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1 Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
2 The two sets of orders were appealed separately, but have been
consolidated here. Frame's first appeal challenges seven orders of
the district court, all entered in 1992: the May 12 Order for
deposition and production of documents, the May 28 Judgment of
Contempt, the May 28 Order of Commitment, the May 29 denial of the
First Motion to Vacate Commitment Order, the June 1 denial of the
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-2513
No. 92-2726
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ALLEN JAMES, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
VERSUS
SUZANNE FRAME, ET AL.,
Defendants.
*********************
In Re: SUZANNE FRAME,
Appellant.
____________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA H-86-4589)
_____________________________________________________
(November 23, 1992)
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Suzanne Frame appeals two sets of contempt and commitment
orders, relating to post-judgment discovery.2 She is presently

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Second Motion to Vacate Order of Commitment, the June 3 Order of
Conditional Release, and the June 3 findings that certain entities
were fiscal agents of Frame. The second appeal challenges the
September 18 Judgment of Contempt, the September 18 Order of Civil
Commitment, the September 24 Revised Judgment of Contempt, and the
September 24 Revised Order of Civil Commitment.
3 Frame and two of her businesses initiated the suit in late
1986, but when numerous investors intervened, alleging that Frame's
original lawsuit was merely an attempt to obscure the true nature
of the relationships between the parties, the district court
realigned the parties. Frame thus became a defendant, and the
intervenors plaintiffs. See Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 196-
96 (5th Cir. 1992).
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imprisoned each weekend in the Harris County Jail in Houston,
Texas, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1826. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.
I.
This appeal arises out of protracted litigation involving an
investment scheme propounded by Frame for importing "grey market"
perfumes. Numerous investors sued Frame on various grounds,
including state and federal securities infringements, violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, common-law
fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.3
In April 1991, the investors obtained a default judgment against
Frame in excess of $10 million, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2), for failure to comply with discovery. This court
affirmed in part, reversing on the issue of damages. See Frame v.
S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1992).
A full explanation of the litigation's tortured and protracted
history appears in this court's prior opinion, see id. at 194-202,
and we will not repeat it here. It suffices to say that "[i]t is

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a story of gross abuse of discovery procedures tolerated much too
long by the district court", including deliberate destruction of
financial ledgers and other documents, repeated manipulation of the
district court's tolerance, and abuse of bankruptcy proceedings in
efforts to avoid discovery. Id. at 196-202. This appeal springs
from the post-judgment discovery process, which appears to include
more of the same behavior.
Post-judgment discovery began in November 1991, when the
district court gave the Appellees permission to propound
interrogatories, and requests for admission and for production of
documents and things upon Frame. On May 11, 1992, the court held
a hearing on the adequacy of Frame's responses to the discovery
requests, at which it concluded that her excuses for not responding
to certain requests were "completely unbelievable" and "wholly
incredible". Its May 12 order compelled Frame to appear for
deposition and produce the requested documents, warning that "[i]f
Frame fails to produce any of the records or answer any of the
[Appellees'] questions completely and truthfully, she will be held
in contempt of court." The court specifically asked Frame's
counsel: "[A]re there any questions about what your client[] is
supposed to do?" They responded in the negative.
On May 28, the day set for the deposition and production,
however, Frame still made only partial production. That afternoon,
the court held her in contempt and ordered her committed until she
complied. It stated:
What I have come to learn is that I may not trust
Ms. Frame; that she has had inconsistent under oath

