Joanne Hedrick v. WESTERN RESERVE CARE SYSTEM and FORUM HEALTH

*The Honorable R ichard M ills, United States District Judge for the
Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0012P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0012p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
JOANNE HEDRICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTERN RESERVE CARE
SYSTEM and FORUM HEALTH,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 02-3898
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 99-00630—Lesley Brooks Wells, District Judge.
Argued: October 21, 2003
Decided and Filed: January 9, 2004
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; MILLS,
District Judge.*
2 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Ira J. Mirkin, GREEN, HAINES, &
SGAMBATI, Youngstown, Ohio, for Appellant. Domenic A.
Bellisario, LAW OFFICE, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ira J. Mirkin, Barry R. Laine,
GREEN, HAINES, & SGAMBATI, Youngstown, Ohio, for
Appellant. Domenic A. Bellisario, LAW OFFICE,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge.
A suit alleging both age and disability discrimination.
Joanne Hedrick worked for Western Reserve Care System
as a registered nurse for twenty-two years before taking a
medical leave of absence. When she attempted to return to
work, Hedrick alleged that Western Reserve Care System and
its holding company, Forum Health, discriminated against her
on account of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.), and on account
of her disability, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and Ohio Revised
Code Chapter 4112.
Upon completion of discovery, the district court granted
summary judgment in Western Reserve Care System’s favor
on all three of Hedrick’s claims against it and denied
Hedrick’s motion for partial summary judgment.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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I. BACKGROUND
Joanne Hedrick was born on June 10, 1948. Hedrick
received an associate’s degree in nursing in 1973 and,
thereafter, became employed as a general duty staff nurse by
the Youngstown Hospital Association, i.e., the predecessor of
Western Reserve Care System (“WRCS”). As a general duty
staff nurse, Hedrick performed typical bedside nursing
functions for WRCS.
During the late 1980's, Hedrick was diagnosed as having
osteoarthritis in her left knee. In the early 1990's, her
condition progressed, and Hedrick was diagnosed as having
and was treated for osteoarthritis in both knees. Since her
initial diagnosis, Hedrick has been treated by her family
physician, Dr. L. Kevin Nash, and by her orthopedic surgeon,
Dr. Raymond Duffett.
On December 1, 1995, Hedrick fell and broke her leg which
necessitated surgery (performed by Dr. Duffett) and a medical
leave of absence from work in order to recuperate. On
April 29, 1996, Dr. Duffett released Hedrick to return to work
without any restrictions effective June 1, 1996.
However, on May 3, 1996, Hedrick visited Dr. Nash and
expressed her reservations about her ability to return to work
as a general duty staff nurse because she was concerned that
she would be unable to perform her duties. Although he did
not initially share Hedrick’s reservations regarding her ability
to return to work as a general duty staff nurse, Dr. Nash
subsequently reversed his opinion and agreed that Hedrick
would be unable to resume her bedside nursing duties. On
July 1, 1996, Dr. Nash wrote a letter to Sue Yoder, WRCS’s
director of nursing, in which he reported that “Ms. Joanne
Hedrick has been making a very slow recovery after her
devastating fracture of the left femur. Joanne has shared with
me that she does not believe that she is going to be able to
4 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
1WRCS would only place an employee on the ADA list upon that
emp loyee’s request.
return to bedside nursing, and frankly I share her
reservations.”
On July 16, 1996, Hedrick underwent a functional capacity
evaluation in order to determine her ability to return to work
and, if it was determined that she was able to return to work,
the limitations, if any, she would have. This evaluation
indicated that Hedrick would be unable to return to her
previous position as a general duty staff nurse at WRCS
because of her physical limitations in bending and lifting and
due to the pain in her knees. As a result of this evaluation,
Dr. Nash wrote to Jon R. Steen, WRCS’s human resources
director, on August 7, 1996, and requested that Hedrick be
considered for other positions.
In July or August 1996, Hedrick asked to be placed upon
WRCS’s list of employees who claimed to have permanent
work restrictions.1 This list was commonly referred to as the
“ADA list.” Once an employee was placed upon the ADA
list, WRCS attempted to find suitable employment for those
employees who could no longer perform the duties of their
regular positions. On September 24, 1996, Dr. Nash wrote a
letter to Steen regarding Hedrick’s precise limitations and
reported that Hedrick was able to conduct daily activities for
short intervals, to walk short distances, and to stand, drive,
and perform desk work for short periods of time. Upon
receipt of Dr. Nash’s letter and pursuant to her request,
WRCS placed Hedrick on the ADA list, and subsequently,
WRCS began identifying job vacancies which corresponded
with Hedrick’s background, skills, and medical restrictions.
