Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0272P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0272p.06… v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

*The Honorab le Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0272P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0272p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
LIRI NOREK MARKU,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney
General; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondents.
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No. 02-4366
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A73 415 870.
Submitted: March 12, 2004
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2004
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Ira J. Kurzban, KURZBAN, KURZBAN,
WEINGER & TETZELI, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner. Lyle
2 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
1The appen dix annexed to Petitioner’s brief in this case will be
designated as “Ap p.”
D. Jentzer, Linda S. Wernery, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondents.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. In this appeal,
Petitioner Liri Norek Marku seeks review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying her application for
asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208
and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3). Because the BIA properly
found that Marku failed to demonstrate past persecution or the
likelihood of future persecution on account of a political
opinion or membership in a particular social group, we
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Marku, a citizen of Albania had lived in Fier, Albania, all
of her life, before fleeing to the United States in 1995. App.
at 86-87.1 While in Albania, Marku was the Chief Finance
Officer (also called the top economist) of the government-
owned National Government Tobacco Company of Albania
(NGTCA) from 1975 until 1994. Id. at 59, 108. In 1994, part
of NGTCA merged with a private Greek tobacco company
known as Costa. Id. at 58, 93. After the merger, the NGTCA
continued to exist as a separate entity but the newly-formed
joint venture became known as National United Kavax

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 3
2Marku was unclear in her testimony as to what extent KAV AX was
considered a private or public entity. Compa re App. at 93 (testifying that
KAVAX was “governmental but . . . [it] was more or less . . . a company
that was privately owned .”); and id. at 100 (“It was a privately-owned
firm that was cooperating with the government.”); with id. at 113 (“As far
as the joint venture Kavax was concerned, the state was in charge.”); and
id. at 130 (describing KAV AX as “public and state o wned ”).
3There is discrepancy in the record as to exact amount of the deficit.
Marku’s affidavit indicates that the deficit was $1,862,532 , and her
testimony consistently rounds that to $1,800,000. App. at 59, 94, 117,
141. The IJ’s opinion, however, indicates that the deficit was $280,000,
which is the dollar equivalent of 1,800,00 0 leke. Id. at 11.
4Marku’s testimony suggests that the Albanian law applies only to
private entities or to joint ventures between p ublic and p rivate entities.
App. at 118-19 (suggesting that Sota wanted Marku to transfer the loss
from KA VA X to the NG TCA because as a wholly public entity, the
NGTCA did not have to comply with the law); id. at 17 (noting that the
state owned com pany was exempt from dissolution in the event of loss).
Industry (KAVAX).2 Technically, after the merger, Marku
worked for both KAVAX and the NGTCA. Id. at 93. One of
her responsibilities was to prepare and file KAVAK’s public
financial disclosures. Id. at 108-09.
KAVAX ended its first fiscal year with a deficit of
approximately $280,000.3 Id. at 11, 17, 94. Marku blamed
these losses, in part, on Spiro Sota, Marku’s direct supervisor,
who was in charge of KAVAX and was also a Vice Minister
in the Ministry of Agriculture, appointed by the Prime
Minister of Albania. Id. at 17-18, 113, 116, 128. Albanian
law HR 83 requires the dissolution of companies with annual
losses exceeding certain thresholds.4 Id. at 94, 103, 118-119.
Apparently, if Marku were to file accurate public financial
disclosures, correctly reflecting the company’s significant
losses, KAVAX would have to be dissolved under the
Albanian law. Id.
4 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
Therefore, in January of 1995, Sota called Marku into the
director’s office and tried to persuade her to manipulate
KAVAX’s balance sheet in order to disguise the company’s
losses. Id. at 59-60, 117. Specifically, Sota asked Marku to
shift the loss from KAVAX to NGTCA. Id. at 17, 60, 95,
117. He promised Marku that he would protect her from the
law in case the auditors discovered the manipulation. Id. at
117. Despite Sota’s promise, Marku feared that she would be
sent to jail and refused to comply. Id. at 95, 117. In response
to her refusal, Sota placed a revolver on the desk, presumably
as a not-so-veiled threat. Id. When Marku again refused to
doctor the books, Sota raised his voice, hit his hand on the
desk and then placed it on the revolver. Id. at 117. The
meeting was interrupted by the unannounced arrival of Sota’s
secretary. Id.
