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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-3634
_______________
IN THE MATTER OF:
MURRAY W. BRASHEARS
and
MARY F. BRASHEARS,
Debtors,
MURRAY W. BRASHEARS
and
MARY F. BRASHEARS,
Appellants,
VERSUS
ROBERT EUSTIS,
and
EUSTIS MORTGAGE CORP.,
Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(CA-92-1780-M)
_________________________
(May 19, 1993)
Before JOHNSON, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

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* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
1 In this appeal, the Brashears for the first time have made Robert
Eustis a party to this proceeding. Eustis contends that the inclusion of
Robert Eustis in this appeal is improper, and the Brashears agree that Robert
Eustis is not a proper party before the court.
2
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
The debtors, Murray and Mary Brashears, appeal from the bank-
ruptcy court's order dismissing their motion to hold creditor
Eustis Mortgage Corp. ("Eustis") in contempt for violations of the
automatic stay and court orders issued pursuant to the provisions
of chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The bankruptcy court found
that no act violative of the automatic stay occurred in this case,
and the district court affirmed. Finding no clear error, we af-
firm.
I.
Eustis owned a promissory note and mortgage guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration on the Brashears' home. The Brashears
filed a petition in bankruptcy pursuant to chapter 13. Eustis was
the only secured creditor and the principal unsecured creditor and
submitted a proof of claim in the amount of $11,869.98, which
included foreclosure costs, filing fees, sheriff's costs, and
attorneys' fees. Eustis opposed confirmation of the plan in bank-
ruptcy and requested the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic
stay or, in the alternative, to grant Eustis relief from the auto-
matic stay. The court denied Eustis any relief.

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2 The Brashears asserted that Eustis made repeated attempts to collect
late charges, attorneys' fees, inflated arrearages, and other costs without
the bankruptcy court's approval. They contended that Eustis's efforts pre-
vented them from closing on a new guaranteed interest rate reduction loan
approved on December 4, 1990, by First Coastal Mortgage Corporation, Inc.
(First Coastal).
Eustis contended that these alleged further violations of the automatic
stay were based upon the "payout statement" from Litton, which included, as
"miscellaneous" amounts, post- and prepetition attorneys' fees, court costs,
and late charges. Eustis asserted that Litton sent the payout statement to
First Coastal at the Brashears's request when the Brashears sought to refi-
nance their loan.
3
Thereafter, Eustis attempted to collect attorneys' fees from
the Brashears without the bankruptcy court's knowledge or
approval. On June 16, 1989, the Brashears filed a motion request-
ing that court to find Eustis in violation of the automatic stay.
On December 1, 1989, the court granted the motion and awarded the
Brashears $105 in attorneys' fees.
The Brashears' mortgage subsequently was purchased by Litton
Mortgage Servicing Center (Litton). The Brashears, contending
that Eustis thereafter continued to attempt to collect money from
them outside the boundaries of the chapter 13 plan,2 filed a mo-
tion to hold Eustis in contempt for further violations of the
automatic stay and court orders. After a hearing on March 25,
1991, the bankruptcy court denied the motion. The Brashears ap-
pealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy
court's order on September 27, 1991. The Brashears appealed to
this court, and we granted Eustis's motion to dismiss the appeal
as interlocutory.
On May 1, 1992, the trustee in bankruptcy issued his final
report and account, and the bankruptcy case was dismissed. The

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3 We dismissed the appeal prior to the decision in Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992), holding that an interlocutory order
issued by a district court sitting as a court of appeals in bankruptcy is
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
4
Brashears appealed to the district court for a final judgment on
their previous motion to hold Eustis in contempt. The district
court, viewing the appeal as essentially an appeal from its previ-
ous ruling, referred the parties to its September 27, 1991, order
and dismissed the appeal. The Brashears appeal from the district
court's dismissal.
II.
The threshold question is whether this court has jurisdiction
over this case. When the Brashears brought their first appeal
from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's
order denying their motion to hold Eustis in contempt, we granted
Eustis's motion to dismiss the appeal because the appeal was based
upon an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court.3 After the
bankruptcy court dismissed the Brashears' chapter 13 proceeding,
the Brashears again appealed to the district court and, appearing
pro se, requested a final judgment from the district court so they
could proceed with an appeal to this court.
The district court, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal
as improvidently and improperly filed, opining that the second
appeal was merely a pro se plaintiff's version of the appeal from
the district court's prior ruling affirming the bankruptcy court
order. The district court observed that the Brashears' initiation