In late September 1996, Ann Marie Ondo, WRCS’s
employment coordinator, informed Hedrick of an opening as
a referral center scheduler. Hedrick interviewed for the

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5
position with Lorraine Nelson and Mary Pat Foley, and
during the interview, one of the interviewers asked her about
her physical limitations. Hedrick responded that she would
be able to fully perform the job’s requirements. However,
upon learning of the salary, Hedrick indicated that she was
not interested in the position because the salary was too low.
Although it is unclear whether the position was formally
offered to Hedrick, it is clear that Hedrick understood that the
job was hers if she wanted it and that she specifically told
Nelson and Foley that she would not take the position.
Later that same month, Ondo informed Hedrick of an open
quality assurance position. Hedrick interviewed with Nelson
for the position in November 1996, and, again, Nelson asked
her about her physical limitations because the position
involved some walking and lifting. Hedrick responded that
she did not believe that her physical limitations would be an
issue and that, although she may not walk as fast as others,
she could get from point “A” to “B.” Ultimately, WRCS
selected an applicant other than Hedrick for the quality
assurance position.
In January 1997, Ondo informed Hedrick of four case
manager vacancies in the department of medicine. Hedrick
interviewed for the positions with Dr. Paul Bunn who also
asked her about her physical limitations because the positions
entailed a fair amount of walking. Hedrick, again, responded
that she would have no problems fulfilling the duties of the
positions, and Dr. Bunn assured her that she would not be
hired for her leg work and that the hiring decision would be
based upon experience and knowledge. In February 1997,
Ondo informed Hedrick that the four case manager positions
were filled by other more qualified applicants.
About a week later, Ondo informed Hedrick that another
qualify assurance position was vacant, and Hedrick expressed
an interest in the job. Although Hedrick was initially
scheduled for an interview in March 1997, Nelson advised her
6 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
2Hedrick filed an Amended Complaint on January 14, 2000, which
did not alter her three causes of action.
that she would not have to interview for the position because
she had recently interviewed for another quality assurance
position. In late March or early April 1997, Ondo advised
Hedrick that she had not been selected for the position.
Thereafter, Hedrick and Ondo continued to communicate
regarding various vacancies at WRCS, but Hedrick was not
interested in any of these vacancies.
In August 1997, Carol Olson contacted Hedrick regarding
a temporary assignment as an admissions nurse. Hedrick
accepted the position and returned to work with WRCS on
August 25, 1997, at no loss of earnings or benefits.
After receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Hedrick filed a timely
suit against WRCS and its parent corporation, Forum Health,
in federal district court on March 17, 1999. Hedrick’s
Complaint contained three Counts: Count I alleged a cause of
action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Count II alleged a cause
of action pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap; and Count
III alleged a cause of action pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq.2
At the close of the discovery period, Hedrick moved for
partial summary judgment on the issues of whether she was
“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA and whether
WRCS had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.
WRCS and Forum Health, in turn, moved for summary
judgment on each of Hedrick’s claims against them. The
district judge referred the cross-motions for summary
judgment to a magistrate judge who filed a report and

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
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3Hedrick did not file an objection with the district court to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation that Forum H ealth was entitled to
summary judgment or to the magistrate judg e’s finding that she had
waived her disability claim based upon obesity by failing to assert it at the
summary judgment stage. Likewise, Hedrick has not challenged on
appeal the district court’s dismissal of Forum H ealth or her disability
claim based upon obesity, and th us, those issues are waived and are not
before the C ourt.
recommendation which recommended that summary
judgment be entered in WRCS and Forum Health’s favor on
all three of Hedrick’s claims and also recommended that
Hedrick’s motion for summary judgment be denied.
Hedrick filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation with the district judge, but the district
judge denied her objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, denied her motion for summary
judgment, and entered summary judgment in WRCS and
Forum Health’s favor on all three Counts of Hedrick’s
Amended Complaint. Thereafter, Hedrick filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS3
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Poe,
143 F.3d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The
moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of
the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
8 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a fact is
“genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary
standard. Id. A fact is “material” only if its resolution will
affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Id. “Once the moving party
satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir.
2001)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
As for Hedrick’s motion for partial summary judgment, an
order denying summary judgment ordinarily constitutes a
non-appealable, interlocutory order. Pacific Union
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S.
