Clouatre v. Runyon

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 12, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
No. 03-30299
Summary Calendar
_______________
WAYNE CLOUATRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MARVIN RUNYON,
POSTMASTER GENERAL; ET AL.,
Defendants,
MARVIN RUNYON,
POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 97-3540-C
_________________________

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2
Before SMITH, DEMOSS, and STEWART,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Wayne Clouatre appeals the dismissal of his
claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794.1 For reasons largely articu-
lated in the opinion of the magistrate judge sit-
ting by agreement, we affirm.
Clouatre sued the Postmaster General, as-
serting that a pattern of harassment from his
supervisors caused him to suffer substantially
and to develop a mental disability.2 Clouatre
claimed that the Postal Service failed to ac-
commodate this disability and improperly ter-
minated his employment.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the
court entered judgment in favor of the Post-
master General and dismissed Clouatre’s claim
with prejudice, based on Clouatre’s failure to
produce evidence indicating what kind of ac-
commodation the Postal Service should have
afforded.3 Even if one assumes that Clouatre
effectively notified the employer of his mental
disability,4 an employee has an obligation to
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 The Rehabilitation Act states, in part, “No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in
the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of
this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his dis-
ability[,] be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance or . . . by the United States Postal Ser-
vice.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The statute tracks the
language of the Americans with Disabilities Act in
determining whether a violation has occurred with
regard to an employment decision. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(d).
2 Couatre displayed symptoms of depression
following complications arising from the unique
and substantial health problems of his daughter.
After Richard Palisi became postmaster at Cloua-
tre’s station, Palisi asked his employees to take on
additional workloads. Clouatre refused. Palisi and
other supervisors cited Clouatre for numerous tech-
nical violations concerning the delivery of his mail;
they rarely, if ever, cited other employees for sim-
ilar violations. Clouatre complained of increased
(continued...)
2(...continued)
stress, his behavior became erratic, and he request-
ed assistance for his deliveries. He eventually
sought psychiatric treatment.
3 To establish a prima facie claim of intentional
discrimination, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) he or
she suffers from a disability; (2) he or she is qual-
ified for the job; (3) he or she was subject to an ad-
verse employment action; and (4) he or she was re-
placed by a non-disabled person or was treated less
favorably than non-disabled employees.’” Burch
v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir.
1997) (quoting Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70
F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995)). As part of proving
he is a “qualified individual,” a disabled plaintiff
must illustrate that, “with or without reasonable
accommodation, [he] can perform the essential
functions of the employment position [he] holds or
desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
4 The court, arguendo, assumed that a combi-
nation of Clouatre’s increasingly odd behavior and
his requests to management to “back off” sufficed
to alert his supervisors that something warranted
their attention. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.
Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1999). Such
odd behavior included switching delivery routes on
a frequent basis, requesting help for routine deliv-
eries, and substantially underperforming on the
(continued...)

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3
state how the employer may accommodate
him.5
Clouatre produced no evidence showing
that he gave an indication to management as to
how it could accommodate him in a reasonable
fashion. Although the Postal Service may not
have performed the most effective examination
of Clouatre, the court did not err in holding
that the employer participated in the process of
exploring Clouatre’s condition.6 Additionally,
as the court noted, at the time of Clouatre’s
termination, his mental state deteriorated to
such an extent7 that the Postal Service could
not have made any accommodation that would
have allowed him to remain in his position.
Consequently, the court did not err in finding
that Clouatre did not produce ample evidence
that he had notified the Postal Service of a
needed accommodation.8
Thus, Clouatre failed to prove a claim un-
der the Rehabilitation Act. Although the con-
duct of his supervisors is troubling,9 Clouatre
may not pursue his claim in this form.
AFFIRMED.
4(...continued)
amount of mail delivered in a shift. We do not ex-
press an opinion as to whether one may notify an
employer of a disability merely through actions and
informal statements rather than through a more for-
malized declaration.
5 “Where the disability, resulting limitations,
and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not
. . . apparent to the employer, as is often the case
when mental disabilities are involved, the initial
burden rests primarily upon the employee, or his
health-care provider, to specifically identify the dis-
ability . . . and to suggest the reasonable ac-
commodations.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group,
93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). Such a notifica-
tion triggers a duty on the part of the employer “to
participate in the interactive process of determin-
ing” an accommodation. Id.
6 In certain instances, the employee’s disability
will be such that the employer “may have an extra
duty to explore the employee’s condition.” Loul-
seged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 n.5
(5th Cir. 1999). Here, the court determined that
the Postal Service, by conducting a fitness-for-duty
examination of Clouatre, sufficiently explored his
condition to satisfy whatever duty it may have
owed.
7 Shortly after Clouatre’s termination, a psychi-
atrist who treated him diagnosed a disabling med-
ication condition that precluded “useful service” in
the Postal Service. Eventually, in interviews with
a psychiatrist, Clouatre made threatening state-
ments against some of his former supervisors.
8 We review the court’s findings of fact for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. Coggin v.
Longview Indep. Sch. Dist., 289 F.3d 326, 330
(5th Cir. 2002).
9 The court stated that “[m]uch of the behavior
directed toward [Clouatre] was unjust and inhu-
mane . . . . This, however, does not bring plaintiff
under the protection of the Rehabilitation Act.”
Because he is a federal employee, Clouatre may not
sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act or similar
state tort statutes. See, e.g,. Bennett v. Barnett,
210 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
postal employee’s emotional distress claims
brought against the Postal Service, under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, were preempted by the Fed-
eral Employees’ Compensation Act); Rollins v.
Marsh, 937 F.2d 134, 138-40 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Civil Service Reform Act precluded
suit under Federal Tort Claims Act).

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