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4 Similarly, Bankr. R. 9021 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided herein, Rule 58 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the [bankruptcy] Code.
Every judgment entered in an adversary proceeding or contested matter shall be
set forth on a separate document." We have held that the separate document
requirement of rule 9021 is identical to that of rule 58. Seiscom Delta, Inc.
v. Two Westlake Park (In re Seiscom Delta, Inc.), 857 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir.
1988).
5
of a separate lawsuit was improper in what essentially was an
appeal from the court's September 27, 1991, ruling, and it reiter-
ated the court's conclusion in its order of that date. By minute
entry dated June 18, 1992, the district court ordered the
Brashears' appeal dismissed.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) states that "[t]he courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judg-
ments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b)
of this section." 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. 1992).
Subsection (a) provides that "[t]he district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judg-
ments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in
cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under
section 157 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (Supp. 1992).
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A
judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as
provided in Rule 79(a)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.4
On June 24, 1992, the bankruptcy court entered an order dis-
charging the Brashears and approving the trustee's final report
and account. A final order "must generally be one that `ends the
litigation . . . and leaves nothing for the court to do but exe-
cute the judgment.'" Smith v. Seaside Lanes (In re Moody), 825

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5 In Foster Sec. v. Sandoz (In re Delta Servs. Indus.), 782 F.2d 1267
(5th Cir. 1986), this court stated that it must focus not only upon the final-
ity of the district court decision, but on the nature of the underlying bank-
ruptcy court order, to determine whether appellate jurisdiction exists. We
concluded that "we have jurisdiction only if the underlying bankruptcy court
order was final." Id.; see also Adams v. First Fin. Dev. Corp. (In re First
Fin. Dev. Corp.), 960 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
6 Eustis uses select language from the district court proceeding to
support its argument that the Brashears were really attempting to appeal a
second time from the bankruptcy court's interlocutory order. Eustis is cor-
rect in its assertion that an appeal based upon the bankruptcy court's earlier
interlocutory order and the district court's affirmance of that order, an
(continued...)
6
F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); County Management,
Inc. v. Kriegel (In Re County Management, Inc.), 788 F.2d 311, 313
(5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463 (1978)).5 In a bankruptcy case, there must be a "final deter-
mination of the rights of the parties to secure the relief they
seek in this suit" for an order to be considered final. Moody,
825 F.2d 81 (quoting Sandoz v. Crain Bros. (In re Emerald Oil
Co.), 694 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The order entered by the bankruptcy court discharging the
Brashears and approving the trustee's final report and account
finally determined the rights of the parties in the chapter 13
proceeding. The Brashears properly appealed from the bankruptcy
court's order to the district court pursuant to section 158(a).
Path-Sciences Lab., v. Greene County Hosp. (In re Greene County
Hosp.), 835 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820
(1988). After dismissing the Brashears' appeal on its own motion,
the district court issued a final order over which this court has
jurisdiction. Id. The district court's order constitutes a sepa-
rate document from which the Brashears can properly appeal.6

