Victor Guzman v. United States Department of Homeland Security

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 12a0129p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
VICTOR GUZMAN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY ,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 10-2243
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:09-cv-13578—Denise Page Hood, District Judge.
Argued: April 19, 2012
Decided and Filed: May 10, 2012
Before: MARTIN, SUTTON, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Roger R. Rathi, LEGALQUEST NETWORK, P.C., Southfield, Michigan,
for Appellant. Samuel P. Go, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roger R. Rathi, LEGALQUEST
NETWORK, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. Samuel P. Go, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. This is an immigration case. Victor
Guzman challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims of United States
citizenship, arguing that the district court failed to adjudicate several of his claims and
misinterpreted a federal immigration statute when applying it to him. For the following
reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
1

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 2
I.
Guzman seeks United States citizenship through his mother or his stepfather,
both of whom are United States citizens. The facts—as summarized by the district court
in Guzman v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 09-13578, Order Granting
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and Dismissing Action, 1-3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2010)—are as
follows:
Plaintiff was born on December 13, 1946 in Mexico. His mother,
Florez Guadalupe Sequeda, was a United States citizen born on February
22, 1930; his father was a Mexican national. His mother came from a
migrant family that frequently traveled between the U.S. and Mexico. In
1945, Plaintiff’s biological parents married in Mexico. Following his
parents’ separation, Plaintiff allegedly entered the U.S. in May of 1949
at the age of two. It is disputed whether this was a legal entry. Plaintiff
alleges that he entered the U.S. with his mother at a designated port of
entry, Brownsville, Texas, where he and his mother passed through the
border without further inspection.
Plaintiff’s mother subsequently remained in the U.S. and divorced
Plaintiff’s father. She remarried Matias Vasques, a U.S. citizen, on June
2, 1960. There is no claim or evidence that his stepfather adopted or
otherwise legitimated Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he has been living
in the United States continuously for the last sixty years, and has been
married to his wife, Laverne Guzman, a U.S. citizen, since 1967.
Plaintiff is the primary caretaker of his disabled son, Tony, who has
spinal meningitis and requires constant care, which is furnished by
Plaintiff and his wife.
Around July 30, 2003, Plaintiff filed an N-600 form with [the
Department of Homeland Security] requesting a Certificate of
Citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1401 or
its predecessor statute related to Nationality. In December 2004, Plaintiff
filed a separate N-600 form claiming citizen status through his mother
and U.S. citizen stepfather. On August 13, 2009, the [Administrative
Appeals Office] issued a final decision denying both applications,
arguing that Plaintiff’s case was controlled by the Nationality Act of
1940, because that was the applicable law at the time of his birth. In
order for Plaintiff to derive citizenship from his mother, the statute
required that his mother be physically present in the U.S. for ten years.
Five of the ten years must have been after the age of sixteen, prior to
Plaintiff’s birth. The [Administrative Appeals Office] ruled that
Plaintiff’s mother did not meet the physical presence requirement
because she had given birth to Plaintiff at the age of sixteen. Further, it
found that Plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that his stepfather had

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 3
adopted him, and that citizenship could not be derived in cases where the
parent is not the natural or adoptive parent. The [Administrative Appeals
Office] also found that Plaintiff had not proven that he had been admitted
as a lawful resident prior to his eighteenth birthday, which was required
to establish prima facie eligibility for attaining citizenship.
In September 2009, Guzman filed suit in the district court against the
Department, alleging that the Nationality Act of 1940 is unconstitutional because it
violates the equal protection clause and because the Department’s interpretation of the
Act creates an arbitrary, irrational, and inequitable outcome. The Department filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed Guzman’s
action with prejudice. Guzman appeals.
II.
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Courie v. Alcoa Wheel &
Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009). We accept the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). We will
affirm the district court only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Marks v.
Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2003).
III.
Guzman appeals the district court’s dismissal of his case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), arguing that the district court erred by: (1) failing to adjudicate his claim for
citizenship under section 314 of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54
Stat. 1137; (2) failing to adjudicate his claims for citizenship under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 and
1433; and (3) finding under a rational basis analysis that section 201(g) of the
Nationality Act does not produce an absurd result.

