Nonprecedential Disposition

*Afterexaminingthebriefsandtherecord,wehaveconcludedthatoralargumentis
unnecessary.Thus,theappealissubmittedonthebriefsandtherecord.SeeFED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
United States Court of Appeals
FortheSeventhCircuit
Chicago,Illinois60604
SubmittedJune23,2010 *
DecidedJuly27,2010
Before
JOHNL.COFFEY,CircuitJudge
JOELM.FLAUM,CircuitJudge
DANIELA.MANION,CircuitJudge
No.091035
CEDRICDUPREE,
PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
EARLYLASTER,etal.,
DefendantsAppellees.
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrict
CourtfortheSouthernDistrictofIllinois.
02cv1059DRH
DavidR.Herndon,
ChiefJudge.
ORDER
CedricDupree,anIllinoisinmate,suedemployeesoftheIllinoisDepartmentof
Correctionsunder42U.S.C.§1983,claimingthattheyhadinterferedwithhisrightto
practicehisreligioninviolationoftheFirstAmendmentandtheReligiousLandUseand
InstitutionalizedPersonsAct(“RLUIPA”),42U.S.C.§§2000cc—cc5.Thedistrictcourt
initiallydismissedthecomplaintatscreening,andweremanded,concludingthatDupree’s
complaintsufficientlystatedclaimsundertheFirstAmendmentandRLUIPA.Dupreev.
NONPRECEDENTIALDISPOSITION
Tobecitedonlyinaccordancewith
Fed.R.App.P.32.1

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No.091035 Page2
Laster,106F.App’x503(7thCir.2004).Onremandthedistrictcourtrecruitedcounselto
representDupreeand,afterathreedayjurytrial,enteredjudgmentinfavorofthe
defendants.Dupreeappeals,butbecausehehasfailedtoprovideuswithatrialtranscript,
weareunabletoconsidermanyofhisarguments.SeeFED. R. A PP. P.10(b)(2).Ofthosethat
weareabletoreview,nonehasmerit,andweaffirmthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt.
DupreetriedhisFirstAmendmentandRLUIPAclaimsbeforeajuryandfocusedon
threeincidents.Heclaimedthatthedefendantsviolatedhisrighttoreligiousexercisewhen
theysuspendedhimfromattendinggroupchurchserviceswhileinsegregation,andwhen
theydisciplinedhimforhavingaBibleinthe“chowhall”andforgatheringinmatesfor
prayerinthedietaryunit.Afterthejuryreturnedaverdictforthedefendants,Dupreefiled
proseamotionforanewtrialortosetasidethejuryverdictandthreesupplemental
motionsforanewtrial.Thedistrictcourttreatedthefirstthreeofhisfilingsasmotionsfor
anewtrialunderRule59(a)andhislastfilingasaRule60(b)motionforrelieffrom
judgment;thecourtdeniedeach.SeeFED. R. CIV. P.59(a);FED. R. CIV. P.60(b).Dupree’s
attorneymovedtowithdraw,citingDupree’sclaimthathehadreceivedineffective
assistanceofcounselduringthetrial.Thedistrictcourtgrantedcounsel’srequestandlater
deniedDupree’smotionforreappointmentofcounsel.
OnappealDupreechallengesthedistrictcourt’sdenialofhisposttrialmotions.His
mostsubstantiveargumentsforanewtrialarethatthedistrictcourterredinallowingthe
defendantstointroduceevidenceofhispriorconvictionsandprisondiscipline,
misinstructingthejuryastotheburdensofproofforestablishingaviolationunder
RLUIPA,andnotoverturningthejury’sverdictdenyinghisclaimthatthedefendants
prohibitedhimfromattendinggroupworship.Dupreealsoassertsthatthecourtignored
hiscomplaintsthathewasnotallowedtobringhislegaldocumentstocourt,thatonone
occasionthejurysawhiminshacklesasheexitedthecourtroom,andthathewasnot
allowedtopresentevidencethatduringthetrialprisonemployeesbeathiminretaliation
forhislawsuit.Eachofthesepurportederrors,Dupreecontends,prejudicedhiscaseand
warrantsanewtrial.
Ordinarilyourreviewofadistrictcourt’sdenialofamotionforanewtrialisforan
abuseofdiscretion.Mooreexrel.EstateofGradyv.Tuleja,546F.3d423,427(7thCir.2008).A
newtrialmaybegrantedonlyifthejury’sverdictisagainstthemanifestweightofthe
evidence,meaning“norationaljury”couldhaverenderedtheverdict.Id.(quotingKingv.
Harrington,447F.3d531,534(7thCir.2006)).Attheoutset,wenotethatDupreehasnot
specifiedwhathispriorconvictionsorprisondisciplinewerefor,andthuswecannot
evaluatehisclaimthatthedistrictcourtshouldhaveexcludedthemattrial.Moreover,we
areunabletodeterminewhethertheverdictisagainstthemanifestweightoftheevidence
orwhetherthepurportederrorsprejudicedDupreebecausehehasnotincludedatrial

