Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Robert James Jenkins

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-5643
Summary Calendar
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT JAMES JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
SA 91 CR 487 1
_________________________________________________________________
July 2, 1993
Before KING, DAVIS and WEINER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert James Jenkins was indicted for the possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was convicted and sentenced to a fifty-
seven month prison term to be followed by three years of
supervised release. He appeals his conviction on the ground that

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the arresting police officer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. While on routine
traffic patrol, Texas Department of Safety Trooper Christopher
Knox observed a tractor-trailer going 65 miles per hour on an
interstate highway, a speed ten miles over the legal speed limit
for trucks traveling at night. Trooper Knox stopped the vehicle
and asked the driver, Robert James Jenkins, to produce his
driver's license and registration papers. Jenkins produced a
Texas driver's license. Knox radioed the license number to a
dispatcher and was advised that the license had been suspended
for traffic violations. Knox also obtained a criminal history
report that Jenkins had prior arrests for weapons and narcotics
offenses.
Knox testified that he had originally intended to give
Jenkins a warning ticket for speeding, but decided to arrest
Jenkins for driving with a suspended license. The record,
however, indicates that a full-blown custodial arrest did not
occur immediately after Knox was apprised of the status of
Jenkins' license. Although Knox asked Jenkins to sit in his
police car while he ran the various computer checks, Knox neither
pulled his weapon or hand-cuffed Jenkins at this point. The
record also indicates that Knox never even informed Jenkins that

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2 According to Knox, he was further concerned by the fact
that Jenkins appeared very nervous. Jenkins was trembling,
talking very fast, and sweating profusely even though it was a
cool December night.
3 During the suppression hearing, the following colloquy
occurred between Trooper Knox and the prosecutor:
Q. Trooper Knox, did you ask him -- did you ask Mr.
Jenkins if he minded you looking in the truck?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Did you ask him if he had any objection to your
looking in the truck?
A. Yes, sir.
* * *
Q. Did he tell you that he did not mind you looking in
the truck?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that reflected in your report?
A. Yes, sir; it is.
3
Knox intended to effect a formal custodial arrest for Jenkins'
suspended license.
Nevertheless, after Know received the information about
Jenkins' criminal history, Knox became concerned about his
safety.2 After obtaining a voluntary consent from Jenkins,3 Knox
searched the inside of Jenkins' truck. Knox not only consented
to the search, but admitted that he possessed a .45 caliber
handgun and directed Knox to a garment bag that contained the
weapon. Knox also spotted an ammunition box in the sleeper area
of the cab. Knox opened the box and found two pouches, a nasal

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4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
spray bottle, and some empty baggies. Knox noticed the odor of
either amphetamine or methamphetamine and opened the zippered
pouches. One of the bags contained marijuana, narcotics
paraphernalia, a digital scale, and what Knox thought was
narcotics. The other bag contained methamphetamine and what
appeared to be a drug ledger. At this point, Knox placed Jenkins
under arrest for possession of a controlled substance, hand-
cuffed him, placed him in the patrol car, and advised of his
Miranda4 rights.
Knox then called for assistance. Sergeant Ralph Sramek
responded to Knox's call. Sramek determined that Jenkins had
been properly advised of his rights and began to question him.
In response to these questions, Jenkins stated that he had
purchased an ounce of methamphetamine at a truck stop in San
Antonio. Another officer, John Langerlaan, arrived next.
Langerlaan also determined that Jenkins had been advised of his
rights and asked him if he would cooperate. Jenkins admitted to
Langerlaan that he owned the items contained in the ammunition
box and that he sold methamphetamine to other truck drivers he
knew.
At trial, Jenkins filed a motion to suppress the fruits of
the search of the truck and any incriminating statements that he
made to law enforcement officers. The motion to suppress was
carried along with the bench trial. The district court denied

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the motion and found Jenkins guilty of the possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine. This appeal ensued.
II.
A. The Fourth Amendment claim
i) The alleged pretextual stop
Jenkins argues that the search was unconstitutional because
the Trooper Knox's original detention of Jenkins for speeding was
simply a pretext to search the tractor-trailer. We reject
Jenkins' conclusory argument that Trooper Knox engaged in such a
pre-textual detention. Jenkins has offered no evidence that
Trooper Knox did not stop Jenkins for a legitimate reason.
Indeed, the record indicates that Trooper Knox had a perfectly
legitimate reason for pulling Jenkins over. Moreover, as we held
in United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987)
(en banc), "[s]o long as police do no more than they are
objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives
in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry."
ii) The search
Jenkins further argues that Trooper Knox did not have
probable cause to search the cab of the tractor-trailer and that
in order to be valid, the search must have come under the
"inventory exception" to the Fourth Amendments warrant

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5 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 819 (5th
Cir. 1991) (discussing the "inventory exception").
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requirement.5 The Government argues that Jenkins voluntarily
consented to the search. Because we agree with the Government,
we see no need to address Jenkins' "inventory search" argument.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that a consensual search by a police officer
lacking probable cause to search was not a Fourth Amendment
violation. Although Schneckloth was a case in which the
defendant gave consent while not yet under arrest, the Court has
subsequently held that a voluntary consent to search may be given
even by one under arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976). Our review of the record indicates that
Jenkins freely consented to Trooper Knox's search of the truck.
Thus, even absent probable cause to search, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.
B. Jenkins' confession
Jenkins' next argument hinges on his Fourth Amendment claim.
He asserts that because the stop and arrest were pretextual and
the search was unconstitutional, any incriminating statements
subsequently given to police officers should have been declared
inadmissible as "fruit of a poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v.
United States 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Jenkins does not argue that
the statements should have been suppressed because they were
coerced or were given in violation of Miranda. In the light of

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our disposition of Jenkins' Fourth Amendment claim, we believe
this claim also has no merit.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Jenkins' conviction.

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