(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-11153
(Summary Calendar)
ANTHONY STRIBLING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:94-CV-2276-G)
(April 12, 1995)
Before DUHÉ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Stribling, a Texas state prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued the State of Texas,
a state judge and a doctor, claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that

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his civil rights had been abridged. On appeal he urges us to
reverse the district court's dismissal of his complaint as
frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), also complaining that
the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing
on the claims. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Stribling sued the State of Texas, Judge Michael J. O'Neill,
a state court judge, and Peggy Joyce Whalley, a physician who
testified at Stribling's criminal trial. He alleged that his civil
rights were violated by Judge O'Neill who denied Stribling's motion
to reinstate a state tort suit in which he alleged that during his
criminal trial Dr. Whalley committed perjury. Judge O'Neill had
dismissed the state tort suit for want of prosecution after
Stribling failed to serve Dr. Whalley. The judge denied
Stribling's motion to reinstate upon determining that the statute
of limitations barred the action.
In the instant civil rights complaint, Stribling alleged that
Judge O'Neill should have reinstated the suit against Dr. Whalley
by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling. Stribling argued
that he was unable timely to serve Dr. Whalley because her name was
misrepresented by the court reporter in the trial transcript as
"Peggy Wally." Stribling sought $75,000 in punitive damages,
$75,000 for mental anguish, and a declaratory judgment.
The magistrate judge, in recommending that Stribling's civil
rights complaint be dismissed as frivolous, reasoned that the State

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of Texas was absolutely immune from a damages suit under the
Eleventh Amendment and that Judge O'Neill also was absolutely
immune from suit. The magistrate judge determined that Stribling's
failure to allege a causal connection between Dr. Whalley's conduct
and the unfavorable disposition of Stribling's state court action
made his civil rights claim against Dr. Whalley frivolous. The
magistrate judge also noted that to the extent that Stribling was
attempting to reassert his state tort claims against Dr. Whalley,
the claims were barred by res judicata: Stribling had asserted the
same claims in a previous federal civil rights action which had
been dismissed as frivolous. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation and dismissed the
complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d). This appeal ensued.
II
ANALYSIS
A § 1983 action that is dismissed under § 1915(d) is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465,
468 (5th Cir. 1992). A complaint is frivolous if it has no
arguable basis in fact and law. Id.
Stribling alleges that the state court conspired to conceal
the correct spelling of Dr. Whalley's name. He contends that the
State of Texas "knowingly and intentionally" misspelled Dr.
Whalley's name and that the prosecutors conspired to conceal her
name. Stribling has filed with us an instrument entitled
"Appellant's Request for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts" in
which he urges that the state court should have reinstated his tort

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suit because the court lacked jurisdiction when the suit originally
was filed.
Although on appeal Stribling lists as an issue his contention
that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint, in the
body of his brief he argues only the merits of his complaint.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4) requires that the
appellant's argument contain the reasons why he deserves the
requested relief, together with citation to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Although we liberally construe
pro se briefs, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972),
we nevertheless require arguments to be briefed in order to be
preserved. Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225. Claims not adequately argued
in the body of the brief are deemed abandoned on the appeal. See
id. General arguments giving only broad standards of review and
not citing to specific errors are insufficient to preserve issues
for appeal. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,
813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Stribling's failure to address
the reasons why the district court dismissed his complaint allows
us to determine that Stribling has abandoned the only issue
"arguably presented to [this court] for review," i.e., the
dismissal of his complaint as frivolous for the reasons given by
the district court. See Searcy v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,
907 F.2d 562, 564 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 970 (1990).
In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Stribling's civil rights complaint as frivolous under

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§ 1915(d). We agree with that court's determination that the State
of Texas was absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, which confers absolute immunity on an unconsenting state
from suits brought in federal court by the state's own citizens.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 684, 687 (1993). The same is true for Judge O'Neill.
He was acting within the scope of his official duties and was
entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims. See Mitchell v.
McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991). Dr. Whalley, in her
capacity as a witness in Stribling's criminal trial, was absolutely
immune from § 1983 damage claims even if the allegation was that
she perjured herself at his trial. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
341-46 (1983); see Matter of Jones, 966 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir.
1992) (this court can affirm on any ground supported by the
record). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the complaint under § 1915(d).
Stribling has also filed a document with us entitled
"Appellant's Notation to the Court" in which he argues that the
district court erred in failing to review his objections to the
magistrate judge's report. Whether or not the district court
considered Stribling's objections is unclear. The objections
appear to have been filed timely, and as a general rule a district
court errs if it does not consider timely-filed objections to a
magistrate judge's report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir.
1992). Nevertheless, a district court's error in failing to

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1 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1985).
6
consider such objections can be harmless. See Smith, 964 F.2d at
485. As Stribling's objections are wholly lacking in merit, the
district court's error, if any, was harmless.
Stribling also lists in his statement of issues on appeal the
alleged error of the district court in failing to hold a Spears1
hearing to determine the merits of his claim. As Stribling has
failed to brief this issue, we deem it too to have been abandoned.
Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225. We nevertheless observe in passing that
here the district court did dismiss Stribling's complaint as
frivolous without holding a Spears hearing or requiring Stribling
to fill out a questionnaire. In Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10
(5th Cir. 1994), we noted that § 1915(d) dismissal was
inappropriate if, with additional factual development, the
"allegations may pass section 1915(d) muster." In the instant
case, however, it is clear that even with additional factual
development Stribling's allegations would remain frivolous. Thus,
it was not error for the district court to dismiss the complaint
without holding a Spears hearing.
The district court's dismissal of Stribling's civil rights
complaint as frivolous, without holding a Spears hearing, is
AFFIRMED.

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