Helen Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0299P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0299p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
HELEN JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MONROE, MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 01-2335
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 01-71472—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.
Argued: October 17, 2002
Decided and Filed: August 21, 2003
Before: BATCHELDER, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: J. Mark Finnegan, HEBERLE & FINNEGAN,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Robert D. Goldstein,
GARAN, LUCOW, MILLER, SEWARD, COOPER &
BECKER, Grand Blanc, Michigan, for Appellee.
2 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
ON BRIEF: J. Mark Finnegan, HEBERLE & FINNEGAN,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, David F. Grenn, Monroe, Michigan,
for Appellant. Robert D. Goldstein, GARAN, LUCOW,
MILLER, SEWARD, COOPER & BECKER, Grand Blanc,
Michigan, Thomas R. Paxton, GARAN, LUCOW, MILLER,
SEWARD, COOPER & BECKER, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellee.
GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
BATCHELDER, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 15-32), delivered
a separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-
appellant Helen Jones, who has multiple sclerosis, brought
suit alleging that the municipal parking program of the City
of Monroe, Michigan (“Monroe”) violates Title II of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Jones filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction requesting that the district court order
Monroe to modify its parking program to grant Jones free all-
day parking adjacent to her place of employment.
Specifically, Jones asked that the district court order Monroe
to reserve a free parking space for Jones adjacent to her office
or to cease ticketing Jones when she parks in a designated
one-hour parking space for the entire work day. The district
court denied Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction on
the ground that she failed to establish a likelihood of success
on the merits. Jones appeals this order. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 3
I.
Jones suffers from multiple sclerosis, an incurable, usually
progressive disease. Her disability affects her sight, balance
and ability to walk. Jones customarily uses a wheelchair,
although on occasion she walks for short distances with the
use of a cane. Jones is employed by the Salvation Army
Harbor Light (“Salvation Army”) as a substance abuse
counselor for deaf and hard-of-hearing clients. The Salvation
Army is located in downtown Monroe.
Because the building which houses the Salvation Army’s
offices lacks private parking spaces, Jones must either park in
a space provided by Monroe or in a private commercial
parking area. Monroe has several parking areas that provide
free parking in the downtown vicinity. One such parking area
is immediately adjacent to the downtown Monroe business
district as well as Jones’s office. These free parking spaces,
however, are each limited to one-hour parking only. Several
parking spaces designated for disabled users are located in
this one-hour parking area. These spaces are similarly limited
to one-hour parking. Monroe also provides free all-day
parking in several lots located within two blocks of Jones’s
office. According to Jones, she is not able to walk from any
of these free all-day parking lots to her office due to her
disability.
On numerous occasions Jones has parked her car in a one-
hour parking space adjacent to her office for the duration of
a work day. Monroe has issued Jones dozens of parking
tickets based on her violations of the one-hour time limitation.
Jones displays a handicapped parking permit on her vehicle,
but Monroe contends that the permit does not allow her to
violate the one-hour time limitation.
On April 16, 2001, Jones brought suit alleging that
Monroe’s refusal to modify its municipal parking program
constitutes unlawful and intentional discrimination on the
4 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
1The original complaint contained three counts. Count one sought
individual relief for Jones relating to Monro e’s failure to mod ify its
downtown parking program to allow Jone s to participate. Counts two and
three related to class-wide claims under federal law a nd M ichigan law
respe ctively. Counts two and three of the original complaint were
abandoned in an amended complaint filed by Jones on November 27,
2001. Count one remains.
basis of disability in violation of federal law.1 In conjunction
with filing her complaint, Jones sought a preliminary
injunction. On June 15, 2001, the district court held a hearing
on Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On
August 28, 2001, the district court denied Jones’s motion for
a preliminary injunction on the basis that Jones had failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred in
refusing to enjoin Monroe’s allegedly discriminatory parking
policies and require that Monroe cease ticketing Jones when
she parks in a designated one-hour parking space or provide
Jones with a free all-day parking space adjacent to her office
pending a final resolution on the merits. This court reviews
a lower court’s decision on whether to grant a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); In re DeLorean
Motor Co. v. DeLorean, 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985).
The district court’s determination will be disturbed only if the
district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact,
improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous
legal standard. Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d
884, 888 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Connection Distrib. Co. v.
Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)). Under this
standard, we must review the district court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Taubman, 319
F.3d at 774.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 5
2Jones also argues that the district court’s order fails to comply with
the requirements of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Despite the somewhat cursory nature o f the district court’s legal analysis,
we find that the district court’s order complies with the requirements of
Rule 52. Moreover, the district court’s opinion is adequate to allow this
court to review the denial of the preliminary injunction. Even if this court
concluded that the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
are inadequate under Rule 52, it would be unnecessary to remand the case
because the record is exceptionally clear. See Urbain v. Knapp Bro. Mfg.
Co., 217 F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1954 ); see also Da vis v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 43 2, 436 (2d Cir. 199 9); White v. Carlucci, 862
F.2d 1209, 12 11 fn. 1 (5th Cir.1989 )). In addition, b oth parties agree that
the record is complete and that this court can address the issue of the
injunction witho ut remand for further proceed ings.
When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the
district court should consider four factors: (1) whether the
moving party has a strong likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury
without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of
the injunction. Nightclubs, Inc., 202 F.3d at 888. The four
considerations applicable to preliminary injunction decisions
are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.
DeLorean, 755 F.2d at 1228. Moreover, a district court is not
required to make specific findings concerning each of the four
factors used in determining a motion for preliminary
injunction if fewer factors are dispositive of the issue. Id.;
Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 160
F.3d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction based on the district court’s
conclusion that the plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits).
Jones argues that the district court erred in finding that
Monroe’s parking program complies with federal law and
thereby concluding that Jones had failed to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim.2 Jones
further claims that the district court erred in failing to address
6 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
3For purposes of this case, there are no relevant differences between
Title II of the ADA and S ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore,
a separate ana lysis of Jones’s Section 5 04 claim is unnecessary. See
McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459,
460 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc).
