United States of America v. Robert Dice

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0005P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0005p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R OBERT DICE ,
Defendant-Appellee.
;>

1
No. 98-3092
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 96-00136—John D. Holschuh, District Judge.
Argued: December 9, 1999
Decided and Filed: January 6, 2000
Before: JONES, COLE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Louis M. Fischer, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, APPELLATE SECTION,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gordon Hobson,
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Louis M. Fischer,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION,
APPELLATE SECTION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

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2 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
Gordon Hobson, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S
OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. William A.
Hasselbach, RITTGERS & MENGLE, Lebanon, Ohio, for
Amicus Curiae.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. This case arises
from a battle in the “war on drugs” that the Government lost
because it failed to abide by one of the key rules of
engagement. Specifically, the district court found a violation
of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule and
excluded evidence seized in the resulting search.
Acknowledging its constitutional infraction, the United States
challenges the district court’s suppression order on more
narrow grounds. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
I.
A.
The seriousness of the resulting suppression order prompts
us to set forth in considerable detail the facts adduced before
the district court.
On October 31, 1996, Defendant-Appellee Dice was
indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio on one count of manufacturing and
possessing with intent to manufacture and distribute more
than 1,000 marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); and one count of maintaining a place to
manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(1). On November 25, 1996, Dice moved to suppress
evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant, and
also moved to suppress oral statements he made during the
execution of the warrant. On February 19, 1997, the district
court held an evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress,
and on June 19, the court granted both motions. After the
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 15
information used to obtain the warrant. [O]fficers, in
executing a valid search warrant, could break in doors of
private homes without sanction.
986 F.2d at 1220.
C.
Although the Government indirectly calls upon the
“inevitable discovery doctrine” in its brief, it does not and can
not make such an argument. To prevail under that doctrine,
the government must show “that the evidence inevitably
would have been obtained from lawful sources in the absence
of the illegal discovery.” Leake, 95 F.3d at 412. This requires
the government to proffer clear evidence “of an independent,
untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered
the same evidence” as that discovered through the illegal
search. Id. Here, the government has not done this. In fact,
the record evinces that there was only one investigation into
Dice’s activity, and that investigation culminated in the illegal
entry we are now scrutinizing.
IV.
The excessive zeal displayed by the enforcement officers
cannot be countenanced even in the interest of battling our
nation’s drug woes. As Lord Atkins declared to his fellow
countrymen in World War II, “In England, amidst the clash of
arms, the laws are not silent.” Nor is our Constitution during
our nation’s “war on drugs.” We therefore AFFIRM the
district court’s suppression order.

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14 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
In United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999), the
Seventh Circuit found that a warrant was not sufficiently specific to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but that the exclusionary rule should not
apply despite this shortcoming. Thus, Stefonek does not speak directly to
the situation in this case, but only to the general discretion courts have in
whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule following Fourth
Amendment violations. Because it concluded that “if the warrant had
complied with the Fourth Amendment, the very same evidence would
have been seized as was seized,” the court held that exclusion was not
appropriate. Id. at 1035. Once again, we find the Seventh Circuit’s
decision eschewing the remedy of exclusion in certain cases neither
relevant nor persuasive for this case.
4Indeed, because the evidence is the direct fruit of an unconstitutional
search, there is no need to inquire as to whether the evidence was
obtained “through the exploitation of an initial illegality,” as the
government asks us to do. Gov’t Br. at 11. That is an inquiry that is only
performed when there is a later, valid search, and a court must determine
if evidence from the valid search can be indirectly linked to information
garnered in the initial, invalid search. See generally Murray, 487 U.S. at
542-44 (remanding to determine if information from an illegal search
contributed to the warrant that, when executed, led to the seizure of
contraband); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the proper inquiry was whether the illegally obtained
evidence “affected the magistrate’s decision to issue the search warrant”
which led to a valid second search).
unconstitutional, and evidence secured pursuant to that search
is inadmissible as direct fruit of the illegal search, justifying
the suppression order of the district court in this case.4
Finally, we reject the Government’s position because it
would completely emasculate the knock-and-announce rule.
As stated supra, the requirement that officers reasonably wait
is a crucial element of the knock-and-announce rule. To
remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-
announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant
would in one swift move gut the constitution’s regulation of
how officers execute such warrants. As the Marts Court
observed, the knock-and-announce rule
would be meaningless since an officer could obviate
illegal entry in every instance simply by looking to the
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 3
court denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration,
the Government filed a notice for an interlocutory appeal to
this Court. On appeal, we are faced with only one question:
whether the acknowledged violation of the knock-and-
announce rule during the execution of a valid search warrant
should result in the suppression of evidence seized in the
search following the violation.
B.
1.
On June 2, 1994, a confidential informant told Pike County
Police Chief Deputy John R. Hull (“Hull”) that Dice’s
residence--located at 97 Magaw Road–was using a large
amount of electricity. The informant further told Hull that
Dice was conducting an indoor marijuana cultivation
operation. Hull then subpoenaed the utility records for the
residence, ascertaining that Dice’s monthly utility bills were
up to ten times as high as the average home in the area. Hull
next conducted daytime surveillance of the residence,
observing covered windows, nine air vents on the roof, and
missing and buckling shingles on the roof. He also observed
two dogs that appeared to be guarding the house.
On June 8, 1994, Agent Tim Gray of the DEA Task Force
of Columbus produced a thermal image videotape of Dice’s
residence. The tape revealed a comparatively large amount of
heat escaping through the roof of the residence. At the
suppression hearing, Gray testified that this amount of heat
was one factor that might indicate the use of a marijuana
“grow light.”
Armed with this evidence, Hull applied for a search warrant
for the residence on June 8. After conducting a hearing on the
warrant application at which he considered the proffered
evidence, as well as testimony regarding the use of the
thermal imager, the Pike County judge issued the warrant
that day. In his motion to suppress, Dice challenged the
issuance and execution of the warrant, and the veracity of

