David L. Hyatt v. United States of America

4 Hyatt v. United States No. 98-4229
States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing Forest v. United States Postal Serv., 97 F.3d 137, 139-
40 (6th Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, “a statute does not operate
‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising
from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsets
expectations based on prior law.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269
(citations omitted). Rather, we must determine whether the
Act “attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.” Id. at 269-70. Although the events
underlying Hyatt’s conviction antedate the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the application of the Act’s
limitation period does not attach “new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment.” Id. The limitation
period applies to Hyatt’s filing of a motion under Section
2255, which occurred after the enactment of the statute; as a
result, the application of the limitation period is prospective
and not retroactive. See id.
We recognize that even though the limitation period is
prospective in application, it cannot be applied so as to bar a
motion before the movant has had a reasonable opportunity to
bring it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21
(1982) (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63
(1902)). For this reason, applying the literal language of
Section 2255 would be an unfair and severe instance of
retroactivity. See id. However, the one-year grace period
ensures that any prisoner whose conviction became final prior
to April 24, 1996 would have had an adequate opportunity to
file a motion under Section 2255. Therefore, we join the
majority of other circuits and hold that prisoners whose
convictions became final on or before April 24, 1996 had
until April 24, 1997 to file their Section 2255 motions.
Consequently, because Hyatt filed his Section 2255 motion
after April 24, 1997, we hold that the motion was time-barred
and AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0108P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0108p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DAVID L. HYATT ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA ,
Respondent-Appellee.
;>

1
No. 98-4229
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 98-01042—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: October 26, 1999
Decided and Filed: March 27, 2000
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and
SILER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Samuel A. Yannucci, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. David L.
Hyatt, Coleman, Florida, pro se.

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2 Hyatt v. United States No. 98-4229
1Section 2255 now reads in pertinent part:
A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this
section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. David L. Hyatt
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his conviction and vacate his
sentence. The district court held that his motion was untimely
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-143, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996),
which allows prisoners one year after their convictions
become final to file motions under Section 2255.
On November 19, 1993, David L. Hyatt was convicted of
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He was sentenced to life in
prison on January 26, 1994. We affirmed the judgment and
sentence on September 9, 1995. On May 4, 1998, Hyatt filed
a motion to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On September 25, the district court
granted the United States’ motion to dismiss and issued a
certificate of appealability on the sole issue of whether
Hyatt’s Section 2255 motion was timely. In reviewing a
district court’s denial of a motion under Section 2255, we
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings and
review its conclusions of law de novo. See Nagi v. United
States, 90 F.3d 130, 134 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by adding a time-limit provision
for Section 2255 motions. As amended, Section 2255
precludes a prisoner from filing Section 2255 motions more
than one year after the conviction becomes final.1 The
No. 98-4229 Hyatt v. United States 3
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making
a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act became
effective on April 24, 1996. A majority of circuits have
interpreted the Act to provide a one-year grace period for
prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the
effective date of the Act. See Paige v. United States, 171
F.3d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1999); Goodman v. United States, 151
F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Angelone, 150
F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1998); Mickens v. United States, 148
F. 3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Flores, 135
F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d
109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d
737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866
(7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
Under this interpretation, such prisoners had until April 24,
1997 to file motions under Section 2255. Hyatt’s conviction
became final prior to the effective date of the Act. He filed
his Section 2255 motion on May 4, 1998, well after the
expiration of the one-year grace period. As a result, the
district court rightly concluded that his motion was time-
barred.
Hyatt argues that the retroactive application of the period of
limitations violates his due process, ex post facto, and
Suspension Clause rights under the Constitution. These
arguments are without merit. While statutory retroactivity has
“long been disfavored,” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 268 (1994), retroactivity concerns generally do not
bar the application of a changed limitation period to a suit that
is filed after the amendment’s effective date. See United

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