A week after the meeting, Sota, giving no advance notice,
sent Marku on a business trip with a colleague to the city of
Vlore. Id. at 12, 60, 117. On their way back, a car drove
straight at them, causing their car to veer off the road and flip
over three or four times. Id. at 60, 118. Both Marku and her
colleague suffered injuries. Id. Marku’s colleague reported
the incident to the police, and the police revealed, after an
investigation, that the driver who caused the accident was a
former chauffeur of Sota. Id. at 98, 118, 124. Marku did not
know whether the government ever pressed criminal charges
against the driver. Id. at 124.
Marku testified that she did not report Sota’s conduct and
threats to anyone because she believed it would be futile, as
the entire government was corrupt. Id. at 132 (“I had no
place to go and complain because corruption was
everywhere. . . . I was aware that there was no constitution in
place where I could . . . have my own rights protected by
law.”). Fearing for her life, Marku made an early and
accurate submission of the corporate filings report. Id. at 13,
61, 120, 123. After obtaining a visa in someone else’s name,
she immediately fled to the United States, leaving her

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 5
5According to the State Department Report upon which she relies,
shortly after Marku fled to the United States, the Office of the Interior
Ministry established an Internal Affairs Office to deal with citizen
com plaints and to uncover public corruption. App. at 33. We mention
this not because of its potential bearing on the reasonableness o f Ma rku’s
fear of future p rosec ution, but so that Marku will be aware of this
resource, in the unlikely event that she ever finds herself in a similar
situation.
6W hile Marku was in the United States, her sister also informed her
that someone had unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap Marku’s daughters
while they were walking home from school. App. at 68. However, there
is no evidence to suggest that this alleged attempt was related to the
incidents at KAVAX . In fact, M arku testified that kidnaping of young
girls for export was a persistent p roblem in A lbania. Id. at 126.
daughters behind because she could not get a visa for them.5
Id. at 13, 61, 88, 120, 125. It appears that Marku left without
alerting anyone in the government about Sota’s attempts at
corruption or threats of violence. At some point after she fled
the country, Marku’s friends back in Albania told her that
KAVAX had been dissolved and Sota fired. Id. at 13, 61,
142. However, according to these unidentified friends, after
a new government came to power in 1997, he was appointed
‘Primary Expert’ at the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of
Agriculture, a position similar to the one he had previously
held. Id. at 13, 61, 97, 120-21, 125, 142.6
Meanwhile, Marku continues to fear persecution were she
to return to Albania. She writes, “It can be eas[ily]
understood that many persons, [A]lbanian and Greeks, whose
interests were hurt, can not forgive me.” Id. at 80. She
testified that there was extensive corruption in Albania, and
that she saw Sota’s corrupt activities as part of a general
trend. Id. at 119-20, 123. However, other than the incidents
described supra, Marku does not detail any specific instances
of corruption. To support her contentions, she cites to a State
Department report, which indicates that the judicial system in
Albania is inefficient, corrupt, and subject to executive
pressure even when the political situation is stable. Id. at 32-
6 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
33. The State Department report states further that
“[a]ccusations of corruption among public officials have been
raised during each of the three governments.” Id. at 33.
Marku also cites to an Amnesty International report which
mentions that a journalist had been detained after he wrote
that “corruption [and] ‘degraded politics’ might ‘explode’ in
Albania.” Id. at 71.
Marku arrived in the United States on or about February 28,
1995, filed a timely application for asylum on November 6,
1995, and a renewed application for asylum and withholding
of removal on August 13, 1998. Pet. Br. at 3; App. at 50, 73,
81. Marku was issued a Notice to Appear before an
Immigration Judge (IJ) on December 11, 1997, and was
charged with failure to possess a “valid nonimmigrant visa or
border crossing identification card at the time of application
for admission.” App. at 81. On August 14, 1998, Marku
appeared telephonically before an IJ in Detroit. Id. at 83. She
requested asylum, withholding of removal, or in the
alternative, voluntary departure. Pet. Br. at 9. On September
14, 1998 and November 16, 1998, Marku appeared before the
IJ to present evidence and testimony in support of her asylum
application. Pet. Br. at 9; App. at 85, 102.
