Summary Calendar HUEY GRANGER v. WILLIAM SLADE, Individually

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 12, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-60491
Summary Calendar
HUEY GRANGER
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
WILLIAM SLADE, Individually and In His Official Capacity as Chief
of Police for the City of Pearl, MS, KEITH PETERSON, Individually
and In his Official Capacity as Police Officer for the City of
Pearl, MS, JEFF TIMS, Individually and In His Official Capacity
as a Police Officer for the City of Pearl, MS; JACK B. BRENEMEN
Defendants - Appellees
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:02-CV-1309
--------------------
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Huey Granger appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion seeking to enjoin the appellees from prosecuting him on
state criminal charges and denying his request for
reconsideration of a protective order.

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No. 03-60491
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Granger argues that appellate jurisdiction exists over the
district court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). While
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides appellate jurisdiction over the
portion of the district court’s order relating to the denial of
injunctive relief, it does not provide appellate jurisdiction
over the portion of the district court’s order relating to the
protective order. See Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 204-
05, fn.18 (5th Cir. 1992).
The protective order issued by the district court is
designed to shape the changing needs of the litigation and
subject to continued modification by the district court. The
order that is on appeal did not alter the inconclusive nature of
the protective order. The order thus is not appealable as a
final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Sherwinski v.
Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996). The inconclusive
nature of the order also indicates that it is not appealable
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See A-Mark Auction
Galleries, Inc. v. American Numismatic Ass’n, 233 F.3d 895, 898-
99 (5th Cir. 2000). That portion of the appeal concerning issues
that Granger raises in connection with the protective order is
therefore DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Granger argues that the district court erred when it denied
his motion for injunctive relief. He asserts that the appellees
are threatening to pursue criminal charges against him in
Mississippi state court in bad faith. A federal court should

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No. 03-60491
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abstain from interfering with state criminal proceedings except
under extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 53-54 (1971). Granger has failed to show that an exception
to Younger is warranted because he has failed to show that the
appellees have undertaken a prosecution in bad faith. See Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); see also Kugler v. Helfant,
421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975). The district court’s ruling denying
Granger’s request for injunctive relief is therefore AFFIRMED.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.

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