Debra Hawkins-Dunn v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

In the District Court, Hawkins-Dunn also claimed she was entitled to additional service time under General
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Motors’ pension plan. The District Court held that she is entitled to the additional pension credit and General Motors
does not contest that decision on appeal.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0212n.06
Filed: March 22, 2007
No. 05-2124
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DEBRA HAWKINS-DUNN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees,
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MERRITT, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this ERISA action, Debra Hawkins-Dunn appeals the District
Court’s holding that she is not entitled to an additional 0.8 years of participation under the Extended
Disability Benefits plan of her former employer, General Motors. Because General Motors’1
interpretation of the disability plan is not arbitrary and capricious, we affirm the District Court’s
decision. We also deny Hawkins-Dunn’s request for attorney’s fees because the issue was not
properly raised in the District Court.

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No. 05-2124
Hawkins-Dunn v. General Motors Corp.
Article II, section 7(c) of the Extended Disability Benefits Plan describes the benefit period as follows:
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In the case of an employe [sic] . . . who has ten or more Years of Participation as
of the day on which the disability commenced, the [period] commencing with the month in
which the date of the expiration of . . . weekly Sickness and Accident Benefits occurs and
terminating with the end of the month in which the employe attains age 65.
[I]n the case of an employe who has less than ten Years of Participation as of the
day on which the disability commenced, the [amount of time] by which the employe’s Years
of Participation at commencement of disability exceed[s] the maximum number of weeks for
which he is entitled to receive Sickness and Accident Benefits.
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I.
Hawkins-Dunn began working for General Motors on August 15, 1977. As a member of the
United Auto Workers, she participated in General Motors’ pension and long-term disability
insurance plans. Hawkins-Dunn worked for General Motors until she became disabled on January
27, 1987. She returned to work for two brief periods in 1987, but neither was long enough to “reset”
January 27 as her disability leave date under the terms of the GM disability plan. As of January 27,
1987, Hawkins-Dunn had worked for General Motors for nine years and seven months.
Pursuant to General Motors’ leave policies, Hawkins-Dunn received Sickness & Accident
Benefits for the first 52 weeks that she was unable to work, ending March 7, 1988. At this point, she
began receiving Extended Disability Benefits. Under the Extended Disability Benefits Plan, the
length of time an employee is eligible to receive disability payments depends principally on whether
an employee has accrued ten years of participation under the plan. More specifically, an employee
with ten (or more) years of participation on the date the disability begins is entitled to receive
disability benefits until age 65. An employee with less than ten years, on the other hand, will receive
disability benefits for a period of time equal to her years of participation.2

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No. 05-2124
Hawkins-Dunn v. General Motors Corp.
J.A. 103
General Motors waived recovery of all but the last year of disability benefits overpayments. The remaining
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overpayment was more than offset by the fact that the insurer had been using an incorrect (and lower) rate in computing
her disability payments. As a result of this offset, Hawkins-Dunn received a net payment of $3,390.60.
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Hawkins-Dunn continued to receive monthly disability payments from March 1988 until
April 2000, when an analyst at Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the plan administrator,
discovered that her benefits should have terminated in March 1996, based on her 9.6 years of
participation at the time her disability commenced. The insurer subsequently communicated this
finding to Hawkins-Dunn and ceased her disability payments.3
In an effort to reinstate her benefits, Hawkins-Dunn contacted a representative of the United
Auto Workers and asked whether General Motors and Metropolitan Life were mistaken in their
conclusion that she had not attained ten years of participation in the plan. Ron Graham, from the
UAW’s Benefit Plans Section, responded by letter on July 27, 2004:
I have concluded my inquiry about the issue you brought to my attention about your
eligibility for extended disability benefits until you turn 65.
The records show that your first day of disability (sick leave) was January 27, 1987.
At that time, you had 9.6 years of credited service. In order to have your extended
disability benefits continue to age 65, on January 27, 1987, you would have to have
had 10 years of credited service. Your plant seniority date was August 15, 1977, and
your last day worked was January 27, 1987, by the calender you were over 6 months
short of 10 years.
An audit of your credited service is enclosed. Two UAW International
Representatives from the UAW G.M. Department Benefits Staff had checked this
issue for you before. They both came up with the results on your inquiry that I did
and I have included both of those responses for your records. You should already
have copies, but I am including these answers again.

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J.A. 67-68. Hawkins-Dunn continued to complain to Graham about the denial of continued
disability benefits, so Graham contacted Elizabeth LaMarra, an insurance specialist at General
Motors. LaMarra responded by letter on August 25, 2004, assuring Graham that his analysis was
correct. J.A. 69-70.
In the District Court, Hawkins-Dunn claimed she was entitled to additional credited service
under the Pension Plan and the disability plan. The District Court concluded that Hawkins-Dunn
had earned an additional 0.8 years of service time under the Pension Plan on account of a plan
provision that awards service credit for corporation-approved leaves of absence. Specifically the
court found that a 1992 worker’s compensation settlement between Hawkins-Dunn and General
Motors rendered a portion of her first year of disability leave a corporation-approved leave of
absence. The court held that this additional credit did not apply under the disability plan because it
was earned after the date on which Hawkins-Dunn commenced disability leave.
II.
Under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), a participant in an employee benefit plan may bring an action
“to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Where, as here, the benefit plan in question gives
the plan administrator authority to construe the terms of the plan, courts will only overturn the
administrator’s decision if it is arbitrary and capricious. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989). This court reviews the District Court’s application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard de novo.

