O'Brien v. Lucent Technol Inc

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 14, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-11227
Summary Calendar
RICHARD O’BRIEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:00-CV-1294-L)
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard O’Brien appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer,
Defendant-Appellee Lucent Technologies, Inc., dismissing O’Brien’s
action for breach of contract following the at-will termination of
his employment; specifically, Lucent’s refusal to grant various
stock option and stock purchase benefits. Having carefully
reviewed the summary judgment record, the comprehensive opinion of
the district court, the appellate arguments of counsel in their

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respective appellate briefs, and the applicable law, we are
satisfied that the rulings of the district court should be
affirmed.
Counsel for both parties have favored this court with
excellent briefing, presenting their respective legal positions
forcefully yet professionally, identifying the issues and advancing
their arguments cogently and clearly. In the end, however, the
legal arguments advanced by O’Brien to reverse the district court’s
dismissal of his action on summary judgment do not carry the day.
The district court correctly ruled that the express choice of
Delaware law in the Stock Option Agreement applies, and that ruling
is not erroneous in being based on the plain wording of that
Agreement only. Neither is there anything in the summary judgment
record to implicate that O’Brien’s termination by Lucent implicated
a denial or forfeiture of benefits as a matter of timing or
purpose. In the end, we are convinced that the careful analysis
set forth in the district court’s Order filed October 20, 2003
squarely hits the mark.
Primarily for the reasons given by the district court, its
grant of Lucent’s motion for summary judgment dismissing O’Brien’s
action, its denial of O’Brien’s motion for partial summary
judgment, and its rejection of O’Brien’s request for attorneys’
fees are, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.

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