1305, 1306 (1977). However, because Hedrick’s appeal is
from a final judgment, the denial of her motion for partial
summary judgment is reviewable. Tetro v. Elliott Popham
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d
988, 992 (6th Cir. 1999). “We . . . review de novo a district
court’s order denying summary judgment, if the denial is
based on purely legal grounds. If the denial is based on the
district court’s finding of a genuine issue of material fact,
however, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
order denying summary judgment.” Black v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2002)(internal
citations omitted).

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4Because the essential elements of an ADA claim and a claim under
the Ohio handicap discrimination statute are identical, our analysis of
Hedrick’s ADA claim also reso lves her state law claim . Plant v. Morton
Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 938-39 (6th Cir. 2000); Hoffman v. Fidelity
Brokerage Servs., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 452 , 457 n. 1 (S.D. Ohio 19 97).
5Under the ADA , the term “disability” is defined as “(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1210 2(2);
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (200 2).
B. ADA CLAIM4
The ADA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a
prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA,
a plaintiff must establish that: “1) he is an individual with a
disability;5 2) he is ‘otherwise qualified’ to perform the job
requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation;
and 3) he was [not hired] solely by reason of his handicap.”
Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178
(6th Cir. 1996) (footnote added)(citations omitted). A
plaintiff may prove that he was discriminated against based
upon his disability either through direct or indirect evidence.
Id.
We have previously explained that in cases where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of disability discrimination:
(1) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he
or she is disabled. (2) The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that he or she is “otherwise qualified” for the
10 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
position despite his or her disability: (a) without
accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged
“essential” job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a
proposed reasonable accommodation. (3) The employer
will bear the burden of proving that a challenged job
criterion is essential, and therefore a business necessity,
or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue
hardship upon the employer.
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186. When a plaintiff seeks to establish
his case indirectly, however, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting approach applies so that the
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that: (1) he or she is disabled;
(2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without
reasonable accommodation; (3) suffered an adverse
employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had
reason to know of the plaintiff’s disability; and (5) the
position remained open while the employer sought other
applicants or the disabled individual was replaced. The
defendant must then offer a legitimate explanation for its
action. If the defendant satisfies this burden of
production, the plaintiff must introduce evidence
showing that the proffered explanation is pretextual.
Under this scheme, the plaintiff retains the ultimate
burden of persuasion at all times.
Id. at 1186-87; Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718,
724-25 (6th Cir. 2000).
As this Court recognized in Kline v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 128 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1997), “[t]he direct evidence
and circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a
plaintiff need only prove one or the other, not both. If a
plaintiff can produce direct evidence of discrimination then
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm is of no
consequence. Similarly, if a plaintiff attempts to prove its

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case using the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm, then
the party is not required to introduce direct evidence of
discrimination.” Id. at 348-49.
As the district court correctly noted, the crux of Hedrick’s
Amended Complaint against WRCS is that WRCS unlawfully
discriminated against her by failing to award her one of the
four case manager positions or one of the two quality
assurance positions for which she applied. Hedrick argues
that she established her prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA via both the direct and the
indirect method.
1. Direct Evidence
a. Arguments
As for her direct evidence of disability discrimination,
Hedrick relies upon the testimony of Dr. Nash who testified
that Nelson “expressed concern to me that she felt that
[Hedrick’s] medical condition would prohibit her from being
able to perform this job as case manager.” Hedrick contends
that the district court erred in rejecting this direct evidence of
disability discrimination–as grounds for denying WRCS’s
motion for summary judgment–for two reasons.
First, Hedrick asserts that the district court erred in
requiring her to establish that she was denied one of the
vacant job positions for which she applied solely because of
unlawful disability discrimination. Although she
acknowledges that Monette and its progeny hold that an
ADA plaintiff must establish that the adverse employment
action occurred “solely by reason of his handicap,” Monette,
90 F.3d at 1178, Hedrick claims that this holding is no longer
good law. Rather, Hedrick argues that all she needed to show
in order to establish her prima facie case under the ADA was
that discriminatory animus played a part in WRCS’s hiring
decision, not that it was the sole reason.
12 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
Second, Hedrick contends that, contrary to the district
court’s conclusion, Dr. Nash’s testimony regarding Nelson’s
statement to him created a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to deny WRCS’s motion for summary judgment.
Hedrick asserts that the district court erred in holding that the
direct evidence standard requires a defendant’s admission in
order to constitute direct evidence of disability discrimination.
