FDIC v. Gold Park Devel

*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 18, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-40814
_____________________
TESORO SAVINGS & LOAN; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
TARECO PROPERTIES INC, the successor in interest of
plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as
Manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GOLD PARK DEVELOPMENT; ET AL.,
Defendants,
STEVE MORRISS,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(USDC Nos. L-92-14 & L-92-15)
March 18, 2003
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant Steve Morriss appeals a district court order denying
his request for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Morriss argues
that the district court erred by not giving preclusive effect to a

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prior interlocutory order of the Chancery Court of Williamson
County, Tennessee, which concluded that Morriss was not served with
written notice of the removal of this case to federal court and
with the summary judgment motion that gave rise to the judgment
entered against him and that the judgment entered against him in
this case was, therefore, void on due process grounds.
After consideration of the briefs, the oral arguments, and the
record in this case, we are convinced that the district court did
not err in denying Morriss’ motion for relief. Morriss has failed
to convince us that we are required to give preclusive effect to
the findings of the Tennessee Chancery Court – findings in a
tentative order that merely reversed a grant of summary judgment
against Morriss without conclusively adjudicating the rights of the
parties. Morriss has also failed to establish that he did not
receive actual notice of the removal of his case to federal court
or the motion for summary judgment filed against him. Morriss’
failure to make this showing is fatal to his due process argument
and his request for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) because
without such a showing Morriss cannot establish the existence of a
procedural error of constitutional significance or any meaningful
prejudice against him.
Furthermore, we agree with the district court that any lack of
actual notice and opportunity to be heard was due primarily to
Morriss’ own failure to monitor the litigation, clarify his
apparent pro se status, and notify the courts and the parties of an

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address at which he could be served. Because Morriss has failed to
show that he met his own procedural obligations in state or federal
court, he can not reasonably complain now that the FDIC’s failure
to serve him amounts to a prejudicial, constitutional error.
Morriss cannot reap a windfall from circumstances for which he is
ultimately responsible. Cf. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown,
84 F.3d 137, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1996). Consequently, we affirm the
order of the district court.
AFFIRMED.

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