(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 92-1665
No. 92-1735
Summary Calendar
_______________________
JEFFREY S. BALAWAJDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DON CARPENTER, Tarrant County
Sheriff, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
CA4 91 640 A
_________________________________________________________________
April 27, 1993
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jeffrey Balawajder, a TDCJ inmate, filed a pro se and in
forma pauperis 282-page civil rights suit against approximately 124
defendants, alleging that 24 causes of action for assorted
violations of his constitutional rights occurred while he resided
in the Tarrant County Jail as a pretrial detainee. In July 1992,

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2
the district court issued a memorandum order and opinion
determining that all of Balawajder's claims were time-barred by the
appropriate statute of limitations. Final judgment was entered
accordingly. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
A complaint filed in forma pauperis can be dismissed by
the court sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d). A complaint "`is frivolous where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.'" Denton v. Hernandez, U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992) (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338
(1989)). This Court reviews a § 1915(d) dismissal under the abuse-
of-discretion standard. Denton, 112 S.Ct. at 1734.
Usually the defense of limitations is an affirmative
defense which must be raised by the defendants in the district
court. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). However,
this court can consider a defense on appeal where it has been
raised sua sponte by the district court. Id.
Balawajder contends that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint based on the application of the pertinent
Texas statute of limitations. He argues that the district court
improperly determined the date of the filing of this action and
failed to apply the appropriate limitations period for a civil
conspiracy.
Balawajder is correct inasmuch as the district court
erred in finding the date of the filing of the complaint was
September 4, 1991. The date of receipt of the complaint by the

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1 Balawajder also brought a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520. As
§ 2520(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations, it also does not extend the
limitations period.
3
clerk (July 3, 1991), rather than the formal filing date
(September 4, 1991), governs the time for limitations purposes.
Martin v. Demma, 831 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1987).
Balawajder brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986. Because there is no federal statute of limitations
for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, federal
courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations
period. Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 352, 334 (5th Cir. 1987). In
Texas, the applicable period is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986). Unlike §§ 1983 and 1985, § 1986 has
its own statute of limitations which requires commencement of a
suit within one year after the cause of action accrues. This does
not make the time period longer in the context of the present
case.1
While state law governs the limitations period, federal
law governs when the cause of action arises. Burrell v. Newsome,
883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989). Under that standard, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury which forms the basis of the action. Id.
Balawajder does not contest that the applicable statute
of limitations is two years. Rather, he argues that because he was
injured by a conspiracy, the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the last overt act pursuant to the conspiracy was
committed. This argument is without merit. Because the actionable

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civil injury to Balawajder resulted from the overt acts of the
defendants, not from the mere continuation of a conspiracy, his
characterization of the events as occurring in the course of a
conspiracy does not extend the time when the statute of limitations
began to run. Helton, 832 F.2d at 335.
It is apparent from the face of Balawajder's complaint
that he was aware of the alleged wrongs done to him during the
times alleged in his complaint. Thus, because Balawajder's
complaint was received on July 3, 1991, all of his claims occurring
prior to July 3, 1989, are barred by the Texas two-year statute of
limitations. To avoid this consequence, Balawajder argues that the
statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case.
"[F]ederal courts possess the power to use equitable
principles to fashion their own tolling provisions in exceptional
situations in which state statutes of limitations eradicate rights
or frustrate policies created by federal law." Rodriguez v.
Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 1992). No exceptional
circumstances exist here. The claims Balawajder alleges should be
equitably tolled -- access to the courts, access to the mails,
inadequate medical care, and overcrowded, inadequate jail
conditions -- do not implicate the constitutionality of his state
court conviction. There was no impediment, nor does Balawajder
allege one, to the filing of a civil rights action on these claims.
Indeed, he did file a previous civil rights suit alleging many of
the same claims against many of the same defendants. As Balawajder
fails to present circumstances indicating that this is an

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"exceptional situation" that would warrant equitable tolling, we
reject his argument.
The district court determined that the complaint alleged
"facts, acts, and omissions giving rise to this action [that]
occurred . . . through May 14, 1989." However, Balawajder's
complaint, read liberally, may allege that he was denied postage in
violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts
through September 1989. Rec. on Appeal 1, 169, 282. He does not
state, however, that this alleged denial of postage after July 3,
1989, interfered with his ability to prosecute his pending court
cases. The complaint also alleges that Balawajder was subjected to
illegal wiretapping, denied access to an adequate law library, and
denied religious freedom throughout his detention at the Tarrant
County Jail (June 14, 1987, through September 12, 1989). Rec. 44-
47, 105-06, 169. Balawajder cites other portions of his complaint
that allegedly involve constitutional violations committed within
two years prior to the filing of his complaint. Rec. 166, 170,
263-81.
Because Balawajder has alleged a few claims that may have
arisen after July 3, 1989, and therefore, if viable, would not be
time-barred, we must remand for the district court to determine, in
the first instance, whether such claims exist and to proceed with
those which do.
In so doing, however, we suggest that the first order of
business will be to require Balawajder to re-plead carefully the
alleged constitutional violations he suffered from and after

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July 3, 1989, identifying specifically which defendants
participated in which incidents. Neither this court nor the
district court has the time to sort through vague charges against
dozens of defendants. Balawajder has filed a number of lawsuits
and can be held accountable for reasonably sophisticated pro se
legal efforts. If he uses this lawsuit to harass or vex the courts
or prison authorities, sanctions should be imposed. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED insofar as it bars litigation of causes of action that
occurred before July 3, 1989, and REVERSED to the extent the
complaint alleges claims that occurred after that date, and
REMANDED for further proceedings.

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