On the contrary, Hedrick claims that this Court’s opinion in
Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2001),
establishes that isolated comments may constitute direct
evidence of disability discrimination sufficient to defeat a
defendant’s summary judgment motion. Accordingly,
Hedrick asks us to reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment against her.
b. Conclusions
We find that the district court did not err in finding
Hedrick’s direct evidence of disability discrimination
insufficient to withstand WRCS’s summary judgment motion.
While it is true (as cited by Hedrick) that some of our sister
circuits have held that an ADA plaintiff need not demonstrate
that disability was the sole reason for the adverse employment
action but only that it played a motivating role in the decision,
e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337
(2d Cir. 2000), Monette and Walsh remain good law in this
circuit, and we are bound by this authority. See McLeod v.
Parsons Corp., 2003 WL 22097841, * 11 (6th Cir. Sept. 5,
2003)(“We decline McLeod’s request that this panel permit
plaintiffs to recover under the ADA in mixed motive cases.
Adopting the approach followed by several other circuits
would require the panel to make a substantial departure from
this Court’s holdings in Walsh and Monette. Under Salmi v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 774 F.2d 685, 689
(6th Cir. 1985), one panel of this Court cannot reverse the
holding of another panel unless there is a contrary Supreme
Court decision or en banc decision by this Court. Id.”).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in requiring Hedrick

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to show that her disability was the sole reason for WRCS’s
decision not to hire her for one of the four case manager
positions or one of the two quality assurance positions for
which she applied.
Furthermore, we agree that Ross is distinguishable from the
instant case. In Ross, we held that the district court erred in
dismissing, as isolated and insufficient to constitute direct
evidence of discriminatory animus, a memorandum which
referred to the plaintiff as a “back case.” Ross, 237 F.3d at
706-07. Although it is true that the Ross court concluded
“that the district court too easily dismissed the ‘back case’
memo as direct evidence of discrimination by the employer,”
id. at 707, when viewed in the entire context of the case and
of the court’s opinion, it is clear that the back memorandum
was but one event in a series of comments and reports which,
when taken cumulatively, was sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Here,
Hedrick has tendered no series of comments or reports which
would indicate WRCS’s discriminatory animus, and thus,
Nelson’s comment to Dr. Nash may properly be characterized
as isolated and insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding WRCS’s discriminatory intent.
In addition, the plaintiff in Ross tendered the memorandum
in order to establish that his employer regarded him as being
disabled, and the Ross court held that the memorandum, when
viewed in combination with other evidence, was sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to that
element. See id. at 706 (“We conclude that Ross has presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning his claim that the company regarded him has [sic]
a person with a disability within the meaning of the Act.
Perhaps the piece of evidence most indicative of this fact is
the ‘back case’ memo . . . .”); see also id. at 707 (“That the
note’s author would think to identify Ross with the scrawled
post-script ‘back case’ demonstrates that there is at least a
genuine issue of material fact that Campbell Soup Co.
14 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
6In any event, as will be discussed infra, Hedrick has failed to show
that she is a “qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8).
regarded Ross through the lens of his medical condition.”).
In the instant case, Hedrick tendered Nelson’s statement to
Dr. Nash in an attempt to tender direct evidence of WRCS’s
discriminatory animus sufficient to establish her prima facie
case under the ADA, not merely to establish that WRCS
regarded her as being disabled.6
Finally, the Ross memorandum is distinguishable in that the
memorandum’s tone was clearly discriminatory, see id. (“Not
only does the note identify Ross as a ‘problem person,’ a
comment which cannot be taken in a positive light, but it also
identifies him as a ‘back case.’ The ADA was enacted, in
part, to eliminate the sort of stereotyping that allowed
employers to see their employees primarily as their
disabilities and not as persons differently abled from
themselves.”), while Nelson’s comment to Dr. Nash was
clearly an expression of concern for Hedrick’s ability to
perform the jobs’ requirements which included a fair amount
of walking. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that
Hedrick failed to tender any direct evidence in support of her
ADA claim against WRCS.
2. Indirect Evidence
a. Arguments
As for her indirect evidence of disability discrimination,
Hedrick argues that only the first two elements of her
prima facie case are in dispute because it is undisputed that
she satisfied elements three, four, and five. She suffered an
adverse employment decision (i.e., she was not hired for one
of the four vacant case manager positions and/or for one of
the two quality assurance positions); WRCS knew of her
disability; and the positions remained open while WRCS

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sought other applicants, and non-disabled applicants were
chosen for the positions rather than her. Hedrick asserts that
the district court erred in concluding that she did not show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the first two
elements of her prima facie case, and therefore, she asks us to
reverse the district court’s summary judgment order.