In an oral opinion on November 16, 1998, the IJ found
Marku credible but concluded:
[T]here is insufficient evidence to establish that the
persecutor imputed any political claim whatsoever to the
respondent. Rather, the individual directly responsible
for taking action against this respondent did so as a result
of his fear that she would expose his criminal and corrupt
activities.
App. at 14, 18, 19. Accordingly, the IJ denied Marku’s
application for asylum and withholding of removal, but did
grant her the privilege of voluntary departure. Id. at 21. The
BIA dismissed the appeal on October 9, 2002, agreeing that
there was “no nexus between the harm directed towards the

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 7
respondent and a protected ground.” Id. at 2. The BIA found
that Sota’s attempts to harm Marku were motivated by his
fear that she would disclose his illegal activities and not by
any of the statutorily protected grounds. Id. Marku appeals
the BIA’s decision, arguing that the BIA erred as a matter of
law in holding that she was not persecuted on account of her
political opinion or membership in a particular social group.
II. DISCUSSION
We must determine whether the BIA erred in holding that
Marku is not eligible for asylum because she did not prove
she fears persecution on account of a ground protected by the
INA. We review the BIA’s factual determinations using the
substantial evidence standard, in which we uphold a BIA
determination as long as it is “supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992); Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 151-52 (6th Cir.
1992). Reversal of a factual determination of the BIA is only
warranted when the reviewing court finds that the evidence
not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it. See
Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152. We review the BIA’s conclusions
of law de novo. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 409 (6th
Cir. 2004); Amadou v. INS, 226 F.3d 724, 726 (6th Cir.
2000); Adhiyappa v. INS, 58 F.3d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1995).
An applicant for asylum must demonstrate that she is a
refugee as defined by the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); see also Perkovic v.
INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994). To establish refugee
status, an alien has the burden of proving that she is unable or
unwilling to return to her home country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(emphasis added); see also Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 487
(6th Cir. 2001).
8 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
Marku argues that she was and will be persecuted based on
her political opinion, which she describes generally as an
opposition to government corruption. Similarly, Marku
argues that she was and will be persecuted on account of her
membership in a “class comprised of former government
employees who directly contested government corruption.”
Reply Br. at 20. It is true that a number of courts have held
that opposition to government corruption can constitute a
political opinion under particular circumstances. See, e.g., Li
Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d. Cir. 2001); Gonahasa
v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 1999); Reyes-Guerrero v.
INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999); Marquez v. INS,
105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1997); Gonzales-Neyra v. INS,
133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Desir, 840 F.2d 723, 727
(9th Cir.1988). Substantial evidence, however, supports the
BIA’s finding that, in this case, Marku’s actions did not
constitute an expression of political opinion and that no
political opinion was imputed to her.
In order to demonstrate that an applicant has been
persecuted on account of a political opinion or membership in
a particular social group, it is not enough to present evidence
that the applicant had a political opinion or was a member of
that social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Evidence
must be presented which suggests that the applicant was
persecuted on account of or because of the political opinion.
Id.; see also Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 479; Klawitter, 970
F.2d at 152; Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 349
(5th Cir. 2002); Ochave v. INS., 254 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir.
2001); Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir.
1986). In this case, Marku’s testimony may suggest that, as
an ideological matter, she was opposed to government
corruption, but she presents no evidence that any of her
actions were ideologically motivated or that Sota, her alleged
persecutor, perceived them as such.

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 9
7W hen asked whether she ever expressed a political opinion, she
replied, “Of co urse, . . . I made my criticism to certain levels of the
society when something went wrong, but my words went to the deaf ear
. . . .” App. at 137. M arku, however, never specified to whom she spoke
or the nature of her criticism. Such testimony is not “sufficiently detailed
to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis” for her fear of
perse cution on account of po litical opinion. Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 621.