Monroe’s alleged discrimination in refusing to provide Jones
with “meaningful access” to the parking program and refusing
to grant her a reasonable accommodation.
Jones alleges that Monroe’s parking program violates Title
II of the ADA,3 which provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall by reason of such disability be excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Section 12131 defines “qualified individual with a disability”
as “an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . .
meets the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The ADA’s
prohibition of discrimination in services, programs, or
activities “encompasses virtually everything a public entity
does.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir.
1998). To make out a prima facie case under Title II of the
ADA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she has a disability;
(2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she is being excluded
from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being
subjected to discrimination under the program solely because
of her disability. See Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of
Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1998); see also
Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1996)
(setting forth the prima facie case under the Rehabilitation
Act); Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d
1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that in order to establish
disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 7
4W e decline to rea ch any conclusions regard ing whether Jones has
a disability and whether she is otherwise qualified. Instead, we assume
for the sake of this opinion that she meets the first two elements of her
prima facie case and address only the third element: whether she was
excluded from p articipation in or denied a b enefit on the b asis of her
disab ility. See Henrietta D. v. Bloom berg, Nos. 02-7022/7074, 2003 WL
21308851, at 13-14 (2 d Cir. June 9, 20 03) (noting that “[a]n ADA
plaintiff must demonstrate that a den ial of benefits occurs ‘by reason of
. . . disability.’” (quotation omitted)).
otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that he
was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination solely on
the basis of the disability).
The district court did not address whether Jones is disabled
or whether she was otherwise qualified for the benefit in
question. Instead, the district court concluded that Monroe is
not excluding Jones from participating in or denying her the
benefits of the parking system. In evaluating the correctness
of this conclusion, we must first examine the nature of the
benefit offered by Monroe.4 Initially, we note that the benefit
is not appropriately defined as free downtown parking
generally, but rather as the provision of all-day and one-hour
parking in specific locations. See Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (holding that “adequate health care” was
too “amorphous” a concept to define the government service
or benefit to which disabled persons may assert a statutory
right of access and accommodation).
In the one-hour parking area specifically addressed by
Jones, Monroe is offering the benefit of free short-term
parking to individuals who wish to transact retail or other
business in the downtown business district. The short-term,
one-hour nature of the benefit is designed to help downtown
businesses by making parking spaces in close proximity to
them more readily available. Monroe quite logically has
determined that downtown shopping and other downtown
business activities are discouraged when patrons cannot easily
obtain parking places close to their destination. All-day
8 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
5Jones argues on appeal that she lacks meaningful access to the free
all-day parking spaces because the spaces fo r the disabled are no t in
compliance with the AD A minimum construction and de sign standards.
These standards address issues such as proper signage, width of parking
spaces, and slope of parking spaces. Jones’s claim of denial of a benefit,
however, does not arise from any design and construction flaws in the all-
day parking, because Jones admits that she would not use any of the free
all-day parking spaces regardless of the alleged design flaws due to the
distance of the parking spaces from her place of employm ent. The district
court’s opinion is limited to Jones’s request, for herself only, that the
court “force the City of Monroe to return to its former policy of not
ticketing the Plaintiff when she leaves her car in a one hour parking space
for the entire work day . . . . Or have the City of Monroe reserve a free
accessible parking space on the street next to her office.” Jones did not
seek injunctive relief for other disabled ind ividuals based on lack of
meaningful access. In addition, Jones did not request injunctive relief in
the form of forcing Monroe to bring the free all-day parking spaces into
compliance with the applicable construction and design standards. For
purposes of this appeal, therefore, any noncompliance with standards in
constructing these spaces is im material.
parking in the current one-hour spaces would thus have a
negative impact on downtown businesses.
In specific locations a short distance away from the one-
hour parking, Monroe has also provided the benefit of free
long-term, all-day parking to all individuals who come
downtown, for whatever reason. While the all-day parking is
not provided for the specific benefit of individuals who work
downtown, they are free to use it.
Access to the one-hour and all-day parking places is
facially neutral. The one-hour limit applies to individuals
with disabilities and those without disabilities. Similarly,
both disabled and able-bodied persons may park in all-day
parking. Both one-hour and all-day parking areas have spaces
for disabled and nondisabled individuals.5 The parking
limitations do not affect disabled and nondisabled individuals

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 9
6Recently, in Henrietta D., the Sec ond Circuit noted that under the
ADA “there m ust be some thing different about the way the p laintiff is
treated ‘by reason of . . . disability.’” 2003 WL 21308851, at 12 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12132). In the instant case, Jones has not been treated
differently from no n-disab led individuals or de nied any benefit.
7The dissent sets forth a lengthy hypothetical purp orting to illustrate
the distinction between what the dissent perceives to be the essence of
Jones’s claim (that she is being denied the benefit of free all-day parking),
and what the majority perceives to be the essence of Jones’s claim (that
the ADA requires Monroe to provide Jones with an all-day parking space
in the location she requests). The hypothetical is distinguishable because
it involves a case where the disabled individual has no access to the
service or benefit by reason of his or her disability, and the o nly available
accommodation is the waiver of the city’s rule. In the present case, Jones
differently in any respect.6 Thus, the district court did not err
in determining that Jones was not excluded from parking
benefits offered by Monroe.