Regarding the first element of her prima facie case, Hedrick
argues that her osteoarthritis in her knees constitutes a
“disability,” as that term is defined in the ADA, (1) because
her condition is a physical impairment which substantially
limits her major life activities of walking and working;
(2) because she has a record of having such an impairment;
and (3) because WRCS regarded her as having a disabling
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Toyota Motor Mfg., 534
U.S. at 193.
First, Dr. Nash testified that, in his medical opinion,
Hedrick’s osteoarthritis in her knees rendered her disabled
within the meaning of the ADA and that her condition is
severe and permanent. Dr. Nash also testified that Hedrick
could not perform a broad range of nursing jobs due to her
limited ability to work and walk– both of which are
considered to be major life activities under the ADA.
Second, Hedrick contends that Dr. Nash’s correspondence
with WRCS, her functional capacity evaluation, and the fact
that she was on WRCS’s ADA list establish that she had a
record of having a disabling impairment and, taken
individually or collectively, constitute sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she is
disabled.
Third, Hedrick claims that WRCS regarded her as having
a disabling impairment and that the district court erred in
holding otherwise. In support of her argument, Hedrick notes
that WRCS agreed that she could not resume her general duty
staff nurse position due to her condition, that WRCS placed
16 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
her on its ADA list, and that WRCS asked her about her
physical limitations during several of her interviews.
Accordingly, Hedrick argues that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether she was “disabled” within the
meaning of the ADA and that the district court committed
reversible error in finding her not to be disabled.
Regarding the second element of her prima facie case,
Hedrick contends that WRCS did not provide her with a
reasonable accommodation as required under the ADA.
Specifically, Hedrick claims that the district court erred in
concluding that the referral center scheduler position was a
reasonable accommodation which satisfied WRCS’s
obligations under the ADA and, as a result, erred in ruling
that she was not “a qualified individual with a disability.”
In making this finding, Hedrick asserts that the district
court resolved disputed issues of fact which were not properly
determinable on summary judgment: the district court found
that WRCS offered Hedrick the referral center scheduler
position, that she refused it, and that the referral center
scheduler position was a reasonable accommodation.
Because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the
first two elements of her prima facie case, Hedrick argues that
the district court committed reversible error in entering
summary judgment against her on her ADA claim.
b. Conclusions
We find that the district court did not err in entering
summary judgment in WRCS’s favor because Hedrick did not
satisfy her prima facie case of disability discrimination under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. In reaching
this conclusion, we need not resolve the thornier issue of
whether Hedrick was “disabled” under the ADA because it is
clear that, even assuming that she was disabled, she was not
a qualified individual with a disability. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court.

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“A ‘qualified individual with a disability’ is defined as ‘an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.’”
Black, 297 F.3d at 448 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)); see 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)(“Qualified individual with a disability
means an individual with a disability who satisfies the
requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual
holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
position.”). As we have previously explained:
To recover under the ADA, a plaintiff must do more than
show that he is “disabled” within the meaning of the
statute. He must also establish that he is a “qualified
individual with a disability” by showing: (1) that he
“satisfies the prerequisites for the position [he holds or
desires], such as possessing the appropriate educational
background, employment experience, [and] skills . . .”;
and (2) that he “can perform the essential functions of the
position held or desired, with or without reasonable
accommodation.”
Burns v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 256 (6th Cir.
2000)(quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d
667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998)).
“A disabled employee who claims that he or she is
otherwise qualified with a reasonable accommodation ‘bears
the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and
showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable.’”
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 633-34 (6th Cir.
1998)(quoting Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183). An employer, then,
has the burden of persuasion to show that an accommodation
would impose an undue hardship. Id. at 634; Monette, 90 F.3d
at 1184.
18 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
Although a “reasonable accommodation” may include
reassignment to a vacant position, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii), an employer need not reassign
a disabled employee to a position for which he is not
qualified, nor is the employer required to waive legitimate,
non-discriminatory employment policies or displace other
employees’ rights in order to accommodate a disabled
employee. Burns, 222 F.3d at 257. On the contrary,
[a]ccording to the regulations, an employer need only
reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position.
