DICK I. TAYLOR and ROBERT J. TAYLOR v. Chief of Police Phillip Keith, in his individual

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0270P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0270p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DICK I. TAYLOR and ROBERT
J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CHIEF OF POLICE PHILLIP
KEITH, in his individual and
official capacity; DEPUTY
POLICE CHIEF JAMES R.
COKER, in his individual and
official capacity; CAPT AIN
DAN DAVIS, in his individual
and official capacity;
SERGEANT GORDON CATLETT,
SR., in his individual and
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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N
No. 01-6460
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 99-00057—James H. Jarvis, District Judge.
Argued: May 6, 2003
2 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
Decided and Filed: August 5, 2003
Before: KRUPANSKY, SILER, and GILMAN, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Wanda G. Sobieski, SOBIESKI, MESSER &
ASSOCIATES, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants. John
A. Lucas, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Knoxville, Tennessee,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Wanda G. Sobieski, Diane
Marie Messer, SOBIESKI, MESSER & ASSOCIATES,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants. John A. Lucas,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Knoxville, Tennessee, for
Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, Sergeant Dick I. Taylor
and Officer Robert J. Taylor, brought a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several City of
Knoxville supervisory police officers in their individual and
official capacities. The Taylors alleged that the defendants
retaliated against them for the exercise of their First
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the
Taylors did not engage in protected speech. For the reasons
that follow, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court
and REMAND for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 14, 1997, police officers Robert Taylor and
Toby Wells attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Jack
Longmire. Longmire resisted arrest and, in the course of the

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 3
struggle, Officer Taylor called for emergency assistance and
was accidentally sprayed with pepper spray. The officers
eventually succeeded in placing Longmire in handcuffs and
forcing him to the ground next to the squad car.
Shortly after Longmire was subdued, Officer John
Szczepanowski arrived at the scene. Officers Taylor and
Wells left Longmire in the custody of Szczepanowski while
they went to flush the pepper spray out of Taylor’s eyes.
When they returned, the officers found Longmire lying face
down with blood flowing from the right side of his head.
Officer Taylor’s father, Sergeant Dick Taylor, who was
covering for Sergeant Roger White, also responded to the
emergency call. Upon arriving at the scene, Sergeant Taylor
was informed that Longmire resisted arrest. He proceeded to
treat Longmire’s wounds and directed another officer to wash
Longmire’s blood from the asphalt. Sergeant Taylor briefed
Sergeant White when he arrived, and the two questioned Mrs.
Longmire about what she had witnessed during her husband’s
arrest. When Mrs. Longmire expressed concern about the
beating her husband received, Sergeants Taylor and White
explained that she could file an abuse complaint with Internal
Affairs. Mr. Longmire was later advised about the procedure
for filing a complaint.
The following day, Officer Taylor filled out the required
Use of Force Report wherein he implicated Szczepanowski in
the beating of Longmire. Taylor’s report stated that he could
not explain how Longmire’s head injury occurred since
Longmire was not bleeding when he was left in
Szczepanowski’s custody. Upon review of this report, Chief
of Police Phillip Keith directed Sergeant Gordon Catlett, Sr.
of Internal Affairs to investigate the matter. Internal Affairs
contacted Longmire, who declined to give a statement, and
the investigation was closed.
Captain Dan Davis and Sergeant White reviewed Officer
Taylor’s Use of Force Report. They felt that there may have
4 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
been a problem with Szczepanowski and decided to conduct
their own investigation. Captain Davis instructed one of his
lieutenants to investigate the report. Sergeant White informed
Internal Affairs that he had left Szczepanowski written
instructions to make a statement about the incident.
Szczepanowski was not interviewed, however, because he
was on medical leave due to injuries sustained in connection
with an arrest made on December 17 wherein he broke the
suspect’s leg.
On January 8, 1998, after Sergeant Taylor saw
Szczepanowski at roll call, he approached his supervisor,
Lieutenant Gordon Catlett, Jr., to express concern about
Szczepanowski’s returning to active duty. Sergeant Taylor
testified that he told Lieutenant Catlett:
[S]ince you are a lieutenant, it may be a good idea for
you to use your influence, if this boy does have a
problem, to get him moved or to get him out of the area
he was in. He was working in a high crime area and the
impression that I got was that he needed to be moved. . . .
Sergeant Taylor’s inquiry prompted Internal Affairs to reopen
the investigation.
The Taylors cooperated with the Internal Affairs
investigation and both implicated Szczepanowski in their
formal statements. At the conclusion of the investigation,
however, the Taylors were terminated by Chief Keith at the
recommendation of Captain Davis, Deputy Chief Robert
Coker, and Sergeant Catlett for allegedly covering up the
Szczepanowski incident. The City alleged that Officer Taylor
intentionally falsified information in Longmire’s resisting-
arrest warrant. The arrest warrant stated that Longmire’s
injuries occurred when he fell to the pavement while
struggling with the officers, whereas the Use of Force Report
indicated that Longmire’s injuries occurred while in the
custody of Szczepanowski. Moreover, Wells testified that
Officer Taylor asked him whether he would cover for

