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93-3062Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit15 mars 2004

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* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 93-3062
Summary Calendar
VELMA PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
DONNA E. SHALALA,
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(CA 91 475 A M2)
(December 13, 1993)
Before GARWOOD, SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
On January 4, 1989, Velma Phillips applied for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB),
alleging disability since November 30, 1986, due to Crohn's
disease, arthritis, a stomach ulcer, blindness, and "bad nerves."
These applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.

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Phillips requested and received a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that Phillips's impairments
did not preclude her from performing her past relevant work as a
cook. Thus, the ALJ held that Phillips was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. The decision of the ALJ became
the final decision of the Secretary when the Appeals Council denied
Phillips's request for review.
Phillips filed suit in the district court seeking review of
the Secretary's decision. The parties later filed cross motions
for summary judgment. The district court approved the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge over Phillips's objections
and granted the Secretary's summary judgment motion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts were presented for the Secretary's
determination. Phillips was born on May 25, 1943. She graduated
from high school and has worked as a sales person and a cook. On
April 12, 1986, Phillips visited Dr. Bruce L. Baer at the Baton
Rouge Medical Center (Baton Rouge Medical), with complaints of
increased belching, flatus, borborygmia, abdominal bloating,
diarrhea, and constipation. Dr. Baer diagnosed Crohn's disease
involving the distal terminal ileum. Crohn's disease, a chronic,
inflammatory disease of the gastrointestinal tract, is
characterized by symptoms such as cramping, nausea, severe
abdominal pain, fatigue, diarrhea, and insomnia. See Dix v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir. 1990). "Crohn's disease also
causes fistulas--abnormal passages between two internal organs or

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an internal organ and the surface of the body." Id. The severity
of the symptoms depends on whether the patient is having a flare-up
and the length of the flare-up. See id.
On November 10, 1986, Phillips was readmitted to Baton Rouge
Medical, complaining of severe cramping pains in the upper abdomen,
nausea, and vomiting. She was diagnosed with intermittent small
bowel obstruction and underwent an operation involving resection of
the terminal ileum and proximal cecum with an ileoascending
colostomy. Phillips recovered fairly well after surgery but
suffered from diarrhea that lasted for approximately two weeks in
January 1987.
Phillips returned to Baton Rouge Medical on April 5, 1987,
with complaints of intermittent sharp pain in the right lower
quadrant, diarrhea, nausea, and vomiting. Dr. Baer opined that
Phillips had experienced a slight exacerbation of Crohn's disease.
Dr. Baer last examined Phillips on June 6, 1987, and advised that
she return in one month's time for a follow-up, but Phillips did
not do so.
On January 15, 1988, Phillips was admitted to Our Lady of the
Lake Regional Medical Center complaining of acute abdominal pains,
recurrent vomiting, diarrhea, and some dehydration. Dr. Shaban
Faruqui diagnosed Grade I esophagitis and erosive duodenitis.
Phillips did well during her hospital stay and it was decided that
she should switch to an out-patient basis. She was discharged on
January 21, 1988.

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On February 23, 1989, Dr. Douglas W. Davidson conducted a
consultative examination of Phillips and diagnosed her as having
Crohn's disease. Nevertheless, his functional assessment indicated
that she could sit, stand, and walk for eight hours a day.
Phillips was also found able to lift up to 25 pounds on a
continuous basis and from 25-50 pounds on a frequent basis. No
postural or environmental limitations were assessed by Dr.
Davidson.
On June 29, 1989, Phillips saw Dr. David Dragon for a
consultative eye examination. He diagnosed myopic astigmatism,
recommended glasses, and placed no work limitations on Phillips.
At the hearing before the ALJ, Phillips testified that she had
been unable to work since developing Crohn's disease. She stated
that she has at least eight bowel movements a day and as many as
fifteen movements a day. She also stated that she was taking 40
milligrams of Prednisone for her Crohn's disease, as well as
medication for her arthritis and insulin for her diabetes.
Phillips's friend essentially corroborated her testimony.
The ALJ's decision was entered on March 30, 1990. On February
24, 1991, Phillips requested that the Appeals Council review the
ALJ's decision in light of additional medical records from Earl K.
Long Memorial Hospital (EKLH). Dr. David Harper had evaluated
Phillips in August 1989 for continuing abdominal complaints,
nausea, and vomiting. The additional evidence reflects that on
August 29, 1989, he opined that Phillips would be totally disabled
from working for a year or more as a result of her Crohn's disease.