The dissent repeatedly states that Jones is excluded from
the benefit of free downtown parking. However, the dissent
fails to explain how Jones is denied this benefit. Jones has
equal access to the free downtown parking, and she can park
there if she chooses. While the dissent claims to define the
benefit at issue as “free downtown parking,” the dissent later
identifies the benefit as the ability “to park for free all-day in
spaces that allow them meaningful access to their
destination.” The dissent thus conflates meaningful access to
downtown parking with meaningful access to an individual’s
destination of choice. When applied to the facts of the instant
case, it is apparent that the dissent is defining the benefit at
issue as the latter and not the former. Jones has equal access
to free downtown parking. She does not have free downtown
parking accessible to any destination she selects or,
unfortunately, her workplace. The benefit that Monroe is
providing to all of its citizens, including Jones, is free
downtown parking at specific locations; it is not free
downtown parking that is accessible to wherever a citizen,
disabled or non-disabled, chooses to go or work.7
10 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
is not denied access to the benefit, and there are alternative
accom modations available to Jo nes.
Contrary to the dissent’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Choate supports a finding of
discrimination, a proper application of Choate requires a
finding that Jones has not been denied meaningful access to
the parking benefit provided by Monroe. In Choate,
Medicaid recipients sued the State of Tennessee for
declaratory and injunctive relief when the state decided to
reduce, from twenty to fourteen, the number of inpatient
hospital days that state medicaid would pay hospitals on
behalf of a medicaid recipient in each year. 469 U.S. at 289.
The medicaid recipients argued that the fourteen-day rule
denied them meaningful access to Medicaid services in
Tennessee in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 301-
02. The Court noted that the fourteen-day limitation would
not deny the medicaid recipients meaningful access to
Medicaid or exclude them from those services. Id. at 303.
The Court held that the benefit provided was the “individual
services offered” and not the amorphous objective of
‘adequate health care.’” Id. The Court further stated that the
State is not required to alter the definition of the benefit
offered “simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have
greater medical needs.” Id. According to the Court, “[t]he
Act does not . . . guarantee the handicapped equal results from
the provision of state Medicaid, even assuming some measure
of equality of health could be constructed.” Id. at 305.
Jones has access to the service offered by Monroe - free
downtown parking in specific locations. She does not have a
right to free downtown parking that allows her access to her
destination of choice. The reality of Monroe’s free downtown
parking system is that not every person is going to have

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 11
8The dissent would create a rule under which, if Monroe provides
free parking anywhere in the city, it could arguably be required to provide
free parking to disabled individuals anyw here in the city they choose to
go. Und er the dissent’s logic, access to free parking could arguably be
extended to individuals other than those traveling to downtown locations.
access to his or her workplace or other destination of choice.8
Monroe provides the benefit of free downtown parking at
specific locations, and these locations will necessarily be
more accessible to some workplaces than others. As the
Choate Court noted, however, equal results from the
provision of the benefit, even assuming equal results could be
achieved, are not guaranteed. Id. at 305. The dissent claims
that “Jones has never taken the position that she should be
able to park wherever she wants.” Yet, that is precisely the
logical result of defining the benefit provided as meaningful
access to one’s destination of choice.
The essence of Jones’s position is that the ADA requires
Monroe to provide her an all-day parking place in the exact
location she requires. Under the ADA, Jones’s individualized
need for a particular spot is most appropriately considered in
determining whether permitting her to park all day in a one-
hour parking place adjacent to her office is a reasonable
accommodation which Monroe must make. The district court
did not specifically rule on this issue in determining that
Jones had not established a likelihood of success on the
merits. As noted previously, a “qualified person with a
disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies or
practices ... meets the essential requirements for receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a particular entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The applicable
regulations interpreting Title II state as follows:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modification
is necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that
12 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program or activity.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
Jones describes her requested accommodation as “allowing
her to park in one of the 11 parking spaces” adjacent to her
office. By contrast, Monroe describes Jones’s requested
accommodation as “immunity from prosecution for her
violations of Monroe’s neutral parking and enforcement
ordinances.” Any accommodation on the part of the entity
only needs to be “reasonable.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151
F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 1998). An accommodation is not
reasonable if it imposes a fundamental alteration in the nature
of the program. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130. The public entity
bears the burden of proving that the accommodation would
fundamentally alter the program. Popovich v. Court of
Common Pleas Domestic Relations Div., 227 F.3d 627, 639
(6th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 276 F.3d 808 (6th
Cir. 2002) (en banc). In cases involving waiver of applicable
rules and regulations, the overall focus should be on “whether
waiver of the rule in the particular case would be so at odds
with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a
fundamental and unreasonable change.” Dadian v. Village of
Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181
F.3d 840, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The purpose of the one-hour limitation is to encourage
patrons to shop at downtown businesses. Waiver of the
ordinance limiting parking to one hour in the business district
would be “at odds” with the fundamental purpose of the rule.
By its very nature, the benefit of one-hour free public parking
cannot be altered to permit disabled individuals to park all
day without jeopardizing the availability of spaces to other
disabled and nondisabled individuals. Such a waiver would
also require Monroe to cease enforcement of an otherwise

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 13
9The dissent relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Ma rtin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001 ), in concluding that the
modification requested by Jones is not a fundamental alteration. In
Ma rtin, the Court first determined that the requested modification, waiver
of the walking requirement, might co nstitute a fundamental alteration by
(1) altering an essential aspect of the game so that it would be
unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally, or (2) altering an
aspect of the game that has only a peripheral impact, but nevertheless
gives a disab led player an advantage o ver others thereby fundam entally
altering the character of the co mpe tition. Id. at 682. The Court concluded
that the “use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental
character of the game of golf,” because “the essence of the game has been
shotmaking.” Id. at 683. Parking, however, is hardly analogous to the
game of go lf. Mo reover, the essential element of a one-hour free public
parking area is the time limitation on an individua l’s ability to use a
designated space to park his or her vehicle. Alteration of the time limit
on spaces designated for one-hour parking is a fundamental alteration of
the parking scheme.
valid ordinance, which by its very nature requires a
fundamental alteration of the rule itself.9
In addition, the record contains evidence of alternative
accommodations available to Jones such as a service which
will pick her up at any Monroe parking lot, based on a
schedule constructed personally for Jones, and take her to the
door of her office building. Accordingly, Jones’s requested
modification, whether characterized as assignment of a
particular parking location or immunity from prosecution, is
not a reasonable accommodation required under the ADA.
