Paredes v. The City of Odessa, et al

04-50434Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit28 févr. 2005

Texte intégral

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 28, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-50434
Summary Calendar
BERNARDO PAREDES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF ODESSA; Etc.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
THE CITY OF ODESSA; CHRISTOPHER C. PIPES, In His Capacity as
Commander of the Odessa Police Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:00-CV-78
--------------------
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bernardo Paredes appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and its dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
against the City of Odessa (the “City”). Paredes’s motion for
leave to file a reply brief out-of-time is GRANTED.
Paredes challenges the district court’s determination that
he did not provide evidence connecting the City to the alleged

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No. 04-50434
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unconstitutional acts that occurred on March 21, 1998. Paredes
asserts that the district court misapplied the summary judgment
standard of review; he contends that the district court did not
draw all reasonable inferences in his favor, disregarded his
testimony, made credibility determinations, and weighed his
testimony.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we apply the
same standards as the district court and consider the evidence
and inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. See Olabisiomotosho v. Houston,
185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is proper if
the pleadings and discovery “show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
In response to the City’s motion for summary judgment,
Paredes was required to set forth specific facts showing the
existence of a genuine issue for trial; that is, he was required
to identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the
manner in which that evidence established that a City employee
was involved in the incident. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Johnson
v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d
293, 301 (5th Cir. 2004).
Paredes did not produce competent summary judgment evidence
sufficient to meet his burden. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
Paredes’s self-serving reference to the Odessa Police, made

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No. 04-50434
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during his deposition, is not the type of “significant probative
evidence” required to defeat summary judgment. United States v.
Lawrence, 276 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Paredes’s failure to establish that an
employee of the City committed the acts that caused the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights defeats his claims of
liability against the City. Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 529.
Additionally, Paredes appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his claims based on the City’s policies and custom. The
summary judgment evidence in the record does not support
Paredes’s assertion that there was a lack of training regarding
General Order 400 or a custom formulated due to the lack of
enforcement of General Order 1500 and that these inadequacies
caused the violation of Paredes’s constitutional rights. See
Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the lack of evidence presented on causation and
training). Accordingly , the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Paredes has abandoned any appeal of the dismissal of the
claims that he asserted under state and federal law against the
Odessa Police Department, Motel 6, Motel 6 Manager Isaac Hughes,
two unnamed Odessa police officers, “Does 1-5,” and Christopher
C. Pipes. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,
813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (we will not raise and discuss
legal issues that the appellant has failed to assert).

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No. 04-50434
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AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.

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