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However, on August 30, 1990, another treating physician at EKLH
indicated that he could not determine whether Phillips was totally
disabled until he saw her response to outpatient treatment. The
Appeals Council denied Phillips's request after concluding that
"[t]he evidence shows that the claimant continued to have problems
due to Crohn's disease but not to the extent that she would be
precluded from performing her past relevant work."
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the Secretary's decision to deny disability
benefits, this Court must determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support it and whether the proper legal
standards were used in evaluating the evidence. Villa v. Sullivan,
895 F. 2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. It is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021-22. In applying
this standard, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or try the
issues de novo, but must review the entire record to determine
whether substantial evidence exists to support the Secretary's
findings. Id. at 1022.
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The same law and regulations govern whether

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a claimant is "disabled" for SSI or DIB purposes. Haywood v.
Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1467 (5th Cir. 1989). The Secretary
follows a five-step process in evaluating a disability claim. A
finding that a claimant is not disabled at any point terminates the
sequential evaluation. Crouchet v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 202, 204,
206 (5th Cir. 1989). The five steps are:
1) Claimant is not presently working;
2) Claimant's ability to work is significantly limited
by a physical or mental impairment;
3) Claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed in the appendix to the regulations (if so,
disability is automatic);
4) Impairment prevents claimant from doing past
relevant work; and
5) Claimant cannot perform relevant work.
See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520.
On the first four steps of the analysis, the initial burden is
on the claimant to prove that she is disabled. On the fifth step,
the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that there is other
substantial work in the national economy which the claimant can
perform. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991).
The ALJ followed this five-step process. The ALJ found that
Phillips had not worked since November 30, 1986. The ALJ further
found that Phillips has "severe Crohn's disease, diabetes mellitus
and anxiety" but that her impairment or combination of impairments
does not meet or equal an impairment listed in the appendix to the
regulations. The ALJ then moved to step four, determining that

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Phillips was not disabled because she could work as a cook, as she
had in the past. This determination ended the ALJ's analysis.
Phillips contends that there was not substantial evidence to
support the Secretary's determination that she was not disabled.
She correctly points out that a determination that a claimant can
engage in substantial gainful activity must take into account the
claimant's actual ability to "hold whatever job he finds for a
significant period of time." Id. at 12; Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1986). She argues that "[t]he very nature
and symptoms of Crohn's disease render [her] incapable of
performing her past relevant work as a cook." Id.
Phillips relies primarily on Dix for supporting authority. In
Dix, the Eighth Circuit held that an applicant suffering frequent
flare-ups of Crohn's disease was entitled to SSI benefits even
though she sometimes received reprieves from her symptoms and pain.
900 F.2d at 138. Even if this Court were to agree with the holding
in Dix, Phillips's reliance on that case is misplaced. In Dix, the
applicant had undergone surgery five or more times since first
being diagnosed with Crohn's disease and had been found to be
disabled based on the regularity and severity of her symptoms. Id.
at 136-38. Phillips, however, required only two brief
hospitalizations in the fourteen months after her November 12,
1986, operation. She received conservative treatment
intermittently before being hospitalized again in August 1989.
Thus, based on the totality of the medical evidence, the Appeals
Board concluded that Phillips suffered from the symptoms of Crohn's

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disease "on an intermittent basis but not to a disabling extent."
Phillips contends that she cannot return to her past relevant
work as a cook because of the frequency of her bowel movements and
gas. "A determination that a claimant is unable to continue
working for significant periods of time must, however, be supported
by more than a claimant's personal history; it must also be
supported by medical evidence." Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822. As
indicated above, the medical evidence does not reflect that the
nature of Phillips's disease prevented her from maintaining regular
employment. Moreover, after examining Phillips, Dr. Davidson
diagnosed Crohn's disease but concluded that Phillips was capable
of sitting, standing, and walking for eight hours a day, and
capable of lifting up to 25 pounds on a continuous basis and from
25-50 pounds on a frequent basis. Although a treating physician,
Dr. Harper, opined that Phillips was disabled, this assessment was
contradicted by that of another treating physician who could not
state whether Phillips was disabled, as the matter depended on her
response to outpatient therapy. When "the evidence presents
conflicting testimony and reports that must be evaluated by their
credibility," it is "[t]he Secretary, not the courts, [who] has the
duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts in the
evidence, and decide the case." Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008,

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1011 (5th Cir. 1987). The ALJ's decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.

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