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 5
Szczepanowski. As for Sergeant Taylor, the City alleged that
he failed to take appropriate action regarding allegations of
officer abuse and improperly processed evidence when he
washed away Longmire’s blood without calling criminalistics
to process the scene.
The Taylors filed grievances regarding their terminations.
After a hearing, the Administrative Hearing Officer found
“overwhelming evidence” that the investigation was initiated
as a result of the Use of Force Report prepared by Officer
Taylor and renewed upon concerns expressed by Sergeant
Taylor. This evidence, she concluded, was wholly
inconsistent with the City’s allegation that the Taylors
attempted to cover up the Longmire incident. The Taylors
were ordered reinstated with full back pay.
The defendants appealed to the Chancery Court for Knox
County, which set aside the decision of the Hearing Officer
and ordered reinstatement with an oral reprimand for Officer
Taylor and reinstatement with a 30-day suspension for
Sergeant Taylor. As a consequence, the Taylors appealed to
the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
reversed the chancery court judgment with respect to Sergeant
Taylor, reinstating him with full back pay and no suspension.
The court upheld the Chancellor’s decision with respect to
Officer Taylor.
The Taylors filed the instant lawsuit against the defendants
in their individual and official capacities. The complaint
alleged that the defendants retaliated against them for the
exercise of their First Amendment Rights. Specifically, the
Taylors claimed they were wrongfully terminated for refusing
to remain silent and, upon reinstatement, were subjected to
further retaliation (loss of clothing and equipment, increased
scheduling on holidays and weekends, and denial of training
and career advancement opportunities), which continues to
this day.
6 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
The defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds
of qualified immunity, claiming that the evidence failed to
show a violation of a clearly established right. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
holding that the Taylors failed to state a claim of unlawful
retaliation because they did not establish that they were
punished for speaking on a matter of “public concern.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Dambrot v. Cent. Michigan Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th
Cir. 1995). Summary judgment should be granted when “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, all inferences drawn from the facts must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1996).
III. DISCUSSION
A public employee has a constitutional right to comment on
matters of public concern without fear of reprisal from the
government as employer. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
140, 145-46 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
574 (1968). Thus, even though the government has greater
authority to regulate the speech of its employees than it has in
regulating the speech of the public at large, public employers
cannot silence their employees simply because they
disapprove of their speech. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 384 (1987). “[R]etaliation by a government
employer against an individual who exercises his First
Amendment rights constitutes a First Amendment violation.”
Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000).

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 7
This circuit has a established a three-step process for
evaluating a public employee’s claim of unlawful retaliation.
First, the employee must establish that his speech is protected.
To accomplish this, the employee must show that his speech
touches on a matter of public concern, Connick, 461 U.S. at
147, and demonstrate that his interest in the speech outweighs
the government’s countervailing interest in promoting the
efficiency of the public service it provides as an employer.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. This determination is a question
of law for the court to decide. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.10.
Second, the employee must show that the employer’s adverse
action would chill an ordinary person in the exercise of his
First Amendment rights. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist.,
270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th. Cir. 2001). Finally, the employee
must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as
to whether his speech was a substantial or motivating factor
in the employer’s decision to discipline or dismiss. Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977).
A. Matter of Public Concern
The district court held that Officer Taylor’s speech did not
touch on a matter of public concern because his speech
merely consisted of a report made in the course of his
employment. In so ruling, the court noted that the report
contained no accusation of excessive force and was not
disclosed to the public. Similarly, the court concluded that
Sergeant Taylor’s comment to Lieutenant Catlett was not
protected because it addressed an internal personnel matter
and did not express an opinion that Szczepanowski violated
Longmire’s rights. For reasons explained below, we reverse
the decision of the district court.
Although it was not necessary for the Taylors to have
spoken to the press or to the general public in order for their
speech to be protected, Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412 (1979), some aspect of their speech
must touch upon a matter of public concern. Connick, 461
8 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
U.S. at 146; see also Charvat v. Eastern Ohio Reg’l
Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 617 (6th Cir. 2001);
Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection Dist. No. 1,
131 F.3d 564, 579 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Constitutional protection
for speech on matters of public concern is not premised on the
communication of that speech to the public.”). Speech
touches upon a matter of public concern if it can be “fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social or
other concern to the community.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
Absent unusual circumstances, however, “when a public
employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of a
personal interest,” his speech is not afforded constitutional
protection. Id. at 147.
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the record as a
whole.” Id. at 147-48. The essence of the Taylors’ argument
is that the content of their speech--alleged police brutality--
addresses a matter of inherent public concern. Moreover,
they assert that their speech should be afforded constitutional
protection because its purpose was to “bring to light actual or
potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust.” See Brown v.
City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1988); Marohnic
v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
statements regarding the operation of public organizations in
accordance with law are matters of public concern).
Relying on Thomson v. Scheid, 977 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir.
1992), the defendants contend that, even if the Taylors’
speech indirectly implicates a matter of public concern, none
of their statements is protected because they were made in the
course of their employment, not in their role as a private
citizen. In Thomson, the plaintiff, a fraud investigator, argued
that his conversation with a supervisor and his decision to
send a report detailing potential fraud involving a local
county official to the Inspector General were protected. Id. at
1020-21. In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim, this court

