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*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-10749
(Summary Calendar)
BILL STEPHENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JUDGE DARRELL R. CAREY, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(2:93-CV-350)
(November 21, 1994)
Before DUHÉ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this appeal of the dismissal of his complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff-Appellant Bill Stephens, proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), takes issue with the district

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court's dismissal of his action as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d). For the reasons set forth below, we find no reversible
error in the rulings of the district court and therefore affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Stephens filed his civil rights complaint against County Court
at Law Judge Darrell R. Carey (Judge Carey), Randall County (Texas)
District Attorney Randy Sherrod (D.A. Sherrod), and the Sheriff of
Randall County, Texas (Sheriff Hooks), (collectively, Appellees),
alleging that those three officials conspired to retaliate against
him because he filed a multi-million dollar federal lawsuit against
them. In the instant case, Stephens alleged that after he was
arrested and while he was being held in the Memphis (Texas) jail
pursuant to a warrant issued by Randall County, the AppelleesSQ
knowing that Stephens required medical treatment which was
unavailable in the Memphis jailSQconspired to manipulate the bail
process to keep him incarcerated. He also alleged that he was
denied adequate medical care at both the Memphis and Randall County
jails.
Subsequently, Stephens filed a motion to amend his complaint
to delete all individual defendants and substitute Randall County
as the only defendant. The federal magistrate judge ordered
Stephens to file an amended complaint naming the appropriate
defendants and indicating how each named defendant had violated
Stephens' constitutional rights. He did so, naming Randall County,
or, alternatively, Judge Carey, D.A. Sherrod and Sheriff Hooks, as

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defendants. Stephens alleged that he had an arrest warrant
improperly issued against him by D.A. Sherrod; that Judge Carey and
D.A. Sherrod conspired to manipulate the bail process to prevent
Stephens from receiving medical treatment; that Sheriff Hooks
continued the conspiracy by denying Stephens medical treatment
while he was in jail; and that as a result Stephens was denied
medical treatment in both the Memphis and Randall County jails.
The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under
§ 1915(d), and Stephens timely appealed.
II
ANALYSIS
A complaint filed IFP may be dismissed by the court sua sponte
if the complaint is found to be frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);
Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1986). A complaint is
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Ancar v.
Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). We review
the district court's dismissal of an IFP complaint under § 1915(d)
for abuse of discretion. Id. We now address Stephens' claims
seriatim.
A. Liability of Randall County
It is unclear from Stephens' brief if on appeal he is
challenging the dismissal of his claims against Randall County. To
the extent that an issue is not briefed, it is abandoned. See
Evans v. City of Marlin, Tex., 986 F.2d 104, 106 n.1 (5th Cir.
1993). To the extent that Stephens may here be considered to be
challenging the dismissal of the claims against Randall County,

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such a challenge would be wholly without merit. As we find no
abuse of discretion here, we affirm the dismissal of Randall County
as a defendant.
B. Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity
Stephens argues that his constitutional rights were violated
by D.A. Sherrod when he sought an arrest warrant against Stephens
and when he manipulated the bail process. But Sherrod is entitled
to absolute immunity for any actions taken in initiating and
carrying Stephens' case through the judicial process. See Young v.
Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991). Clearly, the decision
of the district attorney to seek an arrest warrant and to request
bail are prosecutorial functions. Similarly, Judge Carey is
entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken in connection
with the judicial proceedings in Stephens' case. See McAfee v. 5th
Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990) (judges are absolutely immune for damages from
acts performed in their judicial capacity, even if the acts are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly). Even when we
cut Stephens the proverbial slack accorded pro se IFP plaintiffs
and construe his inartful lay writings as liberally as practicable
in his favor, all allegations made against Judge Carey and D.A.
Sherrod relate respectively to their judicial and prosecutorial
functions: seeking an arrest warrant and dealing with matters
affecting bail. Under these circumstances the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Stephens' claims against
Judge Carey and D.A. Sherrod.

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1The district court applied the Eighth Amendment standard of
deliberate indifference to Stephens' denial-of-medical-care claim.
It appears from the pleadings, however, that Stephens was a pre-
trial detainee and not a convicted prisoner: The arrest warrant
was issued because Stephens failed to make a docket call. Although
the standard under both amendments, as developed through recent
jurisprudence, are now essentially identical, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and not the Eighth, is the proper source of the
constitutional right of a pre-trial detainee.
2Although Stephens alleges that he was denied medical
treatment while housed in the Memphis jail, he did not name any
Memphis jail personnel as defendants and has made his medical care
and treatment arguments to this court only as to the Randall County
jail.
5
C. Denial of Adequate Medical Care - Sheriff Hooks
As Stephens' appellate brief consists primarily of a copy of
his amended complaint, it is difficult to determine the precise
nature of his arguments. He appears, however, to be arguing that
he was denied adequate medical care1 while housed in the Randall
County jail.2 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees
of a state or one of its subdivisions "must be provided with
reasonable medical care, unless the failure to supply it is
reasonably related to a legitimate government objective." Rhyne v.
Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
The documents submitted by Stephens indicate that as of 1989
he suffered Lyme disease and hyperthyroidism. Stephens also
alleged that he informed jail personnel, including the jail doctor,
that he suffers from a neurological disorder, that he was
hemorrhaging, and that he required a vegetarian diet for colon
cancer; but that jail personnel refused to give him the necessary
medical treatment. He further alleged that he did not receive his

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medication until the day he was released.
Even construing Stephens' allegations as liberally as we may,
we are left with the distinct impression that all fall into either
one or both of two categories: purely conclusionary; or fanciful
and delusional. We do not think that the district court abused its
discretion when it dismissed Stephens' denial-of-medical-care
claims as frivolous under § 1915(d), although we concede that,
among all of his claims, denial of medical care comes the closest
to reaching the minimal required basis in fact or law to avoid
dismissal as frivolous. Unfortunately for Stephens, however, even
when thus construed his medical care allegations and arguments fall
short of that mark. The district court's dismissal of Stephens'
inadequate medical care claims was not an abuse of discretion and
must, therefore, be affirmed.
D. Conspiracy
Stephens also argues that Judge Carey, D.A. Sherrod, and
Sheriff Hooks conspired to deny his constitutional rights. To
establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the
existence of a conspiracy involving state action and a deprivation
of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pfannstiel v.
City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (5th Cir. 1990). Stephens
cannot rely on conclusional allegations to establish a conspiracy,
but rather must allege material facts to support his claim. McAfee,
884 F.2d at 222 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083
(1990). For the same reasons discussed in section B. above, Judge
Carey and D.A. Sherrod are absolutely immune from the conspiracy

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charge just as they are from the substantive charge. Moreover, as
we have found insufficient the allegations made by Stephens in
connection with denial of medical care, the conspiracy claims
against Sheriff Hooks must fail as well. The district court's
dismissal of Stephens' conspiracy charges against the three
individual state defendants is free of abuse of discretion and thus
is affirmed.
E. Judicial Bias
Finally, Stephens makes a conclusional contention that the
federal district judge and the federal magistrate judge who
conducted his case in district court are biased against him.
Adverse rulings against a litigant do not support charges of bias
or prejudice. See Liteky v. United States, U.S. , 114 S.Ct.
1147, 1157-58, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (judicial rulings and
opinions formed during judicial proceedings cannot be the basis of
a bias or partiality motion unless they display deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism). In addition to being purely
conclusional, Stephens' charges against the federal judges concern
acts or omissions occurring during judicial proceedings and
therefore have no merit.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's affirmance of
the district court's dismissal of Stephens' claims as frivolous,
pursuant to § 1915(d), is
AFFIRMED.

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