Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0216P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0216p.06… v. Ellie M. Cantrell

*The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0216P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0216p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
ALDEN JOE DANIEL, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ELLIE M. CANTRELL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 03-5188
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
No. 02-00182—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge.
Submitted: March 12, 2004
Decided and Filed: July 8, 2004
Before: MARTIN, CLAY, and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: M. Drew Robinson, Cleveland, Tennessee,
Russell S. Baldwin, BASS, BERRY & SIMS, Nashville,
Tennessee, Melinda Meador, BASS, BERRY & SIMS,
2 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
Knoxville, Tennessee, N. Mark Kinsman, BAKER,
KINSMAN, HOLLIS, CLELLAND & WINER, Chattanooga,
Tennessee, Michael E. Jenne, JENNE, SCOTT & JENNE,
Cleveland, Tennessee, Martha A. Campbell, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, Kent
E. Krause, Henry S. Queener III, BREWER, KRAUSE &
BROOKS, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. Alden J.
Daniel, Jr., Wartburg, Tennessee, pro se.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant filed this pro
se appeal from the district court’s order granting the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to the
Video Privacy Protection Act (the Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
Plaintiff argues that the district court committed error by
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
issues whether certain defendants were proper parties under
the Act and whether the plaintiff timely filed his claim within
the two-year statute of limitations period of the Act. For the
reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
I.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr. (Daniel) was charged
with and eventually pleaded guilty to the sexual molestation
of three underage girls. Allegedly, part of his modus
operandi was showing pornographic movies to the underage
girls. Kimbrell Br. at 3. Therefore, as part of the criminal
investigation into his conduct, law enforcement officials
sought and were able to obtain his video rental records. On
March 27, 2000, Daniel’s state-appointed attorney, James F.
Logan, filed a motion to suppress the disclosures. The motion
argued that these video rental records were obtained in

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 3
violation of the Act. It is unclear whether or not this motion
was granted; however, between May and August of 2000,
Daniel pleaded guilty to one count of rape, five counts of
statutory rape, two counts of sexual battery by an authority
figure and failure to appear.
On June 10, 2002, Daniel filed a pro se complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee alleging that numerous defendants obtained and
disclosed private information regarding his rental of
pornographic videos in violation of the Act. Defendants
“John Doe #1 and Prime Star, John Doe #2 and G&M
Market, and Tim Taylor and Fantasy World,” are retail video
stores at which the plaintiff allegedly had accounts and the
employees who allegedly made disclosures. Defendants
Chuck Kimbrell, Tony Alvarez, Stephen Davis Crump,
Joseph Victor Hoffer and Jerry Estes are the law enforcement
officers and officials who investigated and prosecuted Daniel
for rape and statutory rape in Bradley County Criminal Court,
Tennessee. Defendants Lee Ann Stabler and Ellie and
Michael Cantrell are parents of Daniel’s rape victims and also
the plaintiffs in a civil suit against Daniel. Defendant Roger
Jenne is an attorney who represented Stabler and the Cantrells
in their state civil litigation and in the criminal prosecution.
In his complaint, Daniel asserts that video rental store
owners and their employees disclosed personally identifiable
information about his video rentals to defendants Estes, the
Cantrells, Stabler, Jenne, Kimbrell and Alvarez. These
defendants then disclosed this information to a Bradley
County Grand Jury. Daniel alleges that these disclosures
violated his right to privately rent video tapes under the Act.
According to Daniel’s complaint, the disclosures began as
early as January 11, 1998, and were ongoing and continuous
up to the last two civil suits against him that were filed in
September, 2001. To support this latter contention, Daniel
submitted the sworn affidavits of his mother and father.
4 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
1That Rule provides, in relevant part that: “The app ellant must
prepare and file an appendix to the briefs containing:
(A) the relevant docket entries in the proceeding below;
(B) the relevant portions of the pleadings, charge, findings, or
The defendants thereafter filed various motions to dismiss
Daniel’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). However, because the defendants
attached affidavits and other documents outside of the
complaint to their motions, the district court treated their
motions to dismiss as a collective motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
On January 3, 2003, the district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment because it reasoned that those
defendants who were not “video service provider[s]” under
the Act were not subject to legal liability. See Daniel v.
Cantrell, 241 F. Supp. 2d 867, 872 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). The
court further reasoned that those defendants who were “video
service provider[s]” were not subject to liability because
Daniel did not timely file his lawsuit within the applicable
two-year statute of limitations in the Act. Id. at 873 (“The
Court finds that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged
violation on March 27, 2000, the date he filed the motion to
suppress. To maintain his action, the plaintiff was required to
file his action on or before March 27, 2002. Because he filed
on June 17, 2002, this action against the named video service
providers is barred by the statute of limitations.”). In
addition, the court stated that summary judgment was
appropriate against Daniel as to the statute of limitations
because Daniel “present[ed] no evidence or reference to a
specific incident to demonstrate that such disclosure is
ongoing or that any disclosure occurred after the date the
motion to suppress was filed on his behalf.” Id.
Of course, we could decline to address the merits of
Daniel’s appeal because of his failure to file or designate a
joint appendix or other certified documents as required by
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.1

