United States v. Rodriguez

1Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 01-11062
Summary Calendar
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OSCAR RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:97-CR-257-18-G
______________________
July 1, 2002
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
Oscar Rodriguez was originally sentenced to a 262-month prison term for drug-trafficking
conspiracy and a concurrent 240-month term for distribution, as well as concurrent terms of five
and three-years’ supervised release. On direct appeal, these convictions were affirmed, but we
found that Rodriguez’s criminal history should be Category I rather than Category II and

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remanded the cause for re-sentencing. Rodriguez’s sentencing range as determined using a
Category II criminal history was from 262 to 327 months; with a Category I criminal history the
sentence could range from 235 to 293 months.
Rodriguez asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pro se motion
to replace his court-appointed counsel. Rodriguez fails to brief this claim, however, and has thus
effectively abandoned it. See Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1995). This court may
still exercise jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s unbriefed claim, if there is a possibility of a grave
injustice or if substantial public interests are involved. See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d
434, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, however, Rodriguez’s 260-month sentence (the same as he
initially received) was a standard guideline sentence that roughly split the lower and upper limits
for a Category I criminal history. Thus, this court need not consider this unbriefed issue.
Rodriguez also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not granting his pro
se motion to dismiss the indictment and by not conducting a hearing a hearing to determine the
court’s jurisdiction to resentence him. The court did, however, address its jurisdiction over
Rodriguez at the re-sentencing hearing. Though this court reviews the sufficiency of an
indictment de novo, United States v. Moreci, 283 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2002), Rodriguez fails
to present an argument on this claim as well. It, too, is effectively abandoned. See Al-Ra’id, 69
F.3d at 33.
AFFIRMED.
1

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