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 4
A. Citizenship Claim under Section 314 of the Nationality Act
Guzman argues that the district court erred in failing to adjudicate his claim of
citizenship under section 314 of the Nationality Act of 1940 (the version of the statute
in effect at the time of Guzman’s birth). However, Guzman failed to raise this claim in
his complaint; he first raised it in his response brief in opposition to the Department’s
motion to dismiss, and never moved for leave to amend his complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
Because Guzman’s complaint did not contain his section 314 claim, the district
court correctly ignored that claim in ruling on the Department’s 12(b)(6) motion. When
presented with such a motion, courts consider whether the complaint states a claim upon
which relief could be granted, not whether the plaintiff has stated—or could state—such
a claim elsewhere. See, e.g., Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir.
2003). Guzman did not state a section 314 claim in his complaint, nor did he seek leave
to amend his complaint. The district court did not err in failing to grant leave to amend
the complaint where no such leave was requested. See, e.g., Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions
Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1991). In light of Guzman’s failure to present his
section 314 claim to the district court properly, we decline to address this claim in the
first instance on appeal. See Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243 (6th
Cir. 1991).
B. Citizenship Claims under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 and 1433
Guzman also argues that the district court erred in failing to adjudicate his claims
of citizenship under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 and 1433, which allow for a grant of citizenship
to foreign-born children of United States citizen parents in certain circumstances.
Guzman—who is now more than sixty-five years old—raised both of these arguments
in his complaint, claiming that the government should retroactively apply sections 1431
and 1433 to him as if he had applied for citizenship under them while still a minor.

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 5
Section 1431(a) provides that:
A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen
of the United States when all of the following conditions have been
fulfilled:
(1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United
States, whether by birth or naturalization.
(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years.
(3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and
physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful
admission for permanent residence.
Section 1433 provides that:
A parent who is a citizen of the United States (or, if the citizen parent has
died during the preceding 5 years, a citizen grandparent or citizen legal
guardian) may apply for naturalization on behalf of a child born outside
of the United States who has not acquired citizenship automatically under
section 1431 of this title. The Attorney General shall issue a certificate
of citizenship to such applicant upon proof, to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General, that the following conditions have been fulfilled:
(1) At least one parent (or, at the time of his or her death,
was) is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization.
(2) The United States citizen parent—
(A) has (or, at the time of his or her death,
had) been physically present in the United
States or its outlying possessions for a
period or periods totaling not less than
five years, at least two of which were after
attaining the age of fourteen years; or
(B) has (or, at the time of his or her death,
had) a citizen parent who has been
physically present in the United States or
its outlying possessions for a period or
periods totaling not less than five years, at
least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years.
(3) The child is under the age of eighteen years.
(4) The child is residing outside of the United States in the
legal and physical custody of the applicant (or, if the
citizen parent is deceased, an individual who does not
object to the application).

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 6
(5) The child is temporarily present in the United States
pursuant to a lawful admission, and is maintaining such
lawful status.
Sections 1431 and 1433 are part of the Child Citizenship Act, enacted in 2000.
The Child Citizenship Act “allows a child to achieve derivative citizenship where only
one parent is a U.S. citizen, and eliminates the requirement that adopted children reside
with their adoptive parents at the time of their naturalization.” Smart v. Ashcroft, 401
F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have found that the Child Citizenship Act is not retroactive and can
only be applied to individuals who were under eighteen as of the effective date of this
Act. Drakes v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The [Act’s] derivative
citizenship provision applies only to children who, as of the effective date of the [Act]
. . . are under eighteen years of age . . . . As such the [Act] does not confer citizenship
retrospectively.”) (collecting cases from the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits);
see Smart, 401 F.3d at 122 (“The [Act does] not benefit [plaintiff] because the [Act] is
not retroactive, and [plaintiff] was no longer under eighteen years old upon its
enactment.” (citation omitted)); Morgan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 432 F.3d 226, 230 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2005); Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2004). We join our sister
circuits in finding that sections 1431 and 1433 do not apply retroactively. While the
district court did not make any explicit findings on Guzman’s claims under sections 1431
and 1433, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims with prejudice.
C. Citizenship Claim under Section 201(g) of the Nationality Act
Section 201(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provides, in relevant part, that the
“following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:”
[a] person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of
parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who, prior to the
birth of such person, has had ten years’ residence in the United States or

