Summary Calendar LETITIA DUMAS v. Christian Health Ministries

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
May 16, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 05-30726
Summary Calendar
_______________________
LETITIA DUMAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHRISTIAN HEALTH MINISTRIES; BAPTIST COMMUNITY MINISTRIES;
EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY, INC; ST PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
No. 2:05-CV-285
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Letitia Dumas challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Christian Health
Ministries (“Christian Health”) and Baptist Community Ministries.
Agreeing that Dumas has not demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact, we AFFIRM.

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I. BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed. Dumas, an African-American
woman, was hired by Christian Health in October 2000 as a Nurse
Coordinator. Dumas was subsequently terminated from that position
in February 2001; Dumas’s supervisors cited poor performance due to
her lack of qualifications as reasons for her termination. On
December 7, 2001, Dumas filed suit in Louisiana state court
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Louisiana’s
Anti-Discrimination statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:333. Named as
defendants were Appellees and their insurers, Executive Risk
Indemnity Inc. (“Executive Risk”), and St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. (“St. Paul”). On December 15, 2004, the district
court dismissed Executive Risk from the suit because Christian
Health failed to comply with the notice provisions of its insurance
policy. On January 27, 2005, Dumas revealed that she sought
recovery of punitive damages under federal and state law. The case
was removed to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) and on April 20, 2005, the district court granted
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Dumas’s
claims. On June 2, 2005, the district court granted St. Paul’s
motion for summary judgment, and the company was dismissed from the
suit. Accordingly, the district court entered judgment on June 7,
2005, dismissing Dumas’s suit in its entirety. Dumas timely
appealed, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1291 to hear the appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.
Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2004).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED R. CIV. P. 56(C); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 312-33, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986).
On a motion for summary judgment, a court must review the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Walker v. Thompson,
214 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2000). In this case, we must decide
whether the district court correctly determined that Dumas had
failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to defeat Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
The initial burden in an employment discrimination case
is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 142; 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). This burden is
satisfied by proving that (1) the plaintiff is part of a protected
class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) has suffered an
adverse action by the employer, and (4) was replaced by someone

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outside the protected class. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d
715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002).
In the instant case, Dumas’s prima facie case fails
because she has neither shown she was qualified for the position nor
that she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class.
A careful review of the record reveals Dumas was not qualified for
the Nurse Coordinator position at the time she was hired. The
undisputed evidence shows that she lacked the level of nursing
experience required for her position, did not possess a graduate
degree, and could not satisfactorily fulfill her job duties. The
district court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment was
proper.
AFFIRMED.

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