The district court’s failure to discuss this issue therefore does
not render its denial of the preliminary injunction an abuse of
discretion.
Because the district court did not rely upon clearly
erroneous findings of fact, improperly apply the governing
law, or use an erroneous legal standard, it did not err in
denying Jones’s request for a preliminary injunction.
14 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
III.
For all the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district
court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 15
_______________
DISSENT
_______________
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting. The
majority opinion errs in its application of the ADA to the
facts of this case, applying the statute in a manner that
essentially eviscerates the ADA’s purpose and renders the
ADA impotent in its ability to provide recourse for disabled
individuals, such as Helen Jones, who face a form of
discrimination which Congress has explicitly prohibited.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly sets out the three elements of a
prima facie case of discrimination under Title II of the ADA.
A plaintiff must establish that she: (1) has a disability; (2) is
otherwise qualified to benefit from the public program; and
(3) is unable to do so as a result of her disability.
Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Pediatric Med., 162 F.3d 432,
435 (6th Cir. 1998). In my view, Jones has established her
prima facie case, and Monroe is thus required to
accommodate Jones’s disability by making “reasonable
modifications” so long as these modifications would not
“fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or
activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
Monroe does not dispute that Jones has a disability.
Accordingly, in order to hold that Jones does not have a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, we must find
either: (1) that she was not otherwise qualified to benefit from
the public service or program and thus does not meet the
second element of the prima facie case; (2) that she is able to
receive the benefit despite her disability and thus does not
meet the third element of the prima facie case; or (3) despite
establishing a prima facie case, the modification Jones seeks
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service or
program provided by Monroe.
16 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
I. Facts
Jones works as a substance abuse counselor for deaf and
hearing-impaired individuals. Her multiple sclerosis causes
tremors in her arms and legs, and results in severe fatigue.
She is not capable of walking long distances and therefore
relies on a wheelchair. Jones’s wheelchair, however, is a
manual model, and the exertion required to move long
distances can also cause her significant fatigue. Jones is able
to drive her car, but she is not able to get her wheelchair in
and out of the car by herself. Thus, her practice has been to
park in one of the parking spaces adjacent to her building and
walk across the sidewalk to the building, where she has left
her wheelchair at the door.
Jones’s symptoms become more pronounced as the day
progresses. As her fatigue increases, she can lose the fine
motor skills necessary to communicate with her deaf clients.
In addition, Jones is unable to walk across an intersection in
the time that it takes for the light to change, and is unable to
stand, unassisted, on a sidewalk for more than five minutes.
Jones’s treating physician has testified that Jones should
avoid any unnecessary stress and exertion.
Monroe provides free day-long parking in several
municipal lots throughout downtown. Other individuals
employed in Jones’s office building are able to utilize this
service to access their workplace. Within two blocks of
Jones’s workplace are several municipal lots providing a total
of 373 free spaces where individuals are able to park for the
entire day. Of these 373 spaces, sixteen have been designated
as handicapped spaces.
Monroe has limited parking to one hour at an additional
110 free parking spaces in the retail district, where Jones
works. This time limitation is intended to allow for patron
parking and to discourage employees from using these
particularly convenient spaces. There are eleven such spaces
adjacent to Jones’s building. The closest space is twenty-one

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 17
feet from the entrance to her building; the farthest is sixty-five
feet. The closest handicapped space in one of the free day-
long lots provided by Monroe is 592 feet from the building –
a distance far too great for Jones to manage.
The majority notes that the record contains evidence of an
alternative accommodation for Jones, stating that she can be
picked up at any Monroe lot and taken to the door of her
building. This accommodation is not a viable option for
Jones. She often works odd hours, including well into the
evening, frequently on short notice, and this transit service
requires at least twenty-four hours notice to schedule a pick-
up for a disabled individual. In addition, the service stops
running at 5:30 p.m. The Salvation Army has provided its
own van on occasion to transport her to and from the lots to
her work, but reliance on this private accommodation–which
is not provided by Monroe–is misplaced. Moreover, this
option is no longer available because the Salvation Army van
is not wheelchair accessible, and its driver was seriously
injured trying to help Jones out of the vehicle.
II. Standard of Review
The majority states that we are to review the district court’s
judgment for an abuse of discretion. It is true that this Court
generally reviews decisions on whether to grant a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. See McPherson v. Mich.
High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997).
However, if pure legal conclusions are involved, we review
the judgment of the district court de novo. See id. (stating
that, in an appeal of a ruling on a preliminary injunction,
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal rulings
are reviewed de novo). Jones does not dispute any factual
findings made by the district court. Whether the ADA
requires Monroe to provide Jones with the requested
modification of its parking policy is strictly a legal question.
Therefore, we are not to give deference to the judgment of the
district court.
18 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
III. Whether Jones is a Qualified Individual with a
Disability
Monroe argues that Jones is not a qualified individual with
a disability because she is not a person who is contemplated
to be served by Monroe’s one-hour parking ordinance. As
such, she is not protected by the ADA.
It is incorrect, however, to address the benefit that Jones
claims she is being denied as though it revolves around the
one-hour parking ordinance. Jones has never complained that
she is being denied the benefit of this one-hour ordinance.
Jones argues that Monroe provides all individuals the benefit
of free downtown parking, and this is undisputed. The one-
hour ordinance is only relevant insofar as it prevents Jones
from enjoying the benefit of the free all-day downtown
parking program. Therefore, while the one-hour ordinance
may be relevant to whether Jones’s requested modification is
a fundamental alteration, it is wholly inapplicable to the
question of whether she is a qualified individual with a
disability.
The majority concludes that “[t]he essence of Jones’s
position is that the ADA requires Monroe to provide her an
all-day parking space in the exact location she requires.”
