Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 9, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 02-31169
Summary Calendar
___________________
IRMA J. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SEARS ROEBUCK & COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
01-CV-2714
_________________________________________________________________
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Irma Johnson appeals the summary judgment awarded Sears
Roebuck & Company against her employment discrimination claim
(employee's religious practice) under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., and the denial of her motion for sanctions, pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4)(A), for Sears’ conduct regarding discovery.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g. Weber v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2000). “Summary
judgment shall be entered in favor of the moving party, if the

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record, taken as a whole, shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The denial of Rule 37 sanctions
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. E.g., Tollett v. City of
Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 105
(2002).
Johnson was not hired as a stocker by Sears because of her
refusal, based on her religious beliefs, to wear pants. The
district court held that Sears could not reasonably accommodate
Johnson’s beliefs without undue hardship on its business. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Having reviewed the record and the parties’
briefs, the summary judgment was properly granted, essentially for
the reasons stated by the district court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Johnson’s Rule 37 (a)(4)(A) sanctions motion.
AFFIRMED

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