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 9
determined that the plaintiff’s conversation with his
supervisor about the investigation, her reminder to him that
his investigation was confidential, and her warning not to
pursue the matter without following department procedures,
concerned his duties as an employee and addressed only
matters of internal department policy. Therefore, his speech
could not be considered a matter of public concern. Id. We
also concluded that the plaintiff’s decision to turn over his
report to the Office of the Inspector General was not protected
because the plaintiff’s contact was approved by his
supervisors, which made his contact an action in the course of
his employment. Id. In making these determinations, this
court stated that “First Amendment protection extends to a
public employee’s speech when he speaks as a citizen, on a
matter of public concern, but does not extend to speech made
in the course of acting as a public employee.” Id.
The defendants seize upon this language and argue that
when a public employee speaks in his role as a public
employee, his speech cannot touch on a matter of public
concern. This argument, in our opinion, relies on an overly
broad reading of Thomson. Immediately after stating the
language relied upon by the defendants, the Thomson court
explained that “[n]ot all matters discussed within a
government office are of public concern, and thus internal
office communication does not necessarily give rise to a
constitutional claim.” Id. at 1020-21 (emphasis added).
Thomson therefore did not purport to strip public employees
of the First Amendment’s protection for all speech that occurs
in the course of employment. Rather, Thomson simply
implies that the context of the speech (i.e., whether an
employee speaks in the course of his employment) is relevant
to, but not determinative of, whether the speech touches on a
matter of public concern.
Our recent decision in Cockrel, 270 F.3d 1036, which
implicitly rejects a broad interpretation of Thomson, confirms
this view. In Cockrel, we declined to follow other circuits
that have held that a teacher’s statements, made in the course
10 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
1The decision in Connick does not preclude First Amendm ent
protection when an employee sp eaks in the cou rse of his emplo yment if
the employee’s speech involve s a matter of public co ncern. Connick went
only so far as to hold tha t:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of
only personal interest, absent the mo st unusua l circumstances, a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (emp hasis added).
of a classroom lesson, cannot touch upon a matter of public
concern because “a teacher, in choosing what he or she will
teach his students, is not speaking as a citizen, but rather as an
employee on matters of private interest.” Id. at 1051. Instead,
we held that a public teacher’s speech, made in the role of
employee, is protected so long as the speech itself addresses
a matter of public concern. Id. at 1052 (“[A]lthough
[Cockrel] was speaking in her role as an employee when
presenting information on the environmental benefits of
industrial hemp, the content of her speech. . . most certainly
involved matters related to the political and social concern of
the community, as opposed to mere matters of private
interest.”). In doing so, we concluded that the Supreme Court
made clear in Connick that “the key question is not whether
a person is speaking in his role as an employee or citizen, but
whether the employee’s speech in fact touches on a matter of
public concern.”1 Id. at 1052.
In this regard, the defendants argue that the Taylors’ speech
cannot be characterized as an attempt to “bring to light”
police brutality since neither officer unequivocally stated that
Szczepanowski used excessive force. In their view, Officer
Taylor’s speech amounts to nothing more than recording the
arrest incident and advising Longmire’s wife of her husband’s
rights pursuant to police procedure. Further, they assert that
Sergeant Taylor’s comments fall short of alleging potential
wrongdoing, since he merely suggested that “if