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6(...continued)
appeal that this court previously dismissed, would be improper. Eustis is
incorrect, however, in its contention that the Brashears' present appeal is
based upon the bankruptcy court's earlier order. The earlier order was inter-
locutory but has been followed by a order by the bankruptcy court discharging
the debtors. The Brashears appeal from that final order and may challenge the
bankruptcy and district courts' earlier orders in the present appeal as well.
See Picco, 900 F.2d at 849 n. 4 (appellant may challenge earlier interlocutory
order in appeal from final judgment).
Because the Brashears appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy
court, Eustis's argument that the Brashears' appeal is untimely pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) must fail. That rule reads, in pertinent part, "In a
civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district
court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from . . . ." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
The Brashears filed their notice of appeal on July 10, 1992, within 30 days of
the district court's dismissal of their appeal dated June 18, 1992.
Therefore, no timeliness problems arise.
Eustis also argues that we should dismiss the Brashears' appeal on res
judicata grounds. The test for determining whether a claim is barred by res
judicata is as follows:
For a prior judgment to bar an action on the basis of res judi-
cata, the parties must be identical in both suits, the prior judg-
ment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
there must have been a final judgment on the merits and the same
cause of action must be involved in both cases.
Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir.
1984). A district court's interlocutory order is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of final judgment. Golman v. Tesoro Drilling Corp., 700
F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). Accordingly, an
interlocutory order has no res judicata effect. See id. (holding that order
granting partial summary judgment is interlocutory and has no res judicata
effect). Therefore, the district court's previous order affirming the inter-
locutory order of the bankruptcy court is not a final judgment on the merits
and has no preclusive effect on the present appeal.
7
III.
We review the factual findings of the bankruptcy court under
the clearly erroneous standard. Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1464
(5th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist
Found. of Am.), 712 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1983). A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

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8
with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted." Id. at 209 (quoting United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Strict application of the
clearly erroneous rule is particularly important where the dis-
trict court has affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings. Id.
When a finding of fact is premised on an improper legal standard,
however, or a proper standard improperly applied, that finding
loses the insulation of the clearly erroneous rule. Id. We re-
view de novo the legal conclusions of the courts below. Besing v.
Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488, 1491 (5th Cir. 1993);
Bradley v. Pacific Southwest Bank (In re Bradley), 960 F.2d 502,
507 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993).
In this case, the bankruptcy court did not make any findings
of fact or conclusions of law when it reviewed the Brashears'
motion to hold Eustis in contempt. The bankruptcy court conducted
an evidentiary hearing, and on the basis of the statements of
counsel, testimony of witnesses, and review of the evidence pre-
sented, denied the Brashears' motion. The district court affirmed
without opinion.
This court may affirm if there are any grounds in the record
to support the judgment, even if those grounds were not relied
upon by the bankruptcy or district court. Besing, 981 F.2d at
1494. Even the complete lack of findings and conclusions by the
bankruptcy court on a material issue does not compel reversal if
we nevertheless can fully understand and resolve the issue on
appeal. Id.

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9
Section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
petition filed under chapter 13 operates as an automatic stay of
"any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title."
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1993). Section 362(h) further provides
that "[a]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may
recover punitive damages." 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1993).
A "willful violation" is "an intentional or deliberate act
done with knowledge that the act is in violation of the stay."
Lilly v. FDIC, 1990 WL 199281 (E.D. La. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Lilly v. FDIC (In re Natchez Corp.), 953 F.2d 184
(5th Cir. 1992); Homer Nat'l Bank v. Namie, 96 B.R. 652, 654 (W.D.
La. 1989). Section 362(h) creates a private remedy for an indi-
vidual injured by a willful violation of a section 362(a) stay.
City of Farmers Branch v. Pointer (In re Pointer), 952 F.2d 82, 86
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3035 (1992); Pettitt v.
Baker, 876 F.2d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1989).
The "act" that the Brashears claim constituted a violation of
the automatic stay is made up of what they characterize as re-
peated attempts by Eustis to collect attorneys' fees and late
charges. Prior to the hearing on the Brashears' motion, the bank-
ruptcy court had granted a motion brought by the Brashears re-
questing the court to hold Eustis in violation of the automatic
stay for attempting to collect attorneys' fees without permission

