Gloria Dickerson v. Walgreen Co.

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2).
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 27, 2009 *
Decided August 28, 2009
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
No. 09‐2150
GLORIA DICKERSON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
WALGREEN CO.,
Defendant‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, New Albany Division.
No. 07‐cv‐44
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
Gloria Dickerson, an African‐American woman, sued Walgreen for firing her, claiming
that the firing violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because it was
racially discriminatory and unlawfully retaliatory. Walgreen explained that it had fired
Dickerson, a store manager, for violating company policy when she authorized the use of
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐2150 Page 2
coupons and cash that had been found in the store to cover shortages of money in cash
drawers. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreen, and Dickerson appeals.
Dickerson’s pro se appellate brief is deficient in an unusual way: Dickerson has reused,
verbatim, 19 pages from the 21‐page brief her former counsel filed in opposition to summary
judgment in the district court. Aside from being deficient, the brief ill serves Dickerson because
it does not engage the district court’s comprehensive opinion. Nevertheless, the brief is
sufficient to give notice of the issues that Dickerson wishes to raise on appeal—that may be
why Walgreen has not complained—and so we consider those issues.
The district court granted summary judgment on Dickerson’s discrimination claim
because the only Walgreen employee she accused of discrimination was a former supervisor
who was not involved in the decision to terminate her. Of the nineteen examples of this
supervisor’s conduct that the district court considered, only one even comes close to
suggesting discrimination: the supervisor apparently stated that he had pushed Dickerson
harder than he had pushed other managers. To survive summary judgment under the direct
method, Dickerson had to present evidence that “allows a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 779‐80 (7th Cir.
2006). Dickerson’s evidence was insufficient because, at most, it showed discrimination only
by someone who was not the decisionmaker.
The district court did not explicitly consider the indirect method of proving
discrimination, but our consideration of it does not aid Dickerson. Under the indirect method,
if Dickerson were to present a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden would shift to
Walgreen to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Once it did so, the burden
would shift back to Dickerson to submit evidence showing that the nondiscriminatory reason
was a pretext for discrimination. See Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir.
2007). Even assuming that Dickerson put enough evidence in the record to support a prima facie
case of discrimination, her evidence did not rebut Walgreen’s nondiscriminatory explanation,
because she did not dispute that, in violation of company policy, she authorized her
subordinates to use money that a customer had found to cover a shortage in a cash drawer.
This concession ends her discrimination case. See Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 697
(7th Cir. 2006) (where plaintiff was fired for violating company policy admitted the violation,
she could not rebut employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the firing).
Next, we affirm the district court’s ruling on Dickerson’s retaliation claim under both
the direct and indirect methods of proof. Under the direct method, Dickerson’s evidence fails
to show a causal connection between any protected conduct and her termination. The only
potentially protected activities were Dickerson’s complaints about the conduct by her former
supervisor that she took to be discriminatory. But those complaints came more than one year

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No. 09‐2150 Page 3
before Walgreen fired Dickerson. The district court correctly ruled that no jury could
reasonably find that these year‐old events supported a direct case of retaliation. See
Andonissamy v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 851 (7th Cir. 2008).
The district court also found that Dickerson did not present enough evidence under the
indirect method of proving retaliation. To establish a prima facie case under the indirect
method, Dickerson had to present evidence showing, among other things, that a similarly
situated employee who did not engage in protected activity received more favorable treatment.
See id. at 850. The district court was correct that Dickerson supplied no evidence of such a
person. First, the subordinates whom she identified were not similarly situated to her. See
Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Dickerson also pointed to
a white store manager who was fired after threatening to kill her supervisor but who received
some benefits after termination that Walgreen did not also give to Dickerson. That evidence
might help Dickerson if her claim were about being denied benefits after termination, but
Dickerson’s claim was about the termination itself. In any event, the district court correctly
found that Dickerson and this store manager were not similarly situated. In addition to
threatening to kill her supervisor, the other store manager had threatened to kill herself, and
so Walgreen wanted to help her receive mental health treatment. Dickerson, in contrast, has
never claimed that she suffered from any mental illness. See Cassimy v. Board of Educ. of Rockford
Public Schools, Dist. No. 205, 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff and employee with more
severe illness not similarly situated). Dickerson and this other manager were also not similarly
situated because different decisionmakers were involved in their terminations. See Ellis v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 523 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the district court
correctly granted summary judgment on this claim as well.
AFFIRMED.

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