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4 On October 19, the district court issued an order releasing
Frame from 10:00 a.m. Mondays to 3:00 p.m. Fridays "for the sole
purpose of assisting counsel". Several restrictions apply to her
release.
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explanations for a number of things.... It has
come to the point where she apparently has never
taken the authority of the court particularly
seriously. In a crunch, she has done the minimal.
It has consumed an inordinate amount of court's
time .... It has run up the costs of opposing
counsel; and yet today, given one more chance,
after I tried to make it clear and I tried to limit
the scope of the production and the time period
covered, we're back to the same thing: The lawyer
has it; the trustee has it; I threw it away; I
forgot which bank account I had; it was all
cash.... The time has long since passed that Ms.
Frame needs to obey the simplest rules .... She
has been disingenuous on her good days and
duplicitous consistently.
Following further partial compliance, the court conditionally
released Frame on June 3, 1992, requiring her to produce the
remaining documents. During the next months, however, Frame
continued to defy the court's orders; and on September 18, the
court again held Frame in contempt and ordered her committed. The
orders of contempt and commitment were revised on September 24, and
Frame remains incarcerated under those orders.4
II.
Frame contends that (1) the burden of proof was improperly
shifted to her, (2) the court's orders are impermissibly vague and
ambiguous, (3) there is insufficient evidence that she violated
those orders, (4) she has no real opportunity to purge the
contempt, and (5) the contempt orders were criminal, rather than
civil, requiring the district court to employ additional
procedures, which it did not do.

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An order of civil contempt must be based upon clear and
convincing evidence that (1) a court order was in effect, (2) the
order required certain conduct by the respondent, and (3) the
respondent failed to comply with the order. Martin v. Trinity
Industries, Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992). We review a
civil contempt order only for an abuse of discretion, id. at 46;
the underlying factual findings only for clear error. Id. at 46-
47; Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
1.
The burden of proof was not improperly shifted to Frame. The
court's rejection of her testimony and other evidence at the May 11
hearing regarding why she had failed to produce documents did not
constitute a shift in the burden of proof. Rather, the district
court simply found, as a matter of fact, that the evidence was not
credible.
At the May 28 hearing, the court began by stating to counsel
for the Appellees: "you have gone over the [material] that was
produced this morning and had your conversations in the deposition
with Ms. Frame, would you characterize for me those things which
you believe were not produced in response to my order." Appellees'
counsel responded by explaining, in detail, that gaps existed in
the checks and deposit records produced on Frame's bank accounts;
that no credit cards, charge slips, or monthly credit card
statements were produced; that the tax returns produced were
incomplete; and that no documents reflecting her relationship with
the various corporations involved were produced. This was the

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requisite clear and convincing evidence that Frame had not
satisfied the May 12 order.
Once the elements necessary to support the contempt order were
established, the burden properly shifted to Frame to prove either
compliance with the order or the inability to comply. Petroleos
Mexicanos v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th
Cir. 1987). As noted, the court rejected Frame's excuses.
Furthermore, it stated that to the extent her testimony could be
believed, her excuses went not to the impossibility of production,
but to inconvenience and difficulty. The proof was properly
developed; Frame simply failed to carry her burden.
2.
The orders were not vague and ambiguous. The first contempt
finding was based on Frame's violation of the May 12 order, which
required her to produce the following documents for the period
January 1, 1990, through May 28, 1992:
A. Copies of all deposits made by Frame to any
bank account.
B. Copies of all checks signed by Frame for any
account.
C. Complete records for every credit card Frame
has used.
D. Complete tax return records, including
corporate, personal, and franchise.
E. Any other document reflecting whether Frame is
an officer, director, or employee of any entity,
including any contracts signed by her or executed
by her.
F. Records of travel expenses, including hotel,
rental car, and airline for Frame's travel in any
capacity.

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G. The documentary history of her personal and
business expenses.
The order was neither vague nor ambiguous.
Frame's release on June 3 was conditioned on her producing the
remaining documents "exhibiting the consumption or manipulation of
economic resources from January 1, 1990, to June 1, 1992,"
including "all documents in her possession as well as those in the
possession of her fiscal agents, including Chazare, Inc., and her
brother." The September 18 contempt order provided that she could
"rid herself of her contempt by complying with this court's order
to disclose all documents that reflect her personal and financial
activities." That order was revised on September 24 to further
explain this scope of discovery; it stated that "Frame must turn
over documents relating to financial conduits that the court knows
about as well as those that have not been disclosed by Frame." The
original and revised September civil commitment orders stated that
Frame was required to "disclose all documents that reflect her
personal and financial activities, including sources and
application of all [resources] consumed, directed, disbursed,
acquired, negotiated, or held by her in any capacity." The
September 24 revised civil commitment order broadened the time
period to include documents covering July 1, 1985 to the present.
Although broad, these orders are not ambiguous, especially
when considered in the context, and against the backdrop, of the
entire discovery process. The clear purpose of the post-judgment
discovery is to locate Frame's assets in order to execute judgment
against her. The court orally explained that Frame was to "produce