Employers are not required to create new jobs, displace
existing employees from their positions, or violate other
employees’ rights under a collective bargaining
agreement or other non-discriminatory policy in order to
accommodate a disabled individual.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, in order to satisfy its duty under the ADA, an
employer is only required to transfer an employee to a
position comparable to the employee’s prior position. Hoskins
v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 728 n. 3
(6th Cir. 2000). “The regulations instruct that employers
‘should reassign the individual to an equivalent position, in
terms of pay, status, etc., if the individual is qualified, and if
the position is vacant within a reasonable amount of time,’
and should only reassign an individual to a lower graded
position if the individual cannot be accommodated in an
equivalent position. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o).”
Id. The ADA does not require an employer to offer an
employee a promotion as a reasonable accommodation,
Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634, and “an employee cannot make his
employer provide a specific accommodation if another
reasonable accommodation is instead provided.” Hankins v.
The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69
(1986)). In fact, where a comparable position is not vacant,

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
19
an employer’s obligation to reassign an employee may
include an assignment to a position with a lower grade of pay
if the employee meets the job’s qualifications. Cassidy, 138
F.3d at 634.
Finally, the regulations indicate that, although an employee
is not required to accept an offered accommodation, if an
individual rejects a reasonable accommodation, the individual
will no longer be considered a qualified individual with a
disability. Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 728 n. 3; Hankins, 84 F.3d at
801. Specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) provides:
A qualified individual with a disability is not required to
accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or
benefit which such qualified individual chooses not to
accept. However, if such individual rejects a reasonable
accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit that
is necessary to enable the individual to perform the
essential functions of the position held or desired, and
cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform the essential
functions of the position, the individual will not be
considered a qualified individual with a disability.
Id.
In the instant case, we agree with the district court that the
referral center scheduler position was a reasonable
accommodation and that Hedrick cannot be considered a
qualified individual with a disability based upon her rejection
of that position. As noted supra, although it is unclear
whether WRCS formally offered the position to Hedrick, it is
clear, based upon her own deposition testimony, that Hedrick
understood that the job was hers if she wanted it and that she
preemptively rejected the position by informing Nelson and
Foley that she would not take the position because of its low
salary:
20 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
A. I stated that I expected the cut in salary when I came
back; but I did not expect that drastic of a cut when I
came back.
* * *
A. It became a consensus at that point in time that I was
overqualified. And I told them I would not take the
position.
Q. You said you would not take the position had they
offered it to you?
A. I assumed if they would have offered to me that with
my – I just made the statement that I wasn’t interested
in that position at that point in time because I did not
think it was for me.
Q. And is the reason that you didn’t think it was for you
because of the salary?
A. Yes.
Thus, although Hedrick may have personally believed that she
was overqualified for the position and that the salary was too
low, WRCS satisfied its obligation under the ADA by
offering a reasonable accommodation when it made the
referral center scheduler position available to her.
In addition, we agree with the district court that the referral
center scheduler position was comparable to her previous
position and that the four case manager positions and the two
quality assurance positions were neither vacant nor
comparable. Although Hedrick asserts that she was
overqualified for the referral center scheduler position
because she was a registered nurse, WRCS eventually filled
the position with a registered nurse who, like Hedrick, was
coming off of a disability leave.

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
21
7W RCS offered Hedrick the referral center scheduler position in
September 1996, and the case manager positions becam e available in
December 1996.
Likewise, although it is true that one of the quality
assurance positions became available just nine days after the
referral center scheduler position became available, it is also
true that the quality assurance positions were not comparable
to her previous position because they were salaried, non-
bargaining positions which would have constituted a
promotion. As such, WRCS had no duty to offer the quality
assurance positions to Hedrick. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. As
for the case manager positions, although the jobs would not
have constituted a promotion, the record reflects that they did
not become available until well after the referral center
scheduler position became available, and Hedrick presented
no evidence to establish that WRCS knew that these positions
would soon become available when it offered her the referral
center scheduler position.7
Finally, contrary to Hedrick’s argument, her disability did
not provide her with a preference in WRCS’s hiring practices.
Although WRCS may have had an obligation to reassign her
to a vacant position for which she was qualified, the ADA
does not mandate that she be afforded preferential treatment.
E.g., Burns, 222 F.3d at 258 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.3d at
679)(“Allowing Burns to recover despite his failure to abide
by KCC’s non-discriminatory policy requiring him to apply
for a transfer to a new position within his restrictions would
‘convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory
preference statute, a result which would be inconsistent with
the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA.’”); Daugherty v. City
of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)(“we do not read
the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that
disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment
over those who are not disabled. It prohibits employment
22 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities,
no more and no less.”); Terrell v. USAir, Inc., 132 F.3d 621,
627 (11th Cir. 1998)(“We cannot accept that Congress, in
enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for
disabled workers.”).
Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly entered
summary judgment in WRCS’s favor on Hedrick’s ADA
claim because she failed to tender direct evidence of disability
discrimination sufficient to withstand WRCS’s summary
judgment motion, because she cannot be considered a
qualified individual with a disability based upon her rejection
of the proffered referral center scheduler position, and
because WRCS satisfied its obligations under the ADA of
offering a reasonable accommodation to Hedrick by making
the referral center scheduler position available to her.
C. ADEA CLAIM
The ADEA provides in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful
for an employer– (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Like the ADA, a
plaintiff attempting to establish a claim under the ADEA may
do so by producing either direct evidence, or he may rely
upon the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. Kline,
128 F.3d at 348-49; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,
582 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, like her ADA claim, the gist of Hedrick’s ADEA
claim is that WRCS discriminated against her by failing to
award her one of the case manager positions and/or one of the

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
23
8WRCS filled one of the case manager positions with an individual
older than Hedrick, and so, she does not co mplain of the d enial of this
position with regard to her ADEA claim.
quality assurance positions for which she applied.8 However,
unlike her ADA claim, Hedrick acknowledges that she cannot
produce any direct evidence in support of her ADEA claim.
Accordingly, Hedrick has attempted to establish her ADEA
claim pursuant to the indirect method.
In order to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting method,
a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was at least 40 years
old at the time of the alleged discrimination; (2) he was
subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was
otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) after he was
rejected, a substantially younger applicant was selected.
See Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338,
341 (6th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff successfully
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory
reason for its action. See id. If the defendant comes up
with such a reason, the plaintiff must then demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
proffered reason was a pretext for age discrimination. See
id.
Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 2001).
Moreover,
[i]n Manzer, a case brought under the ADEA, this Court
explained what evidence a plaintiff must adduce in order
to show that an employer’s alleged legitimate reason for
its adverse action against the plaintiff was a mere pretext:
24 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
To make a submissible case on the credibility of his
employer’s explanation, the plaintiff is required to
show by a preponderance of the evidence either
(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact,
(2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate
his discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to
motivate discharge. The first type of showing is easily
recognizable and consists of evidence that the
proffered bases for the plaintiff’s discharge never
happened, i.e., that they are factually false. The third
showing is also easily recognizable and, ordinarily,
consists of evidence that other employees, particularly
employees not in the protected class, were not fired
even though they engaged in substantially identical
conduct to that which the employer contends
motivated its discharge of the plaintiff. These two
types of rebuttals are direct attacks on the credibility of
the employer’s proffered motivation for firing plaintiff
and, if shown, provide an evidentiary basis for what
the Supreme Court has termed “a suspicion of
mendacity.”
The second showing, however, is of an entirely
different ilk. There, the plaintiff admits the factual
basis underlying the employer’s proffered explanation
and further admits that such conduct could motivate
dismissal. The plaintiff’s attack on the credibility of
the proffered explanation is, instead, an indirect one.
In such cases, the plaintiff attempts to indict the
credibility of his employer’s explanation by showing
circumstances which tend to prove that an illegal
motivation was more likely than that offered by the
defendant. In other words, the plaintiff argues that the
sheer weight of the circumstantial evidence of
discrimination makes it “more likely than not” that the
employer’s explanation is a pretext, or a coverup.

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
25
9Hedrick’s evidence of pretext consisted of the following: (1) the
interviewers’ memories had faded, and no notes existed which revealed
how they came to their decisions; (2) it is unclear who made the
employment decisions; (3) her own testimony established that she was the
Accordingly, we hold that, in order to make this type
of rebuttal showing, the plaintiff may not rely simply
upon his prima facie evidence but must, instead,
introduce additional evidence of age discrimination.
Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084.
Pennington v. Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902, 909-10 (6th
Cir. 2000).
In the case sub judice, the district court found (and, in fact,
WRCS conceded) that Hedrick had established a prima facie
case of age discrimination. WRCS, then, offered a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Hedrick for one of
the vacant case manager positions and/or quality assurance
positions, i.e., WRCS asserted that it chose better qualified
candidates than Hedrick to fill the vacant positions. Finally,
the district court found that Hedrick had failed to show that
WRCS’s proffered reason for not hiring Hedrick was
pretextual.