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No.091035 Page3
transcriptintherecord.Withoutthetranscript,weareunabletoverifyhisclaimsor
conductanymeaningfulappellatereviewofhisargumentsforanewtrial.SeeLearning
CurveToys,Inc.v.PlayWoodToys,Inc.,342F.3d714,731n.10(7thCir.2003);LaFollettev.
Savage,63F.3d540,544(7thCir.1995).FederalRuleofAppellateProcedure10(b)(2)
providesthat“[i]ftheappellantintendstourgeonappealthatafindingorconclusionis
unsupportedbytheevidenceoriscontrarytotheevidence,theappellantmustincludein
therecordatranscriptofallevidencerelevanttothatfindingorconclusion.”F ED. R. A PP. P.
10(b)(2);seeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10.BecauseDupree’sarguments
requireustoevaluatethetrialevidenceaswellasstepstakenbythedistrictcourtto
minimizeanyprejudice,hisfailuretoprovidethetranscriptrendersthearguments
forfeited.SeeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10.Dupree’sprosestatusdoesnot
prohibitthisresult.SeeWoodsv.Thieret,5F.3d244,245(7thCir.1993)(dismissinginpart
theappealofproseplaintiffforfailuretoprovidetranscript).
WecouldorderDupreetosupplementtherecordasauthorizedunderFederalRule
ofAppellateProcedure10(e),seeLaFollette,63F.3dat545,butwedeclinetodosohere.In
theirresponsebrief,theappelleesgaveDupreenoticeofhisobligationtohavethetranscript
preparedandtheconsequencesofhisfailuretodoso.Despitethisnotice,Dupreehasmade
noattempttosecureatranscript.SeeLearningCurveToys,Inc.,342F.3dat731n.10;
LaFollette,63F.3dat54546.
Wecan,however,addressafewofDupree’sargumentsontheirface.Dupree
complainsthathisrecruitedcounselwasineffectiveinfailingtoserveoneofthedefendants
who,Dupreecontends,couldhavetestifiedtosupporthisclaims.Butasthedistrictcourt
correctlyexplainedwhenitdeniedhisRule59(a)motion,thereisnoSixthAmendment
righttoeffectiveassistanceofcounselinacivilcase,sohisdissatisfactionwithcounsel’s
performancedoesnotwarrantanewtrial.SeeStancielv.Gramley,267F.3d575,581(7thCir.
2001).
Dupreealsocontendsthatafterthiscourt’sremand,thecaseshouldhavebeen
reassignedtoanewdistrictjudge.Inhisthirdsupplementalmotionforanewtrial,he
relieduponSupremeCourtRule36inarguingthathewasentitleduponremandtoa
changeofvenueandhenceanewjudge.SupremeCourtRule36,however,governsthe
custodyofprisonersinhabeascorpusproceedings,andthedistrictcourtcorrectlynoted
thattheruledoesnotapplytoDupree’scase.ThecourtthusdeniedDupree’smotion,
whichitconstruedasaRule60(b)motionforrelieffromjudgmentbecauseitwasfiledmore
thantendaysaftertheentryofjudgment.SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 59(b)(2008)(amendedDec.1,
2009);FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b);Talanov.Nw.Med.FacultyFound.,Inc.,273F.3d757,762(7thCir.
2001).PerhapsDupreeintendedtorelyonourCircuitRule36,whichprovidesthat
“[w]heneveracasetriedinadistrictcourtisremandedbythiscourtforanewtrial,itshall

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No.091035 Page4
bereassignedbythedistrictcourtfortrialbeforeajudgeotherthanthejudgewhoheard
thepriortrial....”ButDupree’scasehadbeendismisseduponscreening,see28U.S.C.
§1915A(b)(1),andremandedforfurtherproceedings.“Ordersdirectingthedistrictcourtto
undertakefurtherproceedingsareroutinelyheardbythedistrictjudgewhoenteredthe
orderthatwasthesubjectoftheappeal,”andCircuitRule36doesnotrequirereassignment.
InreUnitedStates,572F.3d301,305n.3(7thCir.2009).Dupreefurtherassertsthat
reassignmentwasnecessarybecausethejudge’spriordismissalofthecomplaint
demonstratedhisprejudiceagainstthecase.Judicialrulings,however,rarelypresenta
validbasistoquestionajudge’simpartiality,Litekyv.UnitedStates,510U.S.540,555(1994),
andDupreehaspresentednoreasonwhythejudgecouldnotfairlyruleinhiscase
followingremand,seeCollinsv.Illinois,554F.3d693,697(7thCir.2009);seealsoLiteky,510
U.S.at551(“Ithaslongbeenregardedasnormalandproperforajudgetositinthesame
caseuponitsremand,andtositinsuccessivetrialsinvolvingthesamedefendant.”).

Finally,thedistrictcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionindenyingDupree’sposttrial
requestforreappointmentofcounsel.Thecourtappliedthecorrectlegalstandardand
baseditsdecisiononfactssupportedbytherecord.SeeSantiagov.Walls,599F.3d749,760
61(7thCir.2010);Pruittv.Mote,503F.3d647,658(7thCir.2007)(enbanc).Thecourt
consideredDupree’sargumentsregardingthecomplexityofhisclaimsandhisexperience
withmentalillness,butnotedthatDupreehadbeenabletoadequatelyfiletwoprosepost
trialmotions.ThecourtaddedthatDupreehadfoundfaultwitheachofthefourlawyers
recruitedtoassisthimandhadsimplybeenunabletomaintainanattorneyclient
relationship.Underthesecircumstances,weconcludethatthecourt’sdecisiontodenythe
reappointmentofcounselwasreasonable.SeePruitt,503F.3dat65859.
Accordingly,weAFFIRMthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt.

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