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4 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
information provided to the judge and contained in the
warrant.
2.
On June 8, the Pike County Sheriff’s Office obtained
assistance from the emergency response team of the Ross
County Sheriff’s Office to make the actual entry into Dice’s
residence. The evidence is conflicting regarding how the
officers entered the house. Officer David Large, who was
part of the entry team, described the approach and entry at the
suppression hearing. As they approached the residence, Large
testified, the officers announced that they were deputy sheriffs
and that they had a search warrant. Another sergeant then
knocked on the door, waited “a few” seconds, and on hearing
movement in the house, forced the door open. On cross-
examination, Large acknowledged that the entry team had no
information indicating that Dice was armed or dangerous, and
also had no information that anyone in the home was at risk
of harm; he also acknowledged that they had not been refused
entry into the home. After knocking down the door, a number
of officers entered the residence to execute the search warrant.
Inside, they discovered a marijuana cultivation operation,
with marijuana plants growing throughout the house.
Ultimately, the police seized more than 1,900 marijuana
plants, as well as grow lights, other gardening, plumbing and
electrical equipment used for indoor cultivation of marijuana,
and fertilizer.
Dice testified that he was in the kitchen when the officers
arrived outside of his house, and had begun to walk into the
living room when they entered. He stated that he heard neither
an announcement nor a knock at the door; rather, he simply
heard his dogs barking loudly, followed by the officers
crashing through the door.
In his motion to suppress, Dice challenged the entry as a
clear violation of the knock-and- announce rule under the
Fourth Amendment.
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 13
3The additional cases that the Government recently brought to the
Court’s attention through a supplemental filing are distinguishable. To
the extent that they are analogous to this case, these decisions do not
square with the law of this Circuit. Specifically, the Government cited
two Seventh Circuit cases that it argues support the proposition that
“suppression of evidence is not warranted because of the inevitable
discovery doctrine.” In United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715 (7th Cir.
1998), two teams entered defendant’s house--one through the front door
and one through the back door. The “front-door team” committed a
knock-and-announce violation. But Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
majority, held that “because by the time the front-door team entered
[Jones] was already in the custody of the back-door team,” which had
apprehended him properly, there had clearly been a search independent of
the knock-and-announce violation. Id. at 716. Only in dicta did the court
cast doubt on whether the exclusionary rule should apply in “marginal”
knock-and-announce violations, id. at 716-17 (leaving that question “for
another day”), a proposition with which we disagree.
In this case, there was but one entry, and it was illegal. The
officers seized the evidence in question directly following that
illegal entry. Knock-and-announce caselaw in this circuit
and others makes very clear that such evidence is
inadmissible as the direct fruit of that search. See, e.g., Bates,
84 F.3d at 795. This is so even if that entry would have
otherwise been legal because it was made pursuant to a valid
search warrant. Indeed, the knock-and-announce rule
presupposes that the entry is for a valid purpose--it merely
prescribes the method by which that entry should be made in
order best to protect the interests of the private resident. In
other words, a knock-and-announce violation deems a search
illegal due to the unlawful method in which it was executed
even if the search were legal in its purpose and authority (as
demonstrated by a valid warrant). The admissible evidence
from cases such as Segura and Moreno all arose from
searches which had both a valid warrant (purpose) as well as
a legal entry (method). Here, we only have the former.
Once the distinction between the “two-search cases” and a
“one-search case” such as this and Marts is clear, there is no
caselaw to support the Government’s theory that the warrant
itself serves as an independent source for evidence seized
following a single, illegal search.3 Rather, the search is flatly

