Hanson Aggregates Davon, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0411n.06
Filed: May 17, 2005
No. 04-3629
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
HANSON AGGREGATES DAVON, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
COMBINED BENEFIT FUND, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: GUY, DAUGHTREY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Hanson Aggregates Davon, Inc. (referred to
throughout the litigation as Davon, its pre-merger name), brought this action against United
Mineworkers of America Combined Benefit Fund to retrieve payments Davon made to the
Fund under a provision of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act), 26
U.S.C. §§ 9701, et seq., since held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Davon appeals the district court’s
judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

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No. 04-3629
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The district court determined that Davon was bound by the judgment entered against
it in a previous action in which Davon unsuccessfully attacked the constitutionality of the
scheme in the Seventh Circuit, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eastern Enterprises.
In order to avoid application of the doctrine of res judicata, Davon relied on a notice from
the Commissioner of Social Security in the wake of the Eastern Enterprises opinion,
indicating that the beneficiary assignments previously made under the Coal Act were void.
Characterizing this notice as a “material operative fact” that defeats the third and fourth
elements of the test for res judicata, Davon brought this action for restitution based on the
“federal common law” developed under ERISA. Davon concedes, however, that this is not
an ERISA case. In fact, the notice from the Social Security Administration, however
characterized, is not a judicially material fact, and the complaint in this case reflects only
a different theory of recovery, not a separate and distinct cause of action.
Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on appeal
and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in dismissing
the complaint. Because the reasons why judgment should be entered for the defendants
have been fully articulated by the district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this
court would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its opinion and
order filed March 26, 2004.

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