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 5
opinion;
(C) the judgment, order, or decision in question; and
(D) other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the
court’s attention.
Fed. R. App. P. 30 (a)(1) (emphasis added).
2The Sixth Circuit Rule on failure to file a joint appendix provides
the following sanctions:
Sanctions. Failure to file a joint appendix, or the filing of a joint
appendix substantially out of compliance with the requirements
of this local rule, may result in dismissal of the appea l. This
Court, on the motion of a party or on its own motion, may deny
costs to a party who has been responsible for the insertion of
unnecessary material into, or for the omission of necessary
material from, the joint appendix. Mo reover, any counsel who
so complicates the proceedings in any case b y unreasonably and
vexatiously failing to comply with the requirements of this local
rule may be required by this Court to satisfy personally any
excess costs . . . and may be subject to disciplinary sanctions.
6th Cir. R. 30(m) (emphasis added).
However, we will exercise our discretion and address the
merits of Daniel’s claims, especially since no decision from
this court has interpreted the applicable provisions of the Act
and the district court issued a published opinion.2
II.
DISCUSSION
Because Daniel appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendants, this court reviews the
district court’s opinion de novo. See Logan v. Denny’s, Inc.,
259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is
proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although all facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
a non-movant “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials
6 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
1. Proper Parties
As noted earlier, Daniel brings this suit against (1) various
police officers, attorneys, and the parents of one of Daniel’s
victims, as well as (2) the employees and owners of two video
stores where Daniel rented pornographic videos. There is no
dispute that the defendants making up this second category
are proper parties under the Act. The only question which we
must answer is whether the defendants not associated with the
video stores are proper parties under the Act. We believe that
based on the plain language of the Act, this first group of
defendants are not proper parties.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)
Reading Daniel’s complaint broadly, it appears that he may
be asserting claims under two sections of the Act: §§ 2710(b)
and (d). We discuss section (b) first. Section (b) provides
that “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly
discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information
concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to
the aggrieved person for the relief provided in subsection
(d).” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore,
under the plain language of the statute, only a “video tape
service provider” (VTSP) can be liable. The term VTSP is
defined by the statute to mean “any person, engaged in the
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of
rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or
similar audio video materials, or any person or other entity to
whom a disclosure is made under subparagraph (D) or (E) of
subsection (b)(2), but only with respect to the information
contained in the disclosure.” Id. at § 2710(a)(4). Daniel does
not allege that the defendants in question are engaged in the
business of rental, sale or delivery of prerecorded video
cassette tapes. Therefore, the defendants may only be VTSPs