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the records that will tell her creditors where the sources of her
funds and nature of her expenses have been so that they can ...
recover the money she took from them." The record contains several
volumes of transcripts from the various hearings discussing the
specific information sought by the Appellees.
It is sufficient that contempt orders be framed "so that those
who must obey them will know what the court intends to require and
what it means to forbid." International Longshoreman's Ass'n Local
1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
As the district court noted: "She knows what she is supposed to
produce. She has had plenty of time to seek clarification. She's
had plenty of time to seek assistance. She has not done it. She
has sat here and dissembled." There is no clear error in these
findings.
3.
There was the requisite clear and convincing evidence that
Frame violated the court's orders. Among many other things, the
district court found that Frame destroyed her passport or put it
beyond the Appellees' reach, that she failed to disclose the
existence of over five corporations under her control as well as
several personal bank accounts, and that she failed to provide
information on financial transactions discovered by the Appellees
totaling over $1 million. The record is replete with other
findings regarding Frame's evasive tactics. And, needless to say,
the district court judges Frame's credibility. It stated: "To
find that Miss Frame has not been candid in the disclosure of her

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affairs is one of the easiest findings I would ever have made."
The district court has devoted an incredible amount of time to
these proceedings. It has a complete and most impressive grasp of
the various transactions and documents in issue. Its findings of
fact are not clearly erroneous.
4.
Frame can purge the contempt. The district court set the
standard of compliance as "[s]ubstantial production that indicates
a reasonable effort to produce documents disclosing the location or
path of monies that Frame and her associates have controlled ...."
Frame has failed to this, and has failed to prove an inability to
comply.
Her contention appears to be that producing the documents
sought is impossible because they do not exist. The district
court, however, specifically found that such documents do exist and
that it is within Frame's power to produce them. In light of the
sheer volume of Frame's financial activity, the relative absence of
documentation of that activity, and her history of misleading, to
say the least, the district court in order to conceal her assets,
the district court's inferences were more than reasonable. We find
no clear error in its findings.
Frame destroyed her credibility with the district court
through her repeated abuses of the judicial process and evasive
tactics. The district court is not now required to accept her
self-serving assertion that the documents do not exist, when
indications exist to the contrary. As the district court

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5 As noted, the district court modified the commitment order on
October 19 in an effort to facilitate Frame's compliance by
allowing her to assist her counsel in locating the remaining
documents.
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explained, her only options at this final juncture are to produce
the long-awaited documents, to admit that she has destroyed them,
or to suffer the consequences of contempt.
5.
Finally, the contempt orders were civil, not criminal. They
were designed only to coerce compliance with the court's discovery
orders, not to punish Frame. Although the district court discussed
several times the possibility of seeking criminal prosecution
against Frame, it repeatedly rejected that avenue, emphasizing that
it desired only to coerce her into compliance with its orders.
Moreover, the district court made clear that it would make itself
available "at any time day or night" to determine whether Frame
made any progress toward substantial compliance, recognizing the
severity of the commitment orders.5
Expressions of the district court's understandable frustration
with Frame do not require the conclusion that it ordered contempt
in an effort to punish her. Furthermore, Frame's contention that
"[t]he order serves no remedial purpose beneficial to the
plaintiffs" ignores that imprisonment for contempt has proven
fruitful in getting Frame to comply. Both her initial imprisonment
and her present imprisonment have led to further, albeit still
limited, document production.

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III.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
holding Frame in civil contempt and ordering her committed, the
orders and judgments in issue, including the Revised Judgment of
Contempt, are
AFFIRMED.

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