8Marku may well fit into the particular social group of “former
government employees” or “former government employees who refused
to comply with their employer’s demands,” however, Marku has
presented no evidence which compels the conclusion that this makes her
particularly likely to be persecuted in Albania. Therefore, the BIA could
not be compe lled to find that Marku had a reaso nable fear of future
persecution on such a b asis.
To start with, Marku does not claim that she ever publicly
opposed corruption.7 Cf. Marquez, 105 F.3d at 381
(indicating that if the applicant “had spoken out repeatedly as
a public gadfly about reforming a corruption-ridden
government,” this would be more likely to result in a finding
of persecution on account of political opinion). Instead, the
only evidence Marku presents (beyond her own testimony) to
suggest that she was even opposed in principle to government
corruption, is the fact that she refused to doctor KAVAX’s
books. No evidence in the record, however, compels the
conclusion that Marku’s refusal was based on a political
opinion. To the contrary, she testified that her motive for
refusing to submit doctored balance sheets was her desire not
to go to jail. App. at 117 (“I couldn’t do this personally,
because I could be sent to jail.”); see also App. at 95 (“I
couldn’t believe [Sota] that he was going to protect me . . .
[M]ost likely I was going to wind up in jail.”). Marku never
counseled Sota against engaging in corrupt activity, nor did
she attempt to directly expose his corruption at any time
before or after leaving the country. Her actions and
statements suggest that she simply did not want to be
personally involved in criminal activity.8 Without more,
10 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
9Although some courts have held that when the government
persecutes an individual who has not committed a crime, the persecution
is presumab ly ‘on acc ount o f political opinio n,’ Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985), the presumption is rebutted when, as
here, there is evidence indicating that political opinion was not the reason
for the persecution. In any case, it is not clear that it would even make
sense to apply this presumption where the “government” is limited to one
director of a quasi-public com pany.
submission of accurate balance sheets, under the facts of this
case, is not an expression of political opinion.9
Even if Marku had demonstrated that she acted based on a
political opinion, she presented no evidence that Sota
interpreted her refusal as such. See Adhiyappa, 58 F.3d at
267 (“[T]he motives of the asylum seeker are relevant only to
the extent that they illuminate the motives of the alleged
persecutors.”). Marku is not expected to provide direct proof
of Sota’s motive, but must show “some evidence of it, direct
or circumstantial.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. Because
she is asking this court to reverse the determination of the
BIA, the evidence must be “so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”
Id.
As noted above, Marku presented no evidence that she ever
denounced corruption in public or at work. She presented no
evidence that Sota believed her reason for refusing to commit
fraud was anything other than her desire not to go to jail.
Therefore, there is no evidence that Sota imputed a political
opinion to Marku. Far from compelling the conclusion that
Sota was reacting to any political opinion, Marku’s testimony
suggests that Sota’s motives were also purely personal. App.
at 118 (suggesting that Sota was acting out of fear of losing
his job); see also Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152 (“However
distasteful his apparent treatment of the respondent may have
been, such harm or threats arising from a personal dispute of
this nature, even one taking place with an individual in a high
governmental position, is not a ground for asylum.”); Tarubac

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 11
10Marku argues that the BIA failed to properly apply a mixed motive
analysis. It is true that when an asylum applicant demonstrates that she
was persecuted on the basis of more than one factor, she is eligible for
asylum so long as one of those factors is a protected ground under the
INA. See Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002). Here,
however, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Marku
was not pe rsecuted on the basis of any protected ground. The BIA stated
for explanatory purp oses the motive behind S ota’s persecution of Marku,
i.e., Sota’s fear that M arku would expose him. The BIA did not conclude
that the presence of this motivation precluded it from finding that Marku
was also persecuted o n the basis of a p rotected gro und. The BIA merely
found no evidence that Marku was persecuted on any protected ground.