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 7
if personal information was disclosed to them under
subparagraph (D) or (E) of subsection (b)(2).
Subparagraph (D) applies “if the disclosure is solely the
names and addresses of consumers.” Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(D).
Moreover, disclosure under subparagraph (D) must be “for
the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly to
the consumer.” Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii). For instance, if a
video store provided the names and addresses of its patrons to
a movie magazine publisher, the publisher would be
considered a VTSP, but only with respect to the information
contained in the disclosure. No disclosure in this case was
made under subparagraph (D). The information provided was
not limited to Daniel’s name and address. Instead, the
disclosure was of Daniel’s history of renting pornographic
videotapes and included the specific titles of those videos.
Additionally, the disclosure was not for marketing purposes
but for purposes of a criminal investigation. Therefore,
subparagraph (D) is inapplicable in this case.
Daniel properly does not argue that the disclosure falls
within subparagraph (E). See Pl.’s Br. at 15 (“[T]he appellant
alleged specific information obtained and disclosed by the
appellees . . . pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(i)(ii),
Appellate Record at 1 and 36”). Subparagraph (E) applies
only to disclosures made “incident to the ordinary course of
business” of the VTSP. Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(E). The term
“ordinary course of business” is “narrowly defined” in the
statute to mean “only debt collection activities, order
fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of
ownership.” Id. at § 2710(a)(2); see also S. Rep. No. 100-599
at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342 (noting
that the term is “narrowly defined” in the statute). “Order
fulfillment” and “request processing” are defined in the
legislative history as the use, by VTSPs, of “mailing houses,
warehouses, computer services, and similar companies for
marketing to their customers.” S. Rep. No. 100-599 at 14
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342. Daniel
presents no evidence suggesting that his information was
8 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
disclosed as a result of any of these activities. The disclosure
in this case seems to have been made in conjunction with a
criminal investigation, which is not included on the list of
disclosures made “in the ordinary course of business.”
Moreover, as such a request is anything but ordinary, it would
not naturally fit into this list and, in fact, would be addressed
by a different section of the Act. See id. at § 2710(b)(2)(C)
(discussing disclosure to a law enforcement agency). In sum,
because Daniel has presented no evidence suggesting that a
disclosure was made under subparagraph (D) or (E) in this
case, the non-video store defendants are not VTSPs under the
Act and therefore, are not proper parties to this litigation.
Daniel argues, however, that any person, not just a VTSP,
can be liable under the Act based on Dirkes v. Borough of
Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996). Dirkes did
reach this conclusion but only by misreading the Act. The
court in Dirkes was focused on language in the Act stating
that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a person in
violation of this section may bring a civil action in the United
States district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (emphasis
added). Because the statute states that a suit can be based
upon an act of “a person” rather than an act of “a VTSP,”
Dirkes found that any person can be liable under the Act.
Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 240. Dirkes, however, ignored the
rest of the sentence. A lawsuit under the Act must be based
on an “act of a person in violation of this section . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute makes it
clear that only a VTSP can be in violation of section 2710(b).
See § 2710(b)(1) (“A video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses . . . personally identifiable information
. . . shall be liable . . . .”). Moreover, if any person could be
liable under the Act, there would be no need for the Act to
define a VTSP in the first place. Id. at § 2710(a)(4). More
tellingly, if any person could be liable under the Act, there is
no reason that the definition of a VTSP would be limited to
“any person . . . to whom a disclosure is made under
subparagraph (D) or (E) of subsection (b)(2).” Id. (emphasis
added). Dirkes would have us ignore this limitation and find

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 9
3Dirkes argues that this interp retation is absurd. “[T]he plain
language of the Act does not delineate those parties against whom an
action under this Act may be maintained. Ta king the Defendants’
argument to its logical extension, this omission would prevent plaintiffs
from bringing a cause of action against anyo ne.” Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at
240. W e do not know what statute the court in Dirkes was reading, but
the Act plainly states that an action can b e bro ught against a V TS P. See
18 U.S.C. § 2 710 (b)(1 ) (“A vid eo tap e service pro vider who knowingly
discloses . . . personally identifiable informatio n . . . shall be liable . . . .”).
that any person can be liable under the Act whether or not a
disclosure was made to him under subparagraph (D) or (E).
We avoid interpretations of a statute which would render
portions of it superfluous. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906,
913 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660,
667 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Every word in the statute is presumed
to have meaning, and we must give effect to all the words to
avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous
or redundant.”)); United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 537
(6th Cir. 2004) (“We may not construe a statute in a manner
that renders part of the law superfluous.”).3
The court in Dirkes found otherwise because the “clear
intent of the Act,” as demonstrated by its legislative history,
“is to prevent the disclosure of private information.” Dirkes,
936 F. Supp. at 240. Where the plain language of a statute is
clear, however, we do not consult the legislative history. See
In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.
1999) (“When interpreting a statute, we must begin with its
plain language, and may resort to a review of congressional
intent or legislative history only when the language of the
statute is not clear.”) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir.
1997) (“We have not referred to legislative history in our
discussion of this issue because, where the statutory meaning
is clear, we do not resort to legislative history.”). In any
case, our interpretation of the statute—that only a VTSP can
be liable under § 2710(b)—does not conflict with Congress’
10 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
4Daniel also cites Camfield v. City o f Okla hom a City, 248 F.3d 1214
(10th. Cir 2001) in support of his argument. Daniel believes Camfield
supp orts his position because in that case, several defendants, unrelated
to video stores, were found liable under the Act. It appears, however, that
the defendants in Camfield did not raise this issue on appeal and the court
did not discuss it. Therefore, we do not know whether the court in
Camfield or the district court below ever considered the issue, and the
decision is of little value to us.
purpose in adopting the Act. One can “prevent the disclosure
of private information” simply by cutting off disclosure at its
source, i.e., the VTSP. Just because Congress’ goal was to
prevent the disclosure of private information, does not mean
that Congress intended the implementation of every
conceivable method of preventing disclosures. Printing all
personal information in hieroglyphics instead of English
would also help prevent the disclosure of such information.
However, nothing in the legislative history suggests that
Congress was encouraging hieroglyphics and, similarly,
nothing suggests that Congress intended that anyone other
than VTSPs would be liable under the Act.4 In sum, the Act
is clear that only a VTSP can be liable under § 2710(b).
Because the non-video store defendants do not fit within the
definition of a VTSP, they are not proper parties.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d)
It is unclear to this court whether Daniel is asserting a claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). Nonetheless, in the interests of
completeness we will explain why such a claim must fail.
Section 2710(d) states that “[p]ersonally identifiable
information obtained in any manner other than as provided in
this section shall not be received in evidence in any . . .
proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). Daniel cannot bring suit
based on this section, however, because it is a rule of
evidence—not a basis for a private cause of action. This is
clear for at least two reasons.

