(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide
particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and
burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not
be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-2387
Richard D. Glimes,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
City of Houston, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(CA H 88 1883)
March 10, 1993
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Background
The appellant, Richard Glimes, was employed as a
communications technician in the City of Houston Fire Department.
On October 30, 1986, during a training session taught by his
supervisor, Michael McGowen, Glimes shouted accusations and
obscenities at McGowen and then threatened him with a hammer, his

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fist, and a chair. Prior to this incident, Glimes had received a
three-day suspension for fighting with another employee. After
Glimes threatened him, McGowen recommended to his supervisors, Paul
Cline and Dale Everitt, that Glimes be discharged. Cline and
Everitt concurred with McGowen's recommendation and forwarded their
recommendation to Fire Chief Robert Clayton, who after giving
Glimes a pre-termination hearing, recommended to Mayor Whitmire
that Glimes be discharged.
After the Mayor discharged Glimes on March 27, 1987, Glimes
requested and received a full evidentiary hearing before the city's
civil service commission, which upheld the Mayor's discharge. On
June 1, 1988, Glimes sued the City of Houston, Mayor Whitmire,
Clayton, Everitt, Cline, Nelson, and McGowen, claiming rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). Glimes contended that they were liable because they
subjected him to disparate treatment in violation of Title VII and
because they terminated him in retaliation for his testimony in
another employee civil rights suit in violation of Title VII.
Some three years after this suit was filed and after discovery
had been completed, the defendants moved for summary judgment and
Glimes moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The district
court denied his motion to amend and subsequently entered a summary
judgment against Glimes in favor of all of the defendants.
We have carefully reviewed the circumstances surrounding
Glimes' motion for leave to amend and the order of the district
court denying such motion. Since discovery had been completed and

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a pretrial order filed, and since Glimes offered no explanation
whatsoever for his lateness in seeking to broaden the scope of his
law suit, we believe the decision of the trial court to deny the
motion to amend was well within the discretion which must
necessarily be accorded to trial judges in the control and
management of the trial process.
We have likewise reviewed carefully the motions for summary
judgment filed by the defendants and the summary judgment evidence
and testimony available to the trial judge in ruling on such
motions. We concur with the trial judge's determination that no
genuine issue of fact was raised by Glimes on his theory of
disparate treatment or on his theory that his termination for
abusive conduct was a pretext for termination because of his
testimony in the earlier law suit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the trial court.

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