However, this is not the essence of her claim. Jones has never
taken the position that she should be able to park wherever
she wants. The “essence” of her claim is that because Monroe
provides free and accessible all-day parking for everyone else,
it cannot effectively deny her the benefit of this parking
program because of her disability.
A hypothetical example may serve to illuminate this issue.
Suppose that a city provides the service of a public library for
the enjoyment of its citizens. The library has three separate
entrances, East, West, and South, all of which are equipped
with wheelchair ramps. The wheelchair ramp at the South
entrance is slightly wider than the other two. A certain
disabled individual, Ms. Smith, enjoys utilizing the library,

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 19
just as all other disabled and able-bodied individuals are able
to do. Unfortunately for Smith, her particular disability
requires her to use a specially designed wheelchair that is
larger than other wheelchairs, and she therefore cannot access
the library through the East or West entrance.
After some time, the city decides that it has to do more to
encourage children to read, and so it converts the South wing
of the library to “Kiddies Land,” where there are many
activities designed to develop children’s interest in reading.
The city has determined that this plan is beneficial because it
serves not only to encourage children to read, but also to
increase the revenues generated by the library. Additionally,
the city has decided that in order to reap the full benefits of
Kiddies Land, adult patrons may not use the South wing. As
a result, Smith requests that she be permitted to use the South
entrance without being subject to the monetary fine the city
has decided to impose on adults who enter the South wing.
The city rejects her request. Nevertheless, Smith continues to
access the library through the South entrance, and is severely
fined each time she does so.
Smith sues under the ADA, arguing that the city is
providing a service, in the form of a public library, that she is
denied the benefit of using due to her disability. She requests
that the reasonable modification be made to allow her to use
the South entrance. In such a situation, it would make no
sense for the court to hold that Smith is not a qualified
individual with a disability because the South wing of the
library is intended for the benefit of children. Smith is not
complaining that she is not allowed to use Kiddies Land. She
is complaining that, due to her rare disability, she is denied
access to the entire library. The use of the South entrance is
merely the reasonable modification she proposes in order to
have the same library access as other citizens. The city may
argue that permitting Smith access through the South wing
would fundamentally alter Kiddies Land. It cannot be said,
however, that Smith is not a qualified individual under the
20 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
1The majo rity’s attemp t to distinguish this hypothetical example from
Jones’s case is inapposite. While the majority may assume that Jones has
satisfied the second element of her prima facie case, Monroe argues that
she has not. I put forth this hypothetical illustration to demonstrate the
futility of Monroe’s argument that Jones is not otherwise qualified to
benefit from the parking progra m. By stating that Smith’s case is
different from Jones’s because Jones is not denied access to the b enefit,
the majority is attempting to demonstrate why Jones does not meet the
third element of her prima facie case - a question I address in Part IV of
this opinion, but do not intend to address in this illustration.
ADA when she seeks access to the library itself rather than
access to Kiddies Land.1
The Technical Assistance Manual for Title II of the ADA
sheds further light on the issue of whether Jones is “otherwise
qualified.” The manual confronts the question of whether
accommodations such as freight elevators can be used to
satisfy the program accessibility requirements. See ADA
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUA L II-5.1000 (1993). The
manual states that such arrangements are permissible, as a last
resort, so long as the passageways remain reasonable in
length, fairly well lit, and generally clean. See id. The
argument asserted by Monroe, however, inescapably conflicts
with the manual. By Monroe’s logic, a disabled individual
would not be permitted to use a freight elevator because the
freight elevator is not intended to transport members of the
public. Therefore, the disabled individual would not be
“otherwise qualified.” The example in the Technical
Assistance Manual exposes the flaw in this logic. It is
therefore clear that Jones has satisfied the second element of
her prima facie case by demonstrating that she is otherwise
qualified to benefit from the program.
IV. Whether Jones is Able to Benefit from the Parking
Program
The majority asserts that Jones has equal access to the free
downtown parking, that she can park there if she chooses, and
that she therefore is not denied the benefit provided by

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 21
Monroe. While it is true that she may park in the free all-day
lot if she chooses to do so, this does not mean that she has the
“meaningful access” that the ADA requires. See Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (noting that an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual must be provided with
meaningful access to the benefit offered). For Jones to be
able to benefit from Monroe’s parking program, she needs to
be able to have access to the locations which non-disabled
individuals can access from these parking lots. The majority
accuses me of conflating meaningful access to downtown
parking with meaningful access to an individual’s destination
of choice. However, I do not believe that Jones has the right
to meaningful access to her destination of choice. I do not
contend that, if Monroe provides free parking anywhere in the
city, it must provide free parking to disabled individuals
anywhere in the city they choose to go. Of course, to the
extent that free, accessible parking is not provided for non-
disabled individuals, it need not be provided for anyone. I do,
however, believe that she has the right to the benefit of
meaningful access to those locations that–but for her
disability–would be accessible to her through Monroe’s
parking program. I am not conflating this benefit with free
downtown parking. Rather, the majority’s attempt to separate
the two is artificial. Parking is only meaningful insofar as it
provides individuals with access to their destinations.
Returning to the hypothetical illustration, if Ms. Smith were
to gain access to the library, only to find that all of the books
were placed on shelves too high for her to reach from her
wheelchair, the city would be required to accommodate her
and make sure that she had access to the books she could not
reach. Entry into the library is only meaningful because it
provides individuals with access to the books the library
contains. Under the majority’s logic, if Smith were to argue
that the ADA requires that she be given access to the high-
shelved books, she would be conflating access to the library
with access to the books of her choice.
22 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
The majority cites Choate in support of the proposition that
“the benefit is not appropriately defined as free downtown
parking generally, but rather as the provision of all-day and
one-hour parking in specific locations.” This does not clarify
precisely how the majority is defining the benefit, which is
critical to this case. The provisions for all-day parking and
one-hour parking are two separate and clearly distinct
provisions. Jones only claims that she is denied the benefit of
the former.