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 11
5One might argue that our reading of the statute is problematic
because there would be no way to enforce section (e)— the requirement
that old records be timely destro yed. H owever, if the failure to timely
destroy such records resulted in harm to the consumer, he could
presumab ly bring a negligence action against the VTSP and benefit from
the existence of section (e) by arguing negligence per se. See J.D. Lee &
Barry Linda hl, Mo dern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:42 (2d ed.
2003) (“Under the per se rule, the violation of an applicable statute is
conclusive proof of negligence, leaving only the question of causation to
be determined.”).
First, only § 2710(b) can form the basis of liability. This is
plain because only section (b) includes language relating to
liability. See id. at § 2710(b)(1) (noting that a VTSP “shall be
liable” for violating the section). Neither section (d) nor
section (e) contains such language. Further, the structure of
the statute make it clear that a civil action may be brought
based on only a violation of section (b). Immediately after
section (b), section (c) discusses the rules for bringing a “civil
action.” After section (c), sections (d) and (e) discuss
receiving personal information into evidence and destruction
of old records. If these later sections were to be a basis for
liability, it would make sense that the section on civil actions
would come at the end of the statute, rather than preceding
these sections.5
Second, section (d) states that personal information not
properly disclosed “shall not be received into evidence.” Id.
at 2710(d) (emphasis added). As the district court aptly
noted, “[t]he decision whether or not to receive documents or
testimony is one that will be made by the person presiding
over the relevant proceeding. . . . A private individual is not
in a position to ‘receive’ video records into evidence.”
Daniel, 241 F. Supp. at 872. If Congress wanted, it certainly
could have stated that “no person shall attempt to submit”
personal information into evidence. Congress, however, did
not use this language. Therefore, it is clear that section (d) is
a rule of evidence and cannot be the basis for a private cause
of action.
12 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
Because the following defendants do not fit into the
definition of a VTSP necessary for liability under section (b)
and because section (d) is not the basis for a private cause of
action, we affirm the district court in its dismissal of all
claims against Ellie M. Cantrell, Michael Cantrell, Lee Ann
Stabler, Roger E. Jenne, Jerry N. Estes, Joseph V. Hoffer,
Stephen D. Crump, Chuck Kimbrell and Tony Alvarez.
2. Statute of Limitations
We next turn to the issue whether the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the defendants on the statute of
limitations issue was erroneous. Daniel argues that the
district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to whether the statute of limitations
period prescribed by the Act had expired before he filed his
complaint with the district court on June 10, 2002.
In relevant part, the Act authorizes a civil action by a
litigant, except that “no action may be brought under this
subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years from the
date of the act complained of or the date of discovery.”
18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(3). The district court found that it could
impute knowledge of the privacy violation to Daniel as of
March 27, 2000—the date on which his attorney filed a
motion to suppress evidence of Daniel’s video rental history.
The district court’s conclusion is supported by Veal v. Geraci,
23 F.3d 722 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the Second Circuit,
based on an agency theory, held that a § 1983 action was
barred by the statute of limitations because Veal’s attorney
had made a motion to suppress the same evidence more than
three years before the § 1983 action was brought. Daniel
does not argue that Veal was improperly decided, nor does he
cite any case to the contrary.
Tennessee law of agency is in accord. In Smith v. Petkoff,
919 S.W.2d 595, 597-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), the
Tennessee Court of Appeals also held that an attorney’s

