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1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 92-7484
Summary Calendar
_____________________________________
RAY FLOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BODDIE-NOELL ENTERPRISES,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(WC90-09-B-D)
______________________________________________________
February 17, 1993
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
This is a diversity action brought by a Mississippi resident
against a North Carolina corporation. Plaintiff-Appellant, Ray
Floyd, argues that Mississippi's trespass law, Miss. Code Ann. §
97-17-97 (1972), was unconstitutionally used to have him arrested
after he was refused service at Appellee's restaurant. The
district court granted the Defendant-Appellee's motion for summary
judgment. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Floyd was refused service at a New Albany, Mississippi,

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Hardee's restaurant owned by the Appellee, Boddie-Noell
Enterprises. Prior to this refusal, both parties concede that
Floyd had been told his business was unwelcome at this
establishment. The manager of the restaurant, Dan McGuire, filed
trespass charges against Floyd for returning to the Hardee's
premises after being warned to stay away. Floyd turned himself in,
was formally arrested, and thereafter released. All trespass
charges were eventually dropped against Floyd.
Floyd later filed suit in federal court against Boddie-Noell,
seeking damages for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and the wrongful retention of McGuire as the manager
of the New Albany Hardee's. Cross motions for summary judgment
were filed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Defendant on all of Floyd's claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same
standard of review applied by the district court. See Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1989); Moore
v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir.
1989). Summary judgment is appropriate only if, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record discloses
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
ANALYSIS
1. Mississippi's Trespass Statute.

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2 42 U.S.C. § 2000a provides, in pertinent part:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.
3
Floyd contends that Mississippi's trespass law, Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-17-97 (1972), is unconstitutional because it was used to
exclude him from a place of public accommodation, where he
otherwise had a right of access. The parties agree that Hardee's
is a public accommodation that falls within the strictures of the
civil rights laws.2 Floyd cites 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (1981), for
the proposition that he had an unfettered constitutional right to
receive service at this particular restaurant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1
provides:
All persons shall be entitled to be free, at
any establishment or place, from
discrimination or segregation of any kind on
the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin, if such discrimination or
segregation is or purports to be by any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order
of a State, or any agency or political
subdivision thereof.
Floyd had previously been asked not to return to the Hardee's
in New Albany. Because it is not the usual practice of a business
to turn away customers, we can infer that McGuire had a legitimate
reason for requesting Floyd not to return. Nevertheless, Floyd is
unable to use 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 as a means to challenge the
Mississippi statute under which he was arrested. Section 2000a-1

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by its express terms, prohibits discrimination only on the grounds
of race, color, religion, or national origin. There is no evidence
that Floyd, a forty-eight year old white male, was discriminated
against on any of these grounds. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-97 is
otherwise valid on its face, and we agree with the district court's
conclusion that no reasonable construction of the civil rights laws
supports a finding that this statute is unconstitutional under the
facts of this case. See, e.g., Silbert v. Ramsey, 482 A.2d 147,
151-52 (Md. 1984) (proprietor may exclude patron on grounds other
than those listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Bonomo v. Louisiana Downs,
Inc., 337 So.2d 553, 557 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (§ 2000a of the Civil
Rights Act does not prohibit discrimination on "other reasons which
are not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable . . . under
particular circumstances which may be in question.").
2. Claims for False Arrest and Imprisonment.
False arrest is an intentional tort, arising when one causes
another to be arrested falsely, unlawfully, maliciously, and
without probable cause. See City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562
So.2d 1212, 1218 (Miss. 1990). Probable cause exists if a party
has an honest belief in the guilt of the person accused, and a
reasonable basis for such belief. Page v. Wiggins, 595 So.2d 1291,
1294 (Miss. 1992). The Appellee, acting through its
agent/employee, had probable cause to file a complaint of trespass
against Floyd. McGuire had an honest belief that Floyd committed
a trespass, based on the fact that a prior warning to stay away was
given Floyd. Likewise, McGuire had a reasonable basis for his

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decision to file charges against Floyd.
Because the arrest was valid, and otherwise complied with
lawful procedures, the detention of Floyd fails to give rise to a
claim of false imprisonment. Id. at 1294 (two elements for claim
of false imprisonment: detention, and unlawfulness thereof).
3. Malicious Prosecution.
The "essence" of a malicious prosecution claim is the
malicious institution of criminal proceedings against a party,
absent probable cause therefore. City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson,
562 So.2d 1212, 1218 (Miss. 1990). Appellant's claim for malicious
prosecution fails as well once probable cause for the trespass
charge is shown.
4. Wrongful Retention.
Floyd also argues that Boddie-Noell was negligent in keeping
McGuire in his position as manager of the New Albany Hardee's
because Boddie-Noell should have been aware of McGuire's alleged
violent nature. Floyd lists examples of McGuire's bad temperament
(e.g., kicking and throwing things in the kitchen). What Floyd
fails to show is the causal link between these petty displays of
temper and the filing of trespass charges against him. Because
causation is a necessary element in any tort action, the absence of
a nexus between McGuire's temperament and Floyd's resulting damages
is fatal to his claim for wrongful retention.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

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