Gust Marion Janis v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0393P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0393p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
GUST MARION JANIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney
General; AL HERRERA,
Warden, U.S. Penitentiary,
Lompoc, CA; KATHLEEN
HAWK, Director, Bureau of
Prisons; DAVID WOODY;
VICTOR A. FLORES; FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 02-6506
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Ashland.
No. 02-00088—Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: September 18, 2003
Decided and Filed: November 5, 2003
2 Janis v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-6506
*The Honorable R ichard M ills, United States District Judge for the
Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; MILLS,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Gust Marion Janis, Lompoc, California, pro se.
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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Gust Marion
Janis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a district
court order dismissing his civil complaint filed pursuant to the
settlement agreement in Washington v. Reno, Lexington Civil
Action Nos. 93-217 and 93-290 (E.D. Ky.), which concerned
the propriety of prison telephone system policies. The
settlement agreement afforded inmates an opportunity to
enforce a specific portion of the agreement within the Eastern
District of Kentucky. This case has been referred to a panel
of the court pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 34(j)(1). Upon
examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
On April 2, 2001, the defendants implemented new
telephone policies which limited all Federal Bureau of Prison
inmates to “300 minutes per calendar month for collect-call
and/or dial direct telephone calls.” On April 29, 2002, Janis
filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Kentucky against
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft; Warden Al
Herrera, United States Penitentiary - Lompoc, California;
Director Kathleen M. Hawk Sawyer, Federal Bureau of
Prisons; Chief David Woody, Federal Bureau of Prisons Trust

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No. 02-6506 Janis v. Ashcroft, et al. 3
Fund Systems; Inmate Trust Fund Supervisor Victor Flores,
United States Penitentiary - Lompoc, California; and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. The complaint alleged that the
defendants implemented the new telephone restrictions in
retaliation against the inmates for pursuing the Reno
litigation. According to Janis, the defendants acted in bad
faith and committed a fraud upon the court when they settled
the Reno lawsuit, because at the time of the settlement they
intended to punish the inmates in the future for having
brought the lawsuit. Janis also challenged numerous
conditions of his confinement at the United States
Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, where he is incarcerated.
Janis sought enforcement of the settlement agreement
approved in Reno, as well as injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief.
The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint sua sponte pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The district court subsequently denied
Janis’s motion for reconsideration. Janis filed a timely notice
of appeal. Janis also filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order with this Court.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Friends
of Crystal River v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 35 F.3d
1073, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1994).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court improperly
dismissed Janis’s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Certainly, the district court was correct in
concluding that Janis had not sought enforcement of any
provision of the settlement agreement and thus, jurisdiction
could not be established “under the alleged guise of being
vaguely linked to [the] enforcement of the [] settlement
agreement.” Indeed, Janis’s complaint did not identify any
specific provision of the settlement agreement that he desired
the court to enforce.
4 Janis v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-6506
However, inasmuch as the district court dismissed Janis’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but cited
venue language in support of its decision, it appears that the
district court confused these separate concepts. Janis’s
complaint alleged bad faith on the part of and retaliation by
the defendants against him and other inmates because they
pursued the Reno litigation. Properly understood, Janis’s
complaint essentially asserted constitutional violations rather
than violations of the settlement agreement. We conclude
that these allegations were sufficient to invoke federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although
we note that Janis asserted his claims in the wrong venue as
he filed his complaint in a judicial district where neither he
nor any defendant resides nor where a substantial part of the
alleged events occurred, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), we question
the propriety of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
what was essentially a lack of proper venue. See Rauch v. Day
& Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1978).
While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) permits a
district court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack
subject matter jurisdiction, it does not accord similar authority
to dismiss a case for lack of venue. See id.; but see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (allowing district courts to transfer a case to a
district court where venue is proper).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Janis’s
motion for a temporary restraining order is denied as it was
filed in the first instance with the wrong court.

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