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 11
Szczepanowski did have a problem, it might be a good idea
to move him out of a high crime area.”
When examining the content of speech, “the proper inquiry
[is] not what might incidentally be conveyed by the fact that
the employee spoke in a certain way, [but] the point of the
speech in question.” Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187 (emphasis in
original). The point of the speech, however, is not to be
confused with the speaker’s motivation for speaking.
Chappel, 131 F.3d at 575. The inquiry is primarily concerned
with what the speaker intended to communicate through his
statement, and not his reasons for speaking. Id. at 575 (“The
motive which underlies an employee’s statements is a
relevant, but not necessarily dispositive factor when
considering whether an employee’s statements may be fairly
characterized as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”).
The Taylors’ speech was intended to communicate the
potential wrongdoing of a fellow officer. Officer Taylor’s
report clearly implicated Szczepanowski in the use of
excessive force. And, although his report contained facts
rather than accusations, the purpose of his report was to bring
to light conduct that warranted further investigation to ensure
that the arrests were being carried out according to law.
Similarly, Sergeant Taylor’s suggestion to Catlett to use his
influence to get Szczepanowski moved if there was a problem
clearly implies that Taylor strongly believed that
Szczepanowski had a problem with excessive force,
particularly since the comment was made soon after Sergeant
Taylor learned that Szczepanowki had broken the leg of
another arrestee. The fact that Sergeant Taylor couched his
recommendation in terms of “if” does not lessen the
allegation of wrongdoing since Sergeant Taylor would not
have asked Catlett to use his “influence” if he did not intend
to communicate that he believed there was a serious problem.
There is little doubt that, in this context, the Taylors’
supervisors perceived their comments as communicating a
concern about a fellow officer’s potential for excessive force.
12 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
Accordingly, the Taylors’ speech touches on a matter of
public concern.
B. Causation
Next, the defendants contend that the Taylors cannot
establish that the decision to terminate them was motivated,
in part, by the exercise of their First Amendment rights. They
assert that the Taylors have failed to rebut the defendants’
declarations stating that the Taylors were disciplined for
reasons wholly unrelated to the free exercise of speech. The
defendants further maintain that the Taylors cannot explain
how firing them would have resulted in silencing them about
the Longmire incident.
This circuit has held that “the nonmoving party cannot rely
on the mere fact that an adverse employment action followed
speech that the employer would have liked to prevent.”
Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1055. Rather, to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the employee must present sufficient
evidence linking his speech to the employer’s adverse
decision so that a reasonable factfinder could conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the speech, at least in
part, motivated the decision to discharge. Id.
The Taylors have presented adequate evidence suggesting
that the defendants’ actions were partially motivated by their
desire to silence them about the Longmire incident. First,
aside from the temporal proximity between the Taylors’
speech and their termination, the Taylors were terminated for
acts that the department characterized as attempts to cover for
Szczepanowski when in fact the Taylors were the impetus for
the investigation.
Second, several other police officers who participated in the
Longmire arrest also failed to follow department procedures,
yet they were not disciplined or even reprimanded. Officer
Taylor completed the required Use of Force Report and was
later terminated when Longmire’s resisting-arrest warrant

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No. 01-6460 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. 13
contained facts that were inconsistent with this report.
Officer Wells, who like Taylor observed the Longmire’s
injuries, failed to file a report and was not reprimanded.
Sergeant White, Szczepanowski’s immediate supervisor, who
was present on the scene with Sergeant Taylor, failed to file
a supervisor report or investigate Szczepanowski’s actions.
He received a demotion and a thirty-day suspension, but those
sanctions were later rescinded. The department proceeded
with charges against Sergeant Taylor for his failure to take
appropriate action regarding allegations of officer abuse
(remove Szczepanowski from his duties) and his failure to
have the evidence (blood) properly processed, despite the fact
that he was the only superior officer who pressed for further
investigation into Szczepanowski’s alleged abuse.
After reviewing the evidence, a reasonable juror could
conclude that the disparate treatment of the officers involved
in the Longmire incident shows that the department targeted
the Taylors because of their speech. As such, the temporal
proximity between the Taylors’ speech, and the manner in
which the department disciplined the officers involved,
constitute sufficient evidence for the Taylors to create a
genuine issue that their speech was a substantial or motivating
factor in their termination.
C. Qualified Immunity
Lastly, the defendants claim that, even if the Taylors
establish a violation of their constitutional rights, they are
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court did not
reach this issue and we decline to consider this claim in the
first instance. See Bauer v. Montgomery, 215 F.3d 656, 662
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding, under nearly identical
circumstances, that this court should not consider a qualified
immunity defense where the district court did not reach the
issue). Therefore, we remand this issue to the district court
for further consideration.
14 Taylor, et al. v. Keith, et al. No. 01-6460
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE the decision
of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

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