Mora v. Ashcroft

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 26, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 04-41434
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ELIAS MORA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:03-CV-73
__________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

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the government for the following reasons:
1. The investigation was a discrete act occurring more than 45 days
before Mora sought counseling with the EEOC and Mora’s claims
based on the investigation and his ineligibility for promotions, training,
or assignments pending the investigation are thus time-barred. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.105(a) (2005); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). At the very latest, Mora should have
known to assert his rights when he received the recommendation of
suspension in October 2001. See Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312
F.3d 178, 181-82 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s cause of
action accrued when the employer notified him of its alleged
discriminatory decision to change his status, not when his status was
changed in the future, because “an employee’s claim accrues at the
moment the employee believes (or has reason to believe) that he is the
victim of discrimination.”). That Mora continued to feel the effects of
the investigation into the limitations period when he received the
admonishment letter does not transform the investigation into a
continuing violation. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.
1998).

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2. Mora’s claims regarding the admonishment letter and the allegedly
retaliatory investigation into his alleged improper use of a government
vehicle fail, although timely, because neither the investigation nor the
letter amount to an adverse employment action. E.g., Watts v. Kroger
Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[E]mployment actions are not
adverse where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the
same.”); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Title
VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions,” such as
hiring, firing, compensating, and promoting).
Affirmed.

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