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12 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
court decisions, the Government believes that because the
police had a valid search warrant prior to entering the
residence, and the evidence would have been discovered had
the officers fully complied with the knock-and-announce
requirement, the evidence is admissible under the independent
source doctrine. This argument simply misunderstands that
doctrine.
The cases on which the Government relies are
distinguishable from this case because they all involved a
second search pursuant to a valid warrant, and that second
search was independent of the illegal initial search. In
Segura, for example, the officers initially entered an
apartment without a warrant--a clear constitutional violation.
The next day, pursuant to a warrant that was based on
information wholly independent of their observations while
illegally in the apartment, officers seized considerable
contraband in their search of the same apartment. See Segura,
468 U.S. at 800-01. The Court held this evidence admissible
under the independent source rule because there was “an
independent source for the warrant under which that evidence
was seized.” See id. at 813-14. Of course, Segura did not
alter the lower court’s conclusion that the items observed in
the initial, illegal search were inadmissible. See 468 U.S. at
804. Murray also involved two entries: an initial illegal
search and a later search pursuant to a warrant in which
officers seized evidence. See 487 U.S. at 535-36. The Court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the warrant
for the second search resulted from information obtained in
the initial illegal entry, or from information independent of
that entry. See id. at 543-44. Finally, in United States v.
Moreno, 758 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1985), on which the
Government relies, a second, legal search took place after an
initial illegal search. Because the evidence was obtained only
after the latter, lawful entry, that evidence was admissible
under the independent source doctrine. See id. at 427. See
also Calhoun, 49 F.3d at 234 (finding that evidence was
admissible because it came from a second, valid search made
after defendant’s consent and not from an initial illegal
search).
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 5
1Among other arguments, Dice alleged that the statements made in
the affidavit presented to the Pike County judge were false; that the
warrantless use of the thermal imaging technology was improper; that the
data from the thermal inspection was not reliable; and that the judge
improperly relied on an unreliable confidential source.
3.
On initially observing the inside of the residence, the
officers arrested Dice and read him a Miranda warning. Dice
responded that he wanted to speak to an attorney, at which
point the officers ceased questioning him. Nevertheless, after
officers requested that he turn on some exhaust fans to cool
down the house (which was hot primarily due to the growing
operation), and following a statement by one officer that they
were “nice plants,” Dice began to talk about the quality of his
plants and the methods he used to grow them. Although Hull
testified that he warned Dice he was violating his request to
remain silent, and that the officers re-read him his Miranda
rights, another officer brought a tape recorder into the house
and taped some of Dice’s incriminating statements.
C.
In the district court, Dice challenged the warrant itself, the
execution of the warrant, and the alleged Miranda violation.
The court rejected Dice’s challenge of the warrant,1 and Dice
did not appeal this decision.
Regarding the execution of the warrant, the district court
credited the testimony of the officers who stated that they
knocked on the door and announced their presence and
purpose. Nevertheless, based on the officers’ testimony that
they only waited a “few” seconds after knocking before
violently entering the house, the court found that the officers
had not provided a reasonable opportunity for Dice to respond
to their knock and announcement. In addition, the court
found that the government had not proven any of the