In Choate, the Court explicitly addressed the issue of
defining the benefit, and made clear that the approach the
majority takes here is impermissible. It stated, “The benefit
itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively
denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the
meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure
meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the . . .
benefit may have to be made.” 469 U.S. at 301. The Court
also noted that “[a]ntidiscrimination legislation can obviously
be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is
‘collapsed’ into one’s definition of what is the relevant
benefit.” Id. at 301 n.21.
In determining that the benefit provided in Choate was
“individual services offered,” rather than the more amorphous
benefit of “adequate health care,” the Court noted that “[t]he
14-day limitation will not deny [the disabled individuals]
meaningful access to Tennessee Medicaid services or exclude
them from those services.” Id. at 302-03. In contrast, Jones
is clearly denied meaningful access to parking services, as the
only spaces she is permitted to use are inaccessible to her.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Choate, Jones is therefore altogether
excluded from meaningful access to the service.
The Choate Court also explained, “The reduction in
inpatient coverage will leave both handicapped and
nonhandicapped Medicaid users with identical and effective
services fully available for their use, with both classes of
users subject to the same durational limitation.” Id. While

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 23
the durational limitations in the one-hour spaces are certainly
identical for both classes of individuals, in the present case,
unlike Choate, the durational limitation in and of itself is not
the problem. Rather, the problem here is that the durational
limitation renders Jones unable to take advantage of a benefit
clearly distinct from the durational limitation, that is, free and
accessible, all-day downtown parking.
Lastly, in Choate, “[t]he 14-day limitation . . . [did] not
exclude the handicapped from or deny them the benefits of
the 14 days of care the State [chose] to provide.” Id. In
contrast, Jones is excluded from the benefits of free and
accessible downtown parking because her disability prevents
her from utilizing the all-day spaces Monroe chose to provide
altogether.
It is true that the Supreme Court noted that “Medicaid
programs do not guarantee that each recipient will receive that
level of health care precisely tailored to his or her particular
needs,” id. at 303, but an attempt to claim that Jones is
likewise not guaranteed a parking space precisely tailored to
her particular needs is wholly unpersuasive. A fair reading of
Choate indicates that the Supreme Court would have found a
violation of the Rehabilitation Act if Tennessee’s actions had
the effect of completely denying any individual access to
inpatient care. Here, Jones is denied access to all possible
parking spaces, whether by reason of her disability or
Monroe’s one-hour restriction. Thus, the difference between
the services provided for others and the services provided for
Jones is a difference in kind, and not merely degree. She is
completely denied an effective parking space, and the
language in Choate suggests that the Court would not have
countenanced this type of discrimination. Thus, a proper
application of Choate compels finding for Jones.
The majority’s position is that Jones has access to
downtown parking just as nondisabled individuals do. This
argument ignores the fact that other individuals who work in
downtown Monroe are able to benefit from Monroe’s free
24 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
parking program only because it allows them access to their
“destination of choice.” It may be true that Monroe’s
downtown parking system requires that not every person is
going to have access to his or her own workplace. However,
it is equally true that Monroe’s downtown parking system
provides parking that would be accessible to Jones but for her
disability. The analysis is straightforward. Jones is denied
the relevant benefit because, if Jones did not have multiple
sclerosis, she would be provided with free all-day parking that
gives her access to the building where she works. Because
she has multiple sclerosis, she is not provided with that
benefit. There is no question, therefore, that she satisfies the
third element of her prima facie case, that is, she is unable to
benefit from the public program because of her disability.
V. Whether the Requested Modification is
Unreasonable or Fundamentally Alters the Nature of
the Service Provided
The majority also finds that to permit Jones to park in one
of the spaces adjacent to her building would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service Monroe provides. The majority,
however, points to nothing about the requested modification
that would fundamentally alter the service in any way, other
than merely pointing out that the requested modification is a
change. But this is precisely what the governing statutes
require. If courts were permitted to hold, as the majority does
here, that any “modification” fundamentally alters the service
because it requires that the service be “modified,” the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA would be rendered
ineffectual. It is worth restating that Jones does not complain
that she is being denied the benefit of the one-hour parking
ordinance. Our analysis requires us to consider whether the
modification Jones requests fundamentally alters the program
or service of which she is denied the benefit. Accordingly, it
is not proper to analyze the fundamental-alteration question
based on whether the one-hour ordinance is fundamentally
altered.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 25
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea that any
mere alteration of a rule is fundamental. See PGA Tour, Inc.
v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 n.51 (2001) (disapproving of a
reading of the ADA that would render the word
“fundamentally” largely superfluous). Requiring public
entities to make changes to rules, policies, practices, or
services is exactly what the ADA does. Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d
775, 782-83 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court recognized the
administrative burdens that Congress knew it was imposing
when passing the ADA. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 680. The
majority essentially contends that requiring an entity to make
such changes ipso facto results in a fundamental alteration,
and is therefore not required by the ADA. This is simply not
the case.
Recent Supreme Court precedent compels a finding that the
modification Jones requests is not a fundamental alteration.
In Martin, a disabled professional golfer, Casey Martin, sued
the PGA for refusing to permit him to ride in a golf cart as a
modification of its “walking rule.” See Martin, 532 U.S. at
669. The PGA argued that the goal of its tournaments was to
compare the performance of competitors, a task that is
meaningful only if identical substantive rules apply to all
competitors. Id. at 686. The PGA claimed that the waiver of
any rule that may alter the outcome of the event necessarily
violates this principle, and the reasonable modification Martin
sought would therefore be a fundamental alteration. Id.
Despite this argument, the Supreme Court held that the
refusal to grant Martin’s request was discrimination
prohibited by the ADA, finding that permitting him to ride in
a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of the golf
tournaments. Id. at 689.
