United States v. Betancis-Avalos

1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 26, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50623
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARCELIA MARIA BETANCIS-AVALOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. EP-01-CR-1559-DB
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Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Arcelia Maria Betancis-Avalos, a former communications officer
with the United States consulate in Juarez, Mexico, appeals her
jury convictions for four counts of accepting bribes and gratuities
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C) and § 201(c)(1)(B).
Betancis contends that the district court abused its discretion by
prohibiting the cross-examination of a Government witness with the
witness’ prior, dismissed, drug charges and alleged pro-Government

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bias. Betancis also contends that the evidence was insufficient to
find her guilty on counts two, three, and four of the indictment.
Betancis’ counsel cross-examined the Government witness with
the fact that she was testifying under an agreement with the
Government that had resulted in the dismissal of her own bribery
indictment, facts from which the jury could infer that the witness
was biased. See United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th
Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the scope of the examination satisfied
the confrontation clause. See Restivo, 8 F.3d at 278. Nothing in
the witness’ testimony in the bill of particulars creates an
inference that she was biased toward the Government on account of
the dismissed drug charges; Betancis therefore has not demonstrated
that the district court’s limitation of cross-examination was
clearly prejudicial to her. See id. at 278 & n.12.
Betancis’ sufficiency challenge fails. The jury could infer
from the evidence that Betancis received cash and other gratuities
“in return for” expediting visas, as alleged in count three. See
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369,
1380-81 (5th Cir. 1995). The jury also could infer that the money
and other benefits received by Betancis were linked to specific
instances of expediting visas, as alleged in counts two and four.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,
526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999).
AFFIRMED.

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