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6 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
2As discussed infra, these circumstances are that 1) the persons
inside already know of the officers’ authority and purpose; 2) the officers
have a justified belief that someone is in imminent peril of bodily harm,
or 3) the officers have a justified belief that those within are aware of
their presence and are engaged in escape or destruction of evidence. See
United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 353 (6th Cir. 1993).
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule.2 Focusing
primarily on the “destruction of evidence” exception, the
court concluded that the extensive evidence within Dice’s
residence could not have been easily destroyed. Moreover,
the mere detection of “movement” inside the house and the
presence of barking dogs were not sufficient to provide a
basis for a reasonable suspicion that evidence was being
destroyed. The court therefore concluded that the search was
constitutionally unreasonable. It therefore ordered the
suppression of all evidence obtained during the execution of
the search warrant, including all the physical evidence seized
and Dice’s statements.
Finally, the district court held that because an officer
initiated the conversation in which Dice described his crimes,
Dice had not waived his Miranda rights. Dice’s statements
were thus obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This
issue is not on appeal.
Following the suppression order, the Government filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that despite the knock-
and-announce violation, suppression of all the evidence was
not the appropriate remedy due to the independent source
rule. Finding the evidence to have been a direct result of the
violation, the district court rejected this argument and denied
the motion.
II.
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s legal
conclusion regarding the suppression of evidence for a knock-
and-announce violation. See United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d
790, 794 (6th Cir. 1996).
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 11
the independent source doctrine requires an independent, legal
search to have taken place. We do not find this effort
convincing.
First, we reject the Government’s categorization of knock-
and-announce violations into different degrees of severity
meriting different remedies. See Gov’t Br. at 19-20 (creating
three categories of knock-and-announce violations, and
labeling the failure to knock as “the most egregious
violation,” more severe than failing to wait). A court can not
sever the requirement that an officer wait a reasonable time
before forcing his way into a residence from the requirement
that he knock and announce his presence in the first place. To
the contrary, only together do these requirements serve the
interests described in Bates: 1) reducing the potential for
violence to both the police officers and the occupants of the
house into which entry is sought; 2) curbing the needless
destruction of private property; and 3) protecting the
individual’s right to privacy in his or her house. See 84 F.3d
at 794. After all, knocking without properly waiting for
admittance contravenes each of these three interests as much
as if the knock had never taken place at all. Indeed, this Court
has previously emphasized the crucial role played by the
waiting element in particular: “the identification of
themselves as police and giving the occupants a reasonable
time to respond are far more constitutionally significant” than
the requirement that officers state their purpose. Finch, 998
F.2d at 354 (emphasis added). Finally, the Government’s
attempt to downplay the need for officers to wait a reasonable
time simply overlooks that the knock-and-announce rule
exists to benefit private residents. See id. at 353. To those
residents, of course, the mere knocking by an officer protects
no interests whatsoever if they are not given ample time to
respond.
We also wholly reject the Government’s reliance on the
independent source rule in this context--trying to recast
evidence that is in fact the direct fruit of an unconstitutional
search as indirect evidence from an independent source.
Pointing to cases such as Murray, Segura, and several circuit

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10 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
Supreme Court has long provided that when knowledge or
possession of evidence is gained from an independent and
lawful source, that evidence is admissible. See Murray, 487
U.S. at 538. To be admissible, the government must show
that the evidence was discovered through sources “wholly
independent of any constitutional violation.” United States v.
Leake, 95 F.3d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984)). This doctrine is
anchored in the notion that although the government should
not profit from its illegal activity, “neither should it be placed
in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied.”
United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 482).
This “independent source doctrine” deems evidence
admissible in those situations where an illegal search takes
place at some point during a criminal investigation, but where
a proper, independent search led to the evidence in question.
In Segura, for instance, the Court held that because a second
search pursuant to a warrant was undertaken independent of
an initial illegal search, evidence resulting from the latter
search was admissible despite the initial illegal entry. See 468
U.S. at 813-14. In other words, the Court concluded that the
evidence would have been found even if the illegal entry had
never taken place: “Had police never entered the apartment
. . ., the contraband now challenged would have been
discovered and seized precisely as it was here.” Id. at 814. In
Calhoun, despite an initial illegal search, evidence acquired
as a result of a defendant’s consent was admissible because
that consent was voluntary and independent of the initial
illegality. See 49 F.3d at 234. See also, e.g., United States v.
Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1989) (admitting
evidence obtained pursuant to valid search warrant after
initial illegal entry).
B.
The government’s argument here is no more than an
attempt to circumvent this clear and binding precedent that
knock-and-announce violations require suppression and that
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 7
III.
On appeal, the Government has conceded that the scant
amount of time between its knock and entry rendered the
entry unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Having
done so, it nonetheless repeats its position from below that
this isolated error amid an otherwise valid search should not
lead to suppression of the evidence seized. The Government
essentially seeks a rule--derivative of the “independent source
doctrine”--that when police officers have a valid warrant, and
make a proper knock and announcement, but fail to wait a
reasonable time before forcing their way into a residence, the
exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence thereafter
seized. We can not accept this position because it defies clear
precedent in two critical areas of Fourth Amendment law.
A.
1. The Knock-and-Announce Rule
Absent certain exigent circumstances, it is unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to enter a
dwelling without first knocking and announcing his presence
and authority. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934
(1995); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 588 (6th
Cir. 1999); Bates, 84 F.3d at 795. The knock-and-announce
rule protects several important interests, including 1) reducing
the potential for violence to both the police officers and the
occupants of the house into which entry is sought; 2) curbing
the needless destruction of private property; and 3) protecting
the individual’s right to privacy in his or her house. See
Bates, 84 F.3d at 794. At its heart, the rule exists to protect
the occupants of private residences. See Finch, 998 F.2d at
353. To protect these interests, evidence procured “ensuing”
the execution of a warrant which lacked a proper knock and
announcement is inadmissible. Bates, 84 F.3d at 795. See
also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958)
(holding that because “the petitioner did not receive [] notice
before the officers broke the door to invade his home, the
arrest was unlawful and the evidence seized should have been
suppressed”); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586

