did not review in making her decision, does
not establish that Couture lied about her reasons for

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14 No. 10-1975
choosing Townsend; at best, it shows that her decision
was poorly researched, as one might expect given the
time constraints of the layoff. The fact that a decision
was poorly considered is not enough to establish pretext.
See Van Antwerp, 627 F.3d at 298. More importantly,
the report does not dispute the myriad other bases for
Couture’s decision, specifically Townsend’s apparent
supervisory experience. See Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519
F.3d 393, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a defendant
has offered multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for its
hiring decision, showing that one of these reasons is
pretextual is not enough . . . .”). And while Knox’s deposi-
tion testimony suggested that Townsend gained only
minimal supervisory experience from his work as acting
director, Knox conceded that Townsend gained some
experience while serving in that capacity. In the end,
there is nothing to suggest that Couture lied about her
proffered reasons for choosing Townsend over Everett,
and thus Everett’s direct claim lacks merit.
Everett’s indirect claim fares no better, again partly
due to her underdeveloped argumentation. To move
past summary judgment under the indirect method, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. In the context of a termination case, that
prima facie case normally consists of evidence showing
that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, that
she suffered an adverse employment action, that she was
performing her job satisfactorily, and that a similarly-
situated individual outside of her protected class was
treated more favorably. LaFary v. Rogers Grp., Inc., 591
F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2010). But because this is a reverse-

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No. 10-1975 15
discrimination case, “we have replaced the first
element with a requirement that the plaintiff show ‘back-
ground circumstances’ suggesting that the employer
discriminates against the majority.” Stockwell v. City of
Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2010). Everett’s
claim stalls at the prima facie point: she does not explain
what evidence shows background circumstances of
discriminatory conduct by the County. Because Everett
failed in her prima facie burden, we must reject her
claim under the indirect method of proof. See Antonetti
v. Abbott Labs., 563 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2009). And even
if Everett had satisfied her prima facie case, her claim
would still be wanting, as she has not established that
the County’s reasons for choosing Townsend were
pretextual. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 637
F.3d 729, 743 (7th Cir. 2011).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
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