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7 The Brashears also point to two letters from Litton rejecting their
monthly payment. The amount Litton requested included charges for attorneys'
fees. According to Mr. Brashears' testimony, Litton acknowledged its error
and requested him to resubmit a check in the proper amount. Thereafter,
Litton once again returned the check. Mr. Brashears responded with a letter
that fully explained his position and the terms of the chapter 13 plan. The
record gives no indication that Litton thereafter continued to reject
payments.
10
from the court. In granting the motion, the court awarded the
Brashears attorneys' fees but did not find that Eustis's act in
violation of the stay was willful.
The Brashears testified in the March 25, 1991, hearing that
Eustis had continued in its attempts to collect fees and late
charges. The Brashears had requested a payout statement from
Litton in order to obtain the newly-approved loan from First
Coastal after the court had given them permission to refinance
their mortgage. Litton sent the Brashears a payout statement that
included late charges and fees. The inclusion of these fees
raised the total amount due on the mortgage, and First Coastal
refused to close on the new loan until an accurate payout
statement was received. The Brashears attempted unsuccessfully to
obtain a payout statement from Litton that did not indicate the
fees or late charges.7
Eustis's attorney admitted that Eustis had not obtained the
required court approval for collection of fees from the Brashears.
He emphasized, however, that Eustis never had attempted to collect
the fees indicated on the payout statements. The bankruptcy court
expressed its concern regarding the unapproved fees and late
charges but denied the Brashears' motion for contempt and
violation of the automatic stay. The court stated that if there

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11
were an improper claim, the appropriate action would have been for
the Brashears to object to the claim. The court indicated that it
would rule on attorneys' fees when the parties presented the court
with a motion to set fees or an objection to the fees filed in
Eustis' original proof of claim.
The Brashears argue that the bankruptcy court did not apply
the correct legal standard in ruling on their contempt motion, and
that, therefore, we should not give deference to the factual
findings of the bankruptcy court that were tainted by the legal
error. The Brashears urge that upon independent examination of
the testimony given in the hearing before the bankruptcy judge, we
must conclude that Eustis committed an act in violation of the
automatic stay and that Eustis's act was willful, rendering it
liable for damages pursuant to section 362(h).
The bankruptcy court's remarks in the transcript of the
hearing do not indicate that it used an incorrect legal standard.
The court did not set out the standard for a "willful violation"
of the automatic stay, as urged by the Brashears. We may infer
from his denial of the Brashears' motion, however, that the court,
after hearing the testimony presented, examining the documents,
and evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, did not find that
any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim in violation of the
automatic stay had occurred. The court first must find that an
act violative of the automatic stay occurred pursuant to section
362(a)(6) before it can determine whether a violation was
"willful" pursuant to section 362(h). A finding that such an act

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8 The Brashears engage in a detailed discussion of the facts surrounding
the charges for attorneys' fees that appeared on the payout statements. They
urge that they had reached an agreement with Eustis, embodied in a consent
order, in which Eustis dropped its request for fees in exchange for changing
the Brashears' payment due date. Eustis strongly denies this contention.
Whether an agreement was reached, however, is irrelevant. The bankruptcy
court acknowledged that Eustis had failed to obtain approval for charging fees
and took that fact into account when making its ruling on the Brashears'
motion.
12
occurred or did not occur is a finding of fact that we cannot
overturn absent clear error. No indication of clear error exists
on the record.8
Because no indication exists that the bankruptcy court's
finding that no act violative of the automatic stay had occurred
was clearly erroneous, we need not address the Brashears'
contention that the court should have awarded damages under
section 362(h), or, in the alternative, equitably subordinated
Eustis's claim. The court did not find that Eustis committed any
act in violation of the stay or that Eustis was guilty of any
misconduct.
Despite the lack of formal findings of fact or conclusions of
law by the bankruptcy court, an examination of the record enables
us to resolve this issue on appeal. No clear error exists in the
bankruptcy court's finding that no act violative of the automatic
stay occurred. The order from which the Brashears appeal is
AFFIRMED.

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