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8 United States v. Dice No. 98-3092
(1968) (holding that because officers entered without a proper
knock and announcement, the subsequent arrest was invalid
and the “evidence seized in the subsequent search” was
inadmissible); United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1541-42
(9th Cir. 1994) (excluding evidence due to a knock-and-
announce violation) (cited in Bates, 84 F.3d at 795).
This Court has determined that exigent circumstances
relieve officers of the knock-and-announce requirement in
three situations: when 1) the persons within the residence
already know of the officers’ authority and purpose; 2) the
officers have a justified belief that someone within is in
imminent peril of bodily harm; or 3) the officers have a
justified belief that those within are aware of their presence
and are engaged in escape or the destruction of evidence. See
Finch, 998 F.2d at 353. See also Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936
(stating that announcement was unnecessary when it would
constitute a “senseless ceremony”). The burden of proof rests
with the government to show such circumstances. Here, the
government concedes that none of these circumstances
existed.
An integral part of the knock-and-announce rule is the
requirement that officers wait a “reasonable” period of time
after a knock before physically forcing their way into a
residence. Finch, 998 F.2d at 354. This gives the private
resident the opportunity to allow them into the residence.
We note that law enforcement officers may not take
lightly the requirement of § 3109 that bursting into
apartments is permitted only “after notice of [the
officers’] authority and purpose [and they are] refused
admittance. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Cases in which
officers make a forced entry seconds after announcing
their authority and purpose will be carefully scrutinized
in the future to determine whether there is compliance
with the requirements of § 3109.
United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354-55 (6th Cir.
1990). Although Nabors interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3109,
Supreme Court holdings have made clear that § 3109 codified
No. 98-3092 United States v. Dice 9
the common law knock-and-announce rule, and those same
common law principles inform the Fourth Amendment
analysis. See United States v. Ramirez, 118 S.Ct. 992, 997
(1998); see also Finch, 998 F.2d at 354 (stating that “giving
the occupants a reasonable time to respond” to a knock and
announcement was “constitutionally significant”); United
States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that defendants must be granted “adequate time to
grant admittance to the officers”).
2. The Independent Source Doctrine
The general remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is
that evidence obtained due to the unconstitutional search or
seizure is inadmissible. The scope of evidence to be excluded
sweeps broadly, including both “[e]vidence obtained as a
direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure,” as well
as evidence that is considered the “‘fruit’ of a prior illegality”
that was “come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality.”
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); see also
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (“[T]he indirect
fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when
they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying
illegality.”)(citation omitted); Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988) (stating that the exclusionary rule
prohibits evidence “that is the product of the primary
evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of
the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection
with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint”) (citation omitted). As stated supra, this Court
applies the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce
violations. See Bates, 84 F.3d at 795; see also Sabbath, 391
U.S. at 586; Miller, 357 U.S. at 313-14.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has stated that “as
‘with any remedial device, the application of the
[exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’”
Segura, 468 U.S. at 804 (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). Heeding this statement, the

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