Hill v. USA

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-41191
In the Matter of: JOHN A. HILL,
Debtor.
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JOHN A. HILL,
Appellant,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Acting through its agent,
The Internal Revenue Service,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(C-98-CV-494)
June 27, 2000
Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant John Hill (“Hill”) appeals from an order of the

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district court affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary
judgment to the United States in Hill's adversary proceeding that he
brought to declare that his tax liability for 1978 was uncollectible
as a matter of law. There is essentially one substantive issue in
this appeal, that is, whether the district court properly affirmed
the bankruptcy court's determination, on reconsideration, that Hill's
1978 income tax liability, which had been reduced to a judgment in
1985, remained collectible despite the alleged running of Florida's
statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments purportedly made
applicable to the 1985 judgment by 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a), prior to the
filing of Hill's bankruptcy petition.
We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear
error, but consider questions of law de novo. See Matter of Herby’s
Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, the bankruptcy
court’s factual determinations are not in dispute, and the relevant
issue is one of law, that is, a question of statutory interpretation
as to whether § 6502 incorporates state statutes of limitations.
Hill argues simply that his 1978 tax liability became
uncollectible under § 6502 when the 1985 tax judgment became
“unenforceable” under Florida law. He relies on Florida's five-year
statute of limitations for actions other than for the recovery of
real property found at Section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes. Under
Florida's statute of limitations, Hill argues that the 1985 judgment
became “dormant” and unenforceable on March 31, 1990, five years

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after its entry.
While Hill does acknowledge and agree with the government that
generally speaking, the United States is not subject to state
statutes of limitations with respect to enforcing a judgment in its
favor, he argues that where the United States expressly waives its
immunity, the state statutes govern. It is Hill's contention that
Congress's inclusion of the phrase “until the judgment . . . becomes
unenforceable,” is an express waiver of immunity because that is the
only possible reason for including such language. Hill contends that
there is nothing other than state statutes of limitations to which
Congress could have been referring when it enacted this language
because expiration of such limitations statutes is the only way a
judgment could become “unenforceable.”
As noted above, the district court and the bankruptcy court both
explicitly rejected the contention that the “becomes unenforceable”
language constitutes a waiver of the United States' immunity from
state statutes of limitations because it “is not a clear statement of
Congressional intent to make judgments in favor of the United States
subject to state-imposed limits on enforceability.”
Having carefully reviewed the issues presented by Appellant Hill
and having fully considered the briefs, the record excerpts, the
record, and the arguments presented at oral argument, we are
persuaded that the order of the district court affirming the judgment
of the bankruptcy court should be and the same is hereby AFFIRMED
for the reasons stated therein.

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