United States Court of Appeals
FortheSeventhCircuit
Chicago,Illinois60604
ArguedNovember10,2010
DecidedDecember10,2010
Before
RICHARDD.CUDAHY,CircuitJudge
DANIELA.MANION,CircuitJudge
DIANES.SYKES,CircuitJudge
No.101159
MICHAELBYRONGAGE,
PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
MICHAELJ.ASTRUE,
CommissionerofSocialSecurity,
DefendantAppellee.
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrict
CourtfortheNorthernDistrictofIllinois,
EasternDivision.
No.08C5040
SusanE.Cox,
MagistrateJudge.
ORDER
MichaelGagefailedtoappealthejudgmentagainsthiminhisSocialSecurity
disabilitybenefitssuit,andnearlythreemonthslaterfiledapostjudgmentmotionseeking
permissiontochallengethemeritsoftheunderlyingdecision.Thedistrictcourtdeniedthe
motion,andweaffirm.
GagesustainedanelbowinjuryandappliedforSocialSecuritydisabilityinsurance
benefits.AfteranadministrativelawjudgedeniedhisapplicationandtheAppealsCouncil
affirmed,hesoughtjudicialreview.Amagistratejudge,proceedingwiththeparties’
consent,ruledforthecommissionerinacomprehensive27pagedecisionandentered
judgmentonAugust17,2009.Inherorder,themagistratejudgefoundthattheALJdidnot
NONPRECEDENTIALDISPOSITION
Tobecitedonlyinaccordancewith
Fed.R.App.P.32.1
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No.101159 Page2
erringivingcontrollingweighttotheopinionsofGage’streatingphysician,inquestioning
thevocationalexpertatthehearing,increditingGage’sallegationsofsubjectivepain,and
inanalyzingtherepresentativesamplejobsavailabletoGage.
OnAugust27Gagefiledan“objection”tothedecision,arguingthatthemagistrate
judge“fail[ed]toaddressportionsofthemedicalevidencethatwerefavorableto[him],”
improperlycreditedthevocationalexpert’stestimonythathecouldusehisinjuredarmas
an“assist,”and“ignored”histestimonyabouthispain.GageinvokedFederalRuleofCivil
Procedure72(b),therulegoverningamagistratejudge’sresponsibilitieswhenassignedto
heardispositivepretrialmatters.FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1).Gagefiledthis“objection”with
thedistrictjudgeoriginallyoverseeingthecase.OnOctober28themagistratejudgestruck
this“objection,”seeN.D.Ill.L.R.78.2,becauseGagehadfileditwithoutprovidingthe
required“noticeofpresentmentspecifyingthedateandtimeonwhich,andjudgebefore
whom,theobjectionistobepresented,”seeN.D.Ill.L.R.5.3(b).
OnNovember9Gagefiledaselfstyled“MotiontoReinstateObjection”beforethe
magistratejudge,thistimeprovidingpropernoticeandassertingthathisoriginal
“objection”shouldbe“reinstated”underFederalRuleofCivilProcedure59(e)aswellas
Rule72(b).Gagedidnotexplainwhyeitherruleentitledhimtorelief;hemerelyquoted
thoserulesandarguedobliquelythattheirrequirementswere“consistent.”Themagistrate
judgeheldahearingonGage’smotionand,afterexplainingthatshehad“consideredthis
caseverycarefully,”pronouncedthatshewasdenyinghismotion.Thecourtenteredthe
orderonNovember20.
TwomonthslaterGagefiledanoticeofappeal,whichpromptedourcourttoissue
anorderclarifyingthathisappealwastimelyonlyastothemagistratejudge’sNovember
20orderdenyinghispostjudgmentmotion.OurorderpointedoutthatGagehadfailedto
appealtheAugust17judgmentwithintherequired60days.SeeFED. R. A PP. P.4(a)(1)(B),
(a)(5).
Onappeal,Gagedisregardsourorderlimitingthescopeofthisappealandcontinues
topressargumentsrelatingtothemeritsoftheunderlyingdecision.Hearguesthatheis
entitledtoaddressthemeritsoftheunderlyingdecisionbecause,hecontends,atthe
hearingonhispostjudgmentmotionthemagistratejudge“consideredandrejected”his
argumentsaboutthemeritsofthatdecision.
ThemagistratejudgedidnotabuseherdiscretionwhenshedeniedGage’spost
judgmentmotion(his“MotiontoReinstateObjection”).Thereisconfusionhereastohow
themotionshouldbeconstrued—theFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,ofcourse,donot
recognizea“motiontoreinstateobjection”—butthemotionmightbetreatedasoneunder
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No.101159 Page3
Rule60(b),seekingrelieffromajudgment.F ED. R. CIV. P.60(b).Gagestatedthathefiled
hismotionunderRule59(e),butmoreimportantthanthelabelonthemotionwasthe
timing.BecauseGagefiledhismotionmorethan10daysafterthejudgment,ithadtohave
beentreatedasamotionunderRule60(b)insteadof59(e).SeeKiswaniv.PhoenixSec.
Agency,Inc.,584F.3d741,74243(7thCir.2009).Thisdistinctionmattersbecausedenialsof
Rule60(b)motionsarereviewedunderanextremelydeferentialabuseofdiscretion
standard.See,e.g.,Eskridgev.CookCounty,577F.3d806,80809(7thCir.2009).Further,
Rule60(b)isanextraordinaryremedythatisnotdesignedtoaddresslegalerrorsmadeby
thedistrictcourt,seeTalanov.Nw.Med.FacultyFound.,Inc.,273F.3d757,762(7thCir.2001),
norisitasubstituteforanappeal.See,e.g.,Stollerv.PureFishingInc.,528F.3d478,480(7th
Cir.2008);Bellv.EastmanKodakCo.,214F.3d798,80001(7thCir.2000).Gage’smotion
failedtoargueanyofthegroundsspecifiedinRule60(b),sothemagistratejudgedidnot
abuseherdiscretionwhenshedeniedthemotion.
OurcourtalsolacksjurisdictiontoreviewthemeritsoftheunderlyingAugust17
ruling.Eventhoughthemagistratejudgemayhavereferredtothemeritsofthatruling
whenshedeniedGage’s“MotiontoReinstateObjection,”Gageneverappealedthe
judgmentwithinthe60daytimelimit.See28U.S.C.§§636(c)(3),1291,F ED. R. CIV. P.73(c).
AFFIRMED.
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