Therefore, a mixed mo tive analysis would not be appropriate in this case
although it might well be under other circumstances. See Amanfi v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 71 9, 727 (3d C ir. 2003).
v. INS, 182 F.3d 1114, 1999 (9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that,
although largely irrelevant in a mixed motive case, evidence
of a nonpolitical motivation is clearly relevant where the BIA
finds substantial evidence that the only motivation for the
persecution was nonpolitical).10
Moreover, given (a) the largely private nature of KAVAX
(it was, in part, privately owned and its mission was more
commercial than governmental); (b) the fact that the
attempted corruption related solely to avoiding financial
disclosure obligations; and (c) the fact that the subject
misconduct was an attempt to thwart a law which applied
only to private entities, it is unlikely that Sota believed he was
even asking Marku to be a part of political or governmental
corruption. This makes it even less likely that Sota would
interpret Marku’s refusal as being politically motivated.
Marku relies on three Ninth Circuit cases for the
proposition that her actions amounted to an expression of
political opinion. See Reyes-Guerrero, 192 F.3d at 1245;
Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000); Desir, 840 F.2d
at 727. Of course, these cases from outside the circuit are not
binding on us, but they do have some persuasive value. See
Duffy v. Ford Motor Co., 218 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2000).
12 Marku v. Ashcroft No. 02-4366
11In Grava, the petitioner was a customs agent who re peatedly
uncovered and reported corruption in a number of customs offices, despite
the fact that every time he blew the whistle, he was transferred to a new
office. See Grava, 205 F.3d at 1179-80 . The court in Grava did not find
that there was a nexus between the petitioner’s persecution and his
asserted political opin ion. Id. at 1181. The co urt merely found that the
It is true that in these cases, the court found persecution on
account of political opinion because of the petitioners’
opposition to corruption. The cases are distinguishable,
however, because unlike here, it was clear that the other
petitioners were being persecuted because of an imputed
political opinion.
In each of these cases, the petitioners were on relatively
public campaigns against wide-spread corruption. For
instance, in Reyes-Guerrero, the petitioner was investigating
and prosecuting the corruption of 18 members of the Liberal
party, on behalf of the opposing political party. See Reyes-
Guerrero, 192 F.3d at 1243. Other than being in retaliation
for this investigation and prosecution, which, on its face, was
inherently political, there was no other plausible explanation
for the persecution which followed. See id. at 1245. The
court noted that “[t]he BIA was precisely right that [the
petitioner] was ‘perceived to be “playing politics” or seeking
to embarrass the Liberal Party in his attempt to obtain
convictions of the defendants.’” Id. at 1245.
Similarly, in Desir, the petitioner repeatedly refused to pay
an extortionate tax, despite each refusal’s resulting in his
arrest. See Desir, 840 F.2d at 724. In so doing, he “expressly
refused to affiliate himself with a particular faction.” Id. at
729. Further, the petitioner in Desir, presented evidence that
he regularly met in a small group to discuss his opposition to
the government “kleptocracy.” Id. at 724-25. The court
concluded that it “must view [the petitioner] as possessing a
political opinion because his persecutors . . . both attributed
subversive views to [him] and treated him as a subversive.”
Id. at 729.11

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No. 02-4366 Marku v. Ashcroft 13
BIA erred in finding that Grava's whistleblow ing could no t, as a matter of
law, constitute an expression of political opinio n. Id.
12To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must show
a “clear probability of persecution,” which is a stricter standard than the
“well-founded fear” standard that applies with respect to applications for
asylum. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U .S. 407, 430 (1984 ); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(b)(1). Because Marku has failed to demonstrate a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of a political opinion or membership in a
particular social group, her request for withholding of deportation must
likewise fail. See Ali, 366 F.3d at 411-12 ; Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355
F.3d 615 , 625 (6th Cir. 2004).
In contrast, here Marku has presented no evidence to compel
the conclusion that Sota or anyone else knew or should have
known that she was even opposed to government corruption
or had any other political opinion. Because the BIA properly
found that Marku did not demonstrate past persecution or the
likelihood of future persecution on account of a political
opinion or membership in the class of government employees
who opposed corruption, asylum is not an appropriate
remedy. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the BIA and
DENY the petition for review.12

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