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 7
1The full text of the statute provides additional citizenship requirements and exceptions for
children of parents employed by the United States government or by a United States religious,
philanthropic, commercial, educational, scientific, or financial organization. Guzman does not claim that
he falls under any of these exceptions.
one of its outlying possessions, at least five of which were after attaining
the age of sixteen years, the other being an alien . . . .1
Guzman argues that the district court erred in analyzing his 201(g) claim by: (1)
applying the rational basis test, rather than intermediate scrutiny, to find that the citizen-
parent’s age requirement is constitutional; and (2) “fail[ing] to reject” interpretations of
the statute that produce “an unjust, unreasonable, or absurd result.”
1. Constitutionality of Section 201(g)’s Age-Based Requirement
The parties do not dispute that the plain language of the statute requires that
Guzman’s United States citizen mother must have been physically present in the United
States for five years after the age of sixteen and prior to Guzman’s birth in order for him
to derive citizenship through her under section 201(g). Instead, Guzman argues that the
statute is unconstitutional because the age-based requirement for the United States
citizen parent violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court, under the rational basis test, found that this requirement is constitutional
because it is “rationally related to Congressional intent to foster ties between the foreign-
born child and the United States.” Guzman challenges the district court’s rational basis
finding, and argues that the district court should have applied intermediate scrutiny to
analyze whether the age-based requirement is unconstitutionally discriminatory toward
children of young parents.
“The role of the courts in analyzing an equal protection challenge to a federal
immigration statute is limited to determining whether the statute at issue is conceivably
related to the achievement of the federal interest.” Almario v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.2d 147,
152 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s long-
acknowledged “deference to Congress with respect to immigration law has led this court
to uphold statutory distinctions between classes of aliens if predicated on a rational
basis.” Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

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No. 10-2243 Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Page 8
omitted). Even in the non-immigration context, “[s]tates may discriminate on the basis
of disability or age as long as the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” Coleman v. Ct. App. of Md., 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1349 (2012). “[W]hen
conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such government action unless the
varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of
any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the government’s
actions were irrational.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not err in applying the rational basis test to this claim. The
district court also did not err in finding that section 201(g)’s age-based requirement is
constitutional; section 201(g) is rationally related to Congress’s interest in achieving the
legitimate purpose of ensuring that the citizen parent has developed adult ties to the
United States sufficient to pass along these ties to the child. See, e.g., Ruiz v. INS, 410
F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (reviewing Board of Immigration Appeals’
findings under section 201(g)); United States v. Perez-Toledo, 259 F. App’x 915, 916
(9th Cir. 2007) (same).
2. Absurdity of the District Court’s Interpretation of Section 201(g)
“In matters of statutory interpretation, we look first to the text and, if the meaning
of the language is plain, then ‘the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”
Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lamie
v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). “Interpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the
legislative purpose are available.” Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 261 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982))
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court found that Guzman was not eligible for citizenship under
section 201(g) because his mother had not lived in the United States for “at least five
[years] after attaining the age of sixteen years,” which was her age at Guzman’s birth.

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Guzman argues that the district court erred in interpreting section 201(g) to mean that
foreign-born children of United States citizens younger than twenty-one years old cannot
themselves be deemed United States citizens at birth. Guzman claims that the district
court’s interpretation of the statute is “oppressively harsh and utterly absurd.”
The district court’s interpretation of section 201(g) is not absurd, unreasonable,
or unjust. The language of the statute is plain: it provides that a foreign-born individual
is a United States citizen at birth under section 201(g) if his or her United States citizen
parent lived in the United States for ten years, “at least five of which were after” the
parent turned sixteen, prior to the individual’s birth. First, under the above analysis, this
result is not absurd because it is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.
Second, because naturalization is a privilege, not a right, Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 131 (1943), it is not absurd to require one parent to have adulthood ties
to the United States prior to granting the privilege of citizenship to his or her child. The
district court did not err in finding that section 201(g) does not produce an absurd result.
While Guzman is not presently faced with an immigration action against him, we
note that his ability to defend against such an action by establishing citizenship through
alternate routes may be in question because his entry to the United States at age two was
not recorded. It seems unduly harsh for a two-year-old to be punished for his teenage
mother’s lack of diligence. This issue, however, is left to future determination if
Guzman chooses to raise such a claim.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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