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No. 05-2124
Hawkins-Dunn v. General Motors Corp.
W here the language in a plan summary conflicts with the terms of the benefit plan itself, the provision in the
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plan summary controls. University Hosps. of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 850-51 (6th Cir. 2000).
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An interpretation of an employee benefit plan is not arbitrary and capricious when the reading
is “rational in light of the plan’s provisions.” Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir.
1988). This standard recognizes that each interpretation of an employee benefit plan “implicates the
rights of other members of the plan” and by ensuring that an administrator’s decision is rational “the
courts contribute to consistency and fairness in plan administration.” Id.
The resolution to this dispute over Hawkins-Dunn’s service time turns on the interpretation
and application of the terms of General Motors’ disability plan. As excerpted above, the disability
plan states that an employee’s “years of participation” for the purposes of calculating disability
benefits is determined “as of the day on which the disability commenced.” J.A. 51, 103. It is
undisputed that, as of January 27, 1987, when Hawkins-Dunn’s disability commenced, she had
accumulated 9.6 years of service time, just short of the ten years needed to become eligible for
disability benefits until age 65. In light of this fact, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion
that General Motors’ determination that Hawkins-Dunn has less than ten years of participation under
the disability plan was not arbitrary or capricious.
Hawkins-Dunn argues that a provision in General Motors’ insurance plan summary entitled
“What you should know about your Benefits for hourly employees” conflicts with the language in
the disability plan and compels a finding that she is entitled to more than ten years of participation.4
Specifically, Hawkins-Dunn points to language in the plan summary under the heading “Years of
Participation under the Insurance Plan” that states, “For insurance purposes, your credited service

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No. 05-2124
Hawkins-Dunn v. General Motors Corp.
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accrued on and after October 1, 1975 under the Pension Plan will be added to your years of
participation under the Group Life and Disability Insurance Program as of September 30, 1975.”
J.A. 78. Hawkins-Dunn interprets this provision to allow her to use her credited service under the
pension plan, which all parties agree is in excess of ten years, to qualify for the additional disability
benefits.
We begin by noting that Hawkins-Dunn’s interpretation is not the only, or even the most
plausible, interpretation of the summary plan language cited. Instead, the provision allows an
employee to add credited service under the pension plan accrued after October 1, 1975, to the years
of participation earned by the employee prior to September 30, 1975. Since Hawkins-Dunn did not
begin working at General Motors until 1977, this provision appears to have no relevance to her
benefit calculations.
Further, even if this provision did somehow allow for an employee hired in 1977 to add
pension credit to her years of participation under the insurance plan, Hawkins-Dunn’s eligibility for
benefits under the disability plan is determined “as of the day on which [her] disability commenced.”
J.A. 103. Thus, as the District Court observed, she cannot add the credit she received for a
corporation-approved leave of absence that occurred after January 27, 1987, to the years of
participation she had on that date.
Reading the provision of the plan summary cited by Hawkins-Dunn in light of the summary’s
surrounding provisions further supports the conclusion that General Motors’ interpretation is not
arbitrary or capricious. The section titled “Years of Participation under the Insurance Plan” sets forth
a method for changing the way General Motors calculated years of participation. The section is

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No. 05-2124
Hawkins-Dunn v. General Motors Corp.
The record contains only one reference to attorney’s fees; it appears in the second-to-last line of Hawkins-
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Dunn’s 13-page response to General Motors’ motion to affirm the administrator’s decision. In its order, the District
Court did not address this passing request.
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broken into three subsections: 1) Prior to September 1, 1950; 2) For the Period September 1, 1950
to October 1, 1975 and 3) On and After October 1, 1975. The language highlighted by Hawkins-
Dunn is in the last of these subsections.
A close inspection of the three subsections shows that the language of the second subsection
more closely mirrors the interpretation Hawkins-Dunn is trying to assign to the third subsection. The
second, or interim, subsection provides in part, “If your credited service under the Pension Plan is
greater than your years of participation, credited service may be used instead of years of
participation.” J.A. 78. If General Motors intended for employees to be able to use their credited
service for the pension plan for insurance purposes, this straightforward provision would have
appeared in the third, forward-looking section. The company’s decision not to employ this same
provision in the final subsection indicates that the third subsection has a different meaning, such as
the one described above. Since the interpretation urged by Hawkins-Dunn is inconsistent with the
language of the plan summary, we cannot say that General Motors’ interpretation is arbitrary and
capricious.
Hawkins-Dunn also requests this court to order the defendants to pay her attorney’s fees
relating to her District Court victory on her pension claim. Since the request was never properly
briefed or ruled upon in the District Court, we decline to reach it.5
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

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No. 05-2124
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