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 13
knowledge of the facts and circumstances of a case are
automatically imputed to the client. The court held:
[A] person generally is held to know what his attorney
knows and should communicate to him, and the fact that
the attorney has not actually communicated his
knowledge to the client is immaterial. So, the facts
constituting knowledge, or want of it, on the part of an
attorney, are proper subjects of proof, and are to be
ascertained by testimony as in other cases; but when
ascertained, the constructive notice thereof to the client
is conclusive, and cannot be rebutted by showing that the
attorney did not in fact impart the information so
acquired.
Id. (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 182 (1980));
accord Lane-Detman, L.L.C. v. Miller & Martin, 82 S.W.3d
284, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (same); see also Moody v.
Moody, 681 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1984) (“Counsel’s
knowledge must be attributed to his client, if the actions of
the court are to have any efficacy.”); Roberts v. State, 546
S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (“A client is implied
to have notice of facts transmitted to his attorney in the matter
and course of his employment for such client.”). Since there
is no dispute that Daniel’s criminal attorney knew of the
alleged privacy violations as of March 27, 2000, it follows, as
a matter of Tennessee law, that Daniel also knew of the
alleged violations as of that date.
14 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
6Daniel also argues that his claims fall within the statute of
limitations of the Act, based on a “subsequent disclosure” made in
September 2001. However, this “disclosure” was also prepared by non-
VT SPs and therefore is not releva nt for statute of limitations purposes.
Daniel argues that there were communication problems
between him and his attorney. However, Veal suggests, and
the other cited cases confirm, that the existence of such
communication problems between principal and agent would
not affect the imputation of knowledge. Id. at 725
(“[W]hether or not Veal himself heard Geraci’s testimony,
Veal’s attorney plainly had knowledge of the conduct giving
rise to Veal’s present claim, and under traditional principles
of agency the attorney’s knowledge must be imputed to
Veal.”). In any case, Daniel does not present any evidence to
support his claim that there were serious communication
problems between him and his attorney.
Daniel also argues that the district court erred in not
considering sworn affidavits from his parents indicating that
the defendants continued to violate his rights under the Act
until July 17, 2001, by disclosing personally identifiable
information about his video rentals. We have carefully
reviewed these affidavits. They show only that Daniel’s
parents sought and were provided with a copy of his file from
the Bradley County District Attorney’s Office and from his
former attorney, James Logan. These files contained
personally identifiable information under the Act. But there
are three reasons why these affidavits are of no help to Daniel.
First, as discussed supra, the Bradley County District
Attorney’s Office and James Logan are not VTSPs.6
Therefore, their disclosures are not independently actionable
and would be relevant only for statute of limitations purposes
if they led Daniel to discover an actionable violation of the
Act. Because Daniel had already “discovered” the actionable
violations (under Veal), subsequent disclosures by non-
VTSPs are not relevant for purposes of the statute of
limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(3). Second, it is plain

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No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 15
from their affidavits that the disclosure to Daniel’s parents
was at Daniel’s own behest. Disclosures made to the
consumer or with his consent are not actionable under the
Act. Id. at §§ 2710(b)(2)(A) and (B). Finally, as a matter of
equity, Daniel cannot ask his parents to retrieve his file from
these defendants and then expect us to hold them liable for
complying with his own request.
The district court’s opinion here makes it clear that it
considered the parents’ affidavits. Daniel, 241 F. Supp. 2d at
873 (“It appears from the complaint and amended complaint
that Daniel refers to the ongoing discussion of his video
rentals by persons other than those qualifying as video service
providers.”). Even if the district court had failed to consider
the parents’ affidavits, it is our duty to review the evidence
independently. We have done so and have found nothing that
supports Daniel’s contentions. Second, the district court did
not give short shrift to Daniel’s argument that he was unaware
that his attorney had filed a motion to suppress. The district
court properly found that Daniel’s knowledge, or lack thereof,
was irrelevant because the knowledge of his agent is imputed
to him, as discussed in Veal. We know of no good reason to
depart from the well-established rule that the knowledge of an
agent is imputed to his principal. Therefore, we find
ourselves in agreement with the district court.
16 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188
7Daniel has filed a motion to sanction/disbar attorney Roger Jenne.
This motion is DENIED. He has also filed a motion to issue an order to
the District Attorney’s Office to destroy video records of Ald en D aniel.
This relief was found to be inappropriate in the very case upon which
Daniel relies. See Camfield , 248 F.3d at 1234 (“Camfield implies that the
civil action provision o f the VPP A, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c), provides
statutory authority for expungement of his [personally identifiable
information] from OCPD’s records, but that section do es not expre ssly
grant such relief. Moreover, although the VPP A provides that a court
may award ‘such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court
determines to be appropriate,’ 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(D), this language
has not been construed to provide the relief Camfield seeks.”). Therefore,
this motion too is DE NIE D.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.7

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