Of particular note is that neither the majority nor the dissent
in Martin analyzed whether waiving the walking rule would
fundamentally alter that rule itself, rather, they assessed
whether waiving the rule would fundamentally alter golf
tournaments. The Court’s recognition of the appropriate
26 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
2The majority discounts the instructiveness of Ma rtin, because
parking “is hardly analogous to the game of golf.” However, I believe
that Ma rtin’s precedential value extends well beyond the golf course . The
majo rity’s criticism, if valid, could well be directed at their reliance on
Choate, as parking benefits are similarly “hardly analogous” to Medica id
benefits. My view that both Choate and Ma rtin are instructive here is in
no way ba sed any similarities betwe en M edica id, golf, and parking. A
number of federal circuit courts have applied Ma rtin to ADA cases
involving factual scenarios similarly different from golf. See, e.g., Dudley
v. Hannaford Bros. Co, 333 F.3d 299, 307 (1st Cir. 2003) (relying on
Ma rtin in holding that a retailer’s policy of never reconsidering a refusal
to sell alcohol to a custome r violated the A DA ); Kapche v. City of San
Antonio , 304 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying on Ma rtin in holding
that an individualized inquiry is required in assessing whe ther a city
violated the AD A in deeming an insulin-dependent applicant ineligible for
a position as a po lice officer); Forma n v. Sma ll, 271 F.3d 285, 297 (D.C.
Cir. 200 1). I believe that Ma rtin and Choate are instructive and
precedential because they interpret the relevant statutes and announce
legal principles that are directly applicable to this case.
framing in Martin compels us to take the same approach here.
Here, therefore, we must consider whether waiving the one-
hour ordinance for Jones would fundamentally alter the
overall parking scheme downtown, not its effect on the one-
hour ordinance. Had the Supreme Court utilized the rationale
the majority uses here, it would have simply stated that
waiver of the walking rule “by its very nature” fundamentally
alters the walking rule, and is therefore not required by the
ADA.2
Similarly, in the recent case of Dudley v. Hannaford Bros.
Co., 333 F.3d 299 (1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit considered
whether a retailer’s policy of never reconsidering a cashier’s
refusal to sell alcohol to a customer who appeared intoxicated
violated the ADA. In Dudley, the plaintiff had suffered
severe trauma in an automobile accident, and regularly
exhibited characteristics often associated with intoxication.
Id. at 301. Because he appeared intoxicated, a cashier refused
to sell him alcoholic beverages. Id. at 302. When the
plaintiff asked to speak to a manager and explained his
situation, the manager, despite believing that the plaintiff’s

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 27
3I cannot overstate the importance of applying the proper scope of
analysis when deciding whether a modification is a fundamental
alteration. In this case, contrary to Martin and Dudley, the majority
considers whether waiver of the one-hour ordinance fundamentally alters
the one-hour ordinance itself, rather than whether it fund amentally alters
Monro e’s downtown parking scheme as a whole. Because I fear that the
majority opinion may be read to establish a dangerous precedent that
perm its analyzing whether a requested modification is a fundamental
alteration in a manner that would render virtually all modifications
“fundamental alterations,” I also wish to note that the majority’s
discussion of the fundame ntal-alteration issue is merely dicta. Because
the majority finds that Jones does not meet the third element of her prima
facie case, there is no need for the majority to assess whether her
requested mod ification is a fundamental alteration.
story was plausible, relied on the store’s policy that
management would not revisit a cashier’s refusal to sell
alcohol to a customer. Id. Citing Martin, the First Circuit
noted that, because the plaintiff established his prima facie
case, the defendant had to establish that the requested
modification, withdrawal of the “refusal to reconsider” policy,
fundamentally altered the nature of its business. Id. at 307-
08. Again, it is important to note that the court did not
consider whether withdrawal of the policy fundamentally
altered the nature of the policy itself. Of course, the waiver
of any rule alters that rule tautologically. Rather, the court
assessed whether withdrawal of the policy would
fundamentally alter the nature of its business, and found that
it would not. Id. at 308-09. Again, applying this reasoning to
the present case, it is clear that we should be considering
whether exempting Jones from the one-hour ordinance
fundamentally alters Monroe’s downtown parking scheme as
a whole, not whether it fundamentally alters the one-hour
ordinance itself.3
I recognize that the precise contours of when an alteration
is properly considered fundamental under an ADA analysis
may be difficult to define. It is clear, however, that whatever
this standard demands, in order to be a fundamental alteration,
the requested modification must result in an alteration more
28 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
fundamental than the modification requested in Martin. The
present action is not such a case. If the ADA requires the
PGA to alter the enforcement of the walking rule to
accommodate Martin’s disability, it surely must require
Monroe to alter the enforcement of its one-hour parking
ordinance to accommodate Jones’s disability.
The majority asserts that “[b]y its very nature, the benefit
of one-hour free public parking cannot be altered to permit
disabled individuals to park all day without jeopardizing the
availability of spaces to other disabled and nondisabled
individuals.” This statement misses the point.
First, as the majority recognizes, the ADA requires courts
to conduct an individualized inquiry. The Supreme Court has
stated that “the ADA was enacted to eliminate discrimination
against ‘individuals’ with disabilities . . . . To comply with
this command, an individualized inquiry must be made to
determine whether a specific modification for a particular
person’s disability would be reasonable under the
circumstances.” Martin, 532 U.S. at 688. Jones does not
contend that Monroe’s parking program should be altered to
permit disabled individuals to park all day in the spots most
convenient for them. Jones argues only that she should be
able to park in one of the only eleven spots capable of
accommodating her needs – not most convenient for her.