1. Arguments
Hedrick argues that the district court’s finding regarding
pretext was erroneous. Specifically, Hedrick contends that
the district court improperly applied the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and that the district court
disregarded the evidence of pretext which she tendered,
choosing instead to blindly accept WRCS’s subjective
determination that the successful applicants were better
qualified than she was without conducting any analysis of that
claim.9 Accordingly, Hedrick asks us to reverse the district
26 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
most qualified candidate; and (4) WRCS hired individuals younger than
she.
court’s summary judgment order with regard to her ADEA
claim because genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether WRCS’s proffered reason for refusing to hire her for
one of the vacant case manager and/or quality assurance
positions was pretextual.
2. Conclusions
We find that the district court did not err in holding that
Hedrick failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that WRCS’s proffered reason for not hiring her for
one of the vacant case manager and/or quality assurance
positions was a pretext for age discrimination and, therefore,
did not err in entering summary judgment against Hedrick on
her ADEA claim.
Contrary to her assertion otherwise, we do not believe that
the district court improperly applied the Supreme Court’s
holding in Reeves by requiring her to produce additional
evidence of discrimination beyond the evidence necessary to
cast doubt on the genuineness of WRCS’s asserted reason for
not hiring her. A close reading of the district court’s
summary judgment order reveals that the district court did not
require Hedrick to satisfy a “pretext plus” standard; rather, the
district court specifically stated that “[e]ven if WRCS’s
proffered reason were disbelieved, the evidence Hedrick
presents does not support an inference that age discrimination
was the motivating factor in WRCS’s hiring decision.” Thus,
the district court concluded that, even though Hedrick had
established a prima facie case under the ADEA, and even if
the district court assumed that Hedrick provided sufficient
evidence to show that WRCS’s asserted justification was
false, Hedrick’s evidence was insufficient to avoid summary
judgment, and the Supreme Court in Reeves anticipated just

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No. 02-3898 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
27
such a scenario: “Certainly there will be instances where,
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and
set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory.” Id. at 148.
As for Hedrick’s argument that the district court improperly
disregarded her evidence of pretext, it is true that the district
court could have done a more thorough job of discussing
Hedrick’s proffered evidence, especially given the fact that
WRCS’s justification for its employment decision was
subjective, and subjective reasons provide “ready mechanisms
for discrimination.” Grano v. Department of Dev. of City of
Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983). However, we
ultimately agree with the district court that Hedrick’s
evidence of pretext was insufficient to withstand summary
judgment.
“The isolated fact that a younger person eventually replaces
an older employee is not enough to permit a rebuttal inference
that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination.”
Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 267 (6th Cir.
1986)(citing LaMontagne v. American Convenience Prods.,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1413 (7th Cir. 19084). Moreover,
Hedrick’s subjective view of her qualifications in relation to
those of the other applicants, without more, cannot sustain a
claim of discrimination. Johnson v. United States Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 30 F.3d 45, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1994);
see Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584 (holding that the plaintiff’s
subjective skepticism regarding the truth of an employer’s
representation does not raise a triable issue as to pretext).
Finally, “[a]lthough the reason[] proffered by [WRCS]
involve[d] subjective factors, [it was] clearly sufficient to
dispel the inference of discrimination and to afford [Hedrick]
a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to show pretext.” Daniels v.
Board of Educ. of Ravenna City Sch. Dist., 805 F.2d 203, 209
(6th Cir. 1986)(citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 228, 230
28 Hedrick v. Western Reserve
Care System, et al.
No. 02-3898
(4th Cir. 1981)(en banc)). As we have oft times repeated, “it
is inappropriate for the judiciary to substitute its judgment for
that of management.” Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d
752, 763 (6th Cir. 2000); see Krenik v. County of Le Sueur,
47 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1995)(holding that federal courts
do not sit as a “super-personnel department”); see also Elrod
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.
1991)(same). “Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the
employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Harvey
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470); see Simms v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Dep’t of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165
F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999)(“Our role is to prevent
unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a ‘super personnel
department’ that second guesses employers’ business
judgments.”).
Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly entered
summary judgment in WRCS’s favor on Hedrick’s ADEA
claim because she failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that WRCS’s proffered reason for not hiring
her for one of the vacant case manager and/or quality
assurance positions was a pretext for age discrimination.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for WRCS
in toto. Because we affirm the district court’s grant of
WRCS’s motion for summary judgment, we also AFFIRM
the district court’s denial of Hedrick’s motion for partial
summary judgment.

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