Donathan Durham v. City of Algood

*The Hon. Karl S. Forester, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting
by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0129n.06
Filed: November 23, 2004
No. 03-5974
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DONATHAN DURHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ALGOOD; DAVID DILLON,
individually and in his capacity as Mayor of
Algood; BETHEL NEWPORT, individually
and in his capacity as Manager for the
City of Algood; and JAMES GIST, KEN
HUNTER, RON ELDRIDGE, and
JOHNNY BENNETT, individually and in
their official capacity as Councilmen of the
City of Algood,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Before: DAUGHTREY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges, and FORESTER, * District
Court Judge.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Donathan Durham, appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the defendants, the City of Algood (Tennessee) and various city
officials, in this civil rights action filed as a result of Durham’s termination from his position
as an Algood police officer. In his complaint, Durham alleged a violation of his right to
procedural due process based on the city’s purported failure to provide him with a pre-

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No. 03-5974
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termination hearing. Finding that under state law, Durham was an at-will employee who
had no property interest in continued employment with the City of Algood, the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants on the due process claim and declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claim under the Tennessee Open Meetings
Act.
Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on
appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint. Because the reasons why judgment should be entered for the
defendants have been fully articulated by the district court, the issuance of a detailed
opinion by this court would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in
its memorandum opinion dated June 27, 2003, and entered on the record on June 30,
2003.

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