It is fair to say that, on their face, the parking limitations do
not affect disabled and nondisabled individuals differently,
and it is also true that most disabled individuals are able to
comply with the parking limitations and benefit from the
parking services. Jones, however, cannot. The ADA requires
the question to be whether the parking limitations affect any
disabled individual differently than they affect the
nondisabled. Because of her disability, the parking
limitations clearly do affect Jones differently than
nondisabled individuals. Other similarly situated individuals
are able to park for free all-day in spaces that allow them
meaningful access to their destination, but Jones is not.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 29
Second, whether the requested alteration “jeopardizes the
availability” of spaces to other individuals is not the
appropriate legal question. Virtually every accommodation
made for disabled individuals, in one slight manner or
another, “jeopardizes” others. Handicapped spaces in
shopping mall parking lots “jeopardize” the availability of
parking spaces for nondisabled shoppers. Permitting Casey
Martin to ride in a cart during a golf tournament “jeopardizes”
other golfers’ chances of winning the tournament. But this is
simply what the ADA requires.
The appropriate questions are whether the requested
modification is unreasonable, and whether the modification
fundamentally alters the service. Here, the modification is
clearly reasonable and fundamentally alters nothing.
Monroe’s one-hour parking program provides 110 free
spaces. If Jones were accommodated, only 109 would be
available during certain times. This simply cannot constitute
a “fundamental alteration.”
The Technical Assistance Manual also proves to be
illuminating on this issue. The manual does not even
contemplate that permitting a disabled individual to use a
freight elevator would be a fundamental alteration, despite the
fact that freight elevators are intended to transport freight,
rather than individual members of the public. See ADA
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUA L II-5.1000. The
acknowledgment that a freight elevator could be used as an
accommodation implicitly affirms that permitting such use
does not constitute a fundamental alteration.
The manual also provides the following compelling
illustration of a modification that would be a fundamental
alteration: “Installing an elevator in an historic house museum
to provide access to the second floor bedrooms would destroy
architectural features of historic significance on the first
floor.” ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUA L II-5.5000. In
such a situation, the installation of an elevator would indeed
be a fundamental alteration. The sharp contrast, however,
30 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
between this sort of modification and the benign modification
requested by Jones, is obvious. The alteration to the historic
house is fundamental; the request by Jones is simply an
alteration.
The majority also asserts that providing Jones with her
requested modification would “require Monroe to cease
enforcement of an otherwise valid ordinance.” This is not the
case. The ADA requires only that Monroe cease enforcement
of the one-hour ordinance with respect to Jones. Monroe
would still be free to enforce the ordinance with respect to
others who violate it. Martin simply held that the individual
plaintiff must be permitted to use a golf cart in PGA
tournaments, not that the PGA had to permit all golfers to use
carts. The PGA only had to cease the enforcement of its rule
with regard to Martin. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 689 (stating
that the walking rule could “be waived in individual cases
without working a fundamental alteration”) (emphasis added).
VI. Preliminary Injunction Factors
I do not take issue with the four factors noted by the
majority which the district court is to consider when
considering a motion for a preliminary injunction. However,
for the reasons detailed above, I believe that Jones has a high
likelihood of success on the merits. In addition, the emotional
and physical toll that Jones suffers from being denied a
parking spot is surely irreparable, especially in light of the
severity of her multiple sclerosis. The harm to others in this
case is negligible. The public interest is clearly served by
eliminating the discrimination Congress sought to prevent in
passing the ADA. In addition, permitting Jones to park
adjacent to her building improves her capacity to counsel her
clients, which also serves the public interest. Thus, proper
consideration of all four factors requires this Court to grant
Jones’s request for injunctive relief.

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No. 01-2335 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan 31
VII. The District Court’s Abuse of Discretion
As stated above, I contend that the majority improperly
applies an abuse of discretion standard of review in this case,
when a de novo standard is required. However, the legal
arguments in favor of Jones in this case are so strong that
application of a clearly erroneous standard would not change
the result. As the majority notes, the district court’s
determination will be disturbed only if the district court relied
upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied
the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard.
Nightclubs, 202 F.3d at 888.
Because Jones is being denied the benefit of free and
accessible all-day parking due to her disability, and because
the modification she requests is not a fundamental alteration,
the district court “improperly applied governing law,” and the
decision was therefore an abuse of discretion.
In addition, the district court “used an erroneous legal
standard.” In assessing Jones’s likelihood of success on the
merits, the district court stated only that “[t]he City’s parking
plan takes into account the needs of the handicapped and does
not, on its face, seem to violate the ADA. In short, the City’s
parking plan seems to comply with the federally mandated
standard of equal access.” Whether the parking plan, on its
face, seems to violate the ADA is not the appropriate legal
standard, nor is whether the plan seems to comply with the
standard of equal access. The appropriate legal standards are
whether Jones is being denied a benefit due to her disability,
and whether the modification she seeks is a fundamental
alteration. The district court therefore used erroneous legal
standards in disposing of this case. Accordingly, the
erroneous legal standards used by the district court require
this Court to find the district court’s judgment to be an abuse
of discretion.
32 Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan No. 01-2335
VIII. Conclusion
As the First Circuit has noted, the ADA “did not emerge in
a vacuum.” Dudley, 333 F.3d at 303. Congress found that
“society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities,” creating “a serious and pervasive social
problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Congress explicitly
noted that disabled individuals continually encounter
discrimination that includes, among other things, the
discriminatory effects of architectural and transportation
barriers, failure to make modifications to existing practices,
and relegation to lesser benefits. Id. § 12101(a)(5). In order
to ensure full participation of disabled individuals in our
society, Congress enacted the ADA to “address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(4).
The majority decision is in direct conflict with the intent of
Congress, the text of the statutes, and the corresponding
regulations, and the decision also violates binding Supreme
Court precedent. Because the benefit “cannot be defined in
a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled,”
Choate, 469 U.S. at 301; and because we cannot read the
ADA in a manner that “renders the word ‘fundamentally’
largely superfluous,” Martin, 532 U.S. at 689 n.51, I would
reverse the district court and